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Abstract1 
In our first study (Chapter 3) we investigate valuation bias in the UK. stock 
market by examining the valuation of new stocks relative to survivor stocks as new stocks 
have relatively higher valuations with the valuation gap increases in: bullish markets and 
vice versa. The value explanatory model and individual fundamental factor tests 
developed provide evidence of a negative significant relation between age and value. This 
does not seem to be backed by any known economic rationale given that new stocks 
showed lower profitability levels, no concrete evidence of materialised higher growth or 
lower risk which is inconsistent with their relatively higher valuations indicating that 
valuation bias could well be present. 
The evidence in the first study does not imply that valuation of survivor stocks is 
rational or otherwise. Hence, in our second study (Chapter 4), we seek evidence on 
valuation bias at the stock market aggregate level where the occurrence of major 
divergences between stock prices on one side and economic growth and equity invested 
capital on the other, followed by subsequent price falls (corrections) is evident. The 
evidence obtained shows: (a) low earnings yields using theoretical and empirical models 
under plausible scenarios, (b) no changes in corporate profitability pattern that could 
explain stock price levels, (c) a cyclical gap between implied growth and economic 
growth, (d) that implied growth was almost always higher than both economic and 
earnings realised growth, and finally (e) the implied average equity risk premium 
compared with the evidence in the literature and the market unbiased expected return 
appears to underestimate risk revealing a paradox of high return expectations driving 
prices up implying lower equity risk premium. The evidence on balance, suggests that 
stock price levels in the UK. during 1989-2002 cannot be explained by fundamentals and 
the idea of temporary mispricing is not supported by strong evidence leaving the door 
open to argue the presence of overvaluation on average during 1989-2002. 
One of the implications of valuation bias and stock age is that investors are 
relatively more limited in exaggerating the potential of survivor stocks because of the 
better investment knowledge available about them compared to new stocks. Thus, in our 
third study (Chapter 5), we seek evidence for the role of 'investment knowledge' in 'stock 
price rationalisation' from property investment stocks exploiting the special investment 
characteristics of their underlying assets and operations. We establish the presence of a 
significant and enduring market discount to the underlying value for property investment 
stocks. We test the hypothesis that property investment stocks discount is a reflection of 
investment knowledge-based rationality that limits valuation bias for these stocks. In 
testing the hypothesis, we establish knowledge-based rational explanations for property 
stocks market valuation or discount. The evidence from return differential, operating 
expenses, capital gains risk, leverage risk, and the stability of property stock prices, 
unlike the overall stocks market, relative to the economy and the underlying value leads 
towards not rejecting the null hypothesis. 
II Each of the three main chapters 3, 4, and 5 has its own more comprehensive abstract at its 
outset. 
x 
1 Chapter One: Introduction 
1 Chapter One: Introduction 
Bias as a notion can be found in too many areas and walks of life. Bias in 
equity valuation would be one type of investor behavioural biases that would fit 
under behavioural finance.2 Valuation bias would exist if equity valuations were 
different for different groups of stocks in a way that is inconsistent with, or 
unsubstantiated by, the differences between their underlying corporate and 
economic fundamentals that determine value. Bias would also exist if overall 
stock market levels were inconsistent with the underlying economic and corporate 
fundamentals of value. 
Therefore, for this thesis, valuation bias is defined as the case when valuation 
levels or differences are driven by investor expectations that are inconsistent with 
fundamental corporate and economic factors. 
It is important to clarify that valuation bias in this thesis deals with (a) bias in 
valuing a category of stocks relative to other stock categories, such as the market 
valuation of new stocks relative to older stocks (Chapter 3), and (b) bias relative 
to value fundamentals, such as on the overall stock market levels (Chapter 4). 
The reader's attention is drawn to the specific meaning and interpretation of the 
term valuation bias in this thesis. Of course, as with many terms, the use of the 
term valuation bias is not perfect or free from abuse. However, the research 
tackles investor behaviour with respect to valuation emphasising behavioural bias 
explanations for valuation differences and value levels amongst stock age groups 
and against fundamentals. Thus, the term would fit this context given the wide use 
of the term bias in behavioural finance literature (behavioural biases) especially 
that using mis-valuation or mis-pricing is problematic too as fair value levels are 
unknown and they do not emphasise the behavioural aspects explicitly. 
2 Valuation bias should not be mixed with survivorship bias, as the fonner is related to market 
behaviour and not to performance measurement in research. The idea of survivorship bias is not 
new, it is known as a technical or statistical measurement issue in empirical research. 
2 
Valuation bias would be a systematic tendency for mis-valuation. The evidence of 
this thesis, as shown later, would suggest that for the period understudy. Mis-
valuation is due to investor behaviour, hence, while the term bias conveys this 
message, the degree and persistence of bias will always be debatable. The length 
of the period for which unexplained value levels, fluctuations and differences 14 
years is reasonably long for the modem economic era. The long-standing evidence 
on IPOs systematic long-term underperformance that our evidence meets, as 
shown in Chapter 3, backs the use for the term bias as far as persistency is 
concerned. Also, some researchers such as Sougiannis and Yaehura (200 I) used 
similar term 'Bias of Equity Values' in the context of stock valuation.3 
Figure 1-1 illustrates the process of market valuation/stock pricing based 
on basic economic and investment logic. It shows equity valuation as an ex ante 
estimate for the values of firms based on conditional expectations. The process is 
built on translating available relevant information into forecast and then into value 
estimate through a valuation model, and with supply and demand forces the 
market price is shaped. The figure shows that errors and bias can occur because of 
wrong investor expectations, flawed pricing model, flawed model interpretation, 
and mainly because human behaviour is involved in the entire process. 
Therefore, it is not difficult to agree that this market process, by its very nature 
and structure, is susceptible to biased behaviour in pricing and trading different 
stock categories, leave alone aggregate market mispricing. 
3 Bias in life could be in one/several position(s), one/several case(s), some period(s) ... or 
systematic/persistent. Bias in this thesis is clearly different from the statistical reference to bias. 
The reference to bias in the thesis is limited to the above clarification presented in this 
Introduction. 
3 
Available relevant information 
[Past, current and expected] 
Translated, through a valuation framework, into: 
Forecast and then Value Estimate 
Different participants: Different value estimates 
with Supply & Demand forces 
/ 
Market Price / 
~------' 
Figure 1-1. The Process of Equity Pricing 
An important part of the motivation for this work is the severe fluctuation 
In stock market levels that do not seem to accord with any robust economic 
explanation. We sympathise with Shiller (2001) that the stock market ups and 
downs over the last century have made virtually no sense ex post, because we 
initially believe that stock prices are often driven by complex investor 
expectations rather than by the underlying corporate and economic fundamentals. 
This thesis covers three main studies: 
• Valuation Bias and Stock Age: New Stocks versus Survivors. Under which we 
investigate the presence of valuation bias through examining whether 
differences in fundamentals can explain the evident differences in market 
valuation between new and older stocks as the former have relatively higher 
valuations. Chapter 3. 
• Stock Market Levels in the UK: Earnings Yield, Growth, and Return 
Expectations. The first study does not address whether survivor stocks' 
valuation or overall stock market levels are reasonable. Therefore, the second 
study deals with valuation bias at stock market level by investigating whether 
stock market levels in the UK during the period 1989-2002 can be explained 
4 
by fundamentals such as reasonable expected profitability, expected growth 
and/or risk levels or whether stock prices on average over time are correctly 
valued against fundamentals with occasional mispricing. Otherwise, stock 
market levels in the UK could be overvalued, on average, relative to 
fundamentals. Chapter 4. 
• Investment Knowledge and Stock Price Rationalisation: Evidence from 
Property Investment Stocks. The third and final study in this thesis starts from 
one of the implications of the first study that investors might have been more 
able to exaggerate the potential of new stocks relative to survivor stocks as the 
market knows relatively more about older stocks. Hence, in the context of 
'valuation bias in the stock market' we study the role of 'investment 
knowledge' in 'stock price rationalisation' exploiting the special investment 
characteristic of property investment stocks because such knowledge about 
them is available and reliable. In particular, we explore whether valuation bias 
is less for property investment stocks relative to non-financial stocks (as per 
Chapters 3 and 4) because of the greater investment knowledge about the 
former. Chapter 5. 
We believe it is appropriate to comment at this stage on the cornerstone of 
our methodology. The premise on which the research method is built for this work 
is derived from standard finance theory and practice and common sense of 
investment and economics. That is, the value of a business is a function of its 
prospective profitability, growth potential and risk. Hence, when we value 
companies, small or large, we need to learn about their prospective profitability, 
growth and risk. From profitability and growth, cash flows can be derived and 
from understanding the risk of the business, whether operational, financial, or 
other such as political risk of some operations in a foreign country, the required 
rate of return can be estimated and hence the business can be valued. These 
factors are what we really need to value a business. These are the proxies of real 
value fundamentals bearing in mind that eventually these factors capture the 
impact of both unique and systematic factors (micro and macro) on the business. 
5 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents 
the literature review for the whole thesis under suitable headings, Chapter 3 
covers valuation bias and stock age, Chapter 4 deals with stock market levels in 
the UK, Chapter 5 covers investment knowledge and stock price rationalisation, 
and Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and presents prospects for future research. 
Each chapter of the main studies (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) is structured as follows: A 
chapter abstract is presented at the outset, followed by a chapter introduction 
covering motivation, objectives, hypotheses, and method. Data are then discussed 
followed by the empirical analysis and results. Then a chapter conclusion 
summarises the findings and finally a chapter appendix. 
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2 Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a reVIew of related literature divided into four 
categories: 
(a) Fundamental valuation, covering the economic fundamental explanations for 
market valuations. Chapters 3, 4 and 5, the three empirical studies presented in 
this thesis, examine whether fundamentals can explain observed stock market 
values. 
(b) Behavioural bias, reviewing behavioural explanations of stock market 
valuation. It will be argued that the results presented in this thesis are 
consistent with the hypotheses of behavioural finance, in particular 
behavioural bias, not withfundamental valuation. 4 
(c) The literature on stock market levels, in particular excess volatility and 
overvaluation. Chapter 4 examines, empirically, valuation bias relative to 
fundamentals at stock market overall level in the UK. 
(d) The literature related to property investment stocks. These are the subject of 
the third empirical study presented in this thesis. Chapter 5 uses property 
investment stocks to examine the role of investment knowledge in stock price 
rationalisation. Some relevant articles on real estate investment trusts and 
closed-end funds are reviewed in this section too. 
4 Behavioural bias, the subject of this thesis, is not to be confused with survivorship bias. The 
latter is just a statistical and measurement issue concerned with representation of a sample, e.g., 
the impact of excluding dead stocks on stock return measurement. For survivorship bias literature, 
see for example Ball and Watts (1979), Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross (1992), Brown, 
Goetzmann, and Ross (1995), and Jorion and Goetzmann (1999). Also, see for example, on 
corporate survival Evans (1987), Dunne and Hughes (1994), Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), and 
Koke (200 I). 
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2.2 Fundamental Valuation 
Equilibrium models such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the 
single risk factor model of Shapre (1964) and Lintner (1965), and the Arbitrage 
Pricing Theory (APT), the multi-risk factor model of Ross (1976) are classical 
efficient markets models to asset pricing.5 In the 1970s, the efficient markets 
theory related asset prices to economic fundamentals, using rational expectations 
to link finance and the entire economy. The models of Merton (1973), Lucas 
(1978), and Breeden (1979) of efficient markets concluded that stock prices are 
the expected present value of future dividends relating the discount rate to the 
utility of consumption. 6 
Standard finance theory postulates that the value of a capital asset should be equal 
to the present value of its expected future outcome stream (e.g., dividends, cash 
flow, and earnings). Hence, fundamental approaches to stock valuation are used to 
estimate the fair or intrinsic value of companies based on key fundamentals. 
Popular standard fundamental approaches to equity valuation such as the 
Enterprise DCF, the Equity DCF (or Dividends Discount Model), the Adjusted 
Present Value (APV), and the Economic Value Added (EVA) use the key 
fundamental variables of profitability, growth and risk to derive and value future 
outcomes.7 Profitability and growth determine cash flow (or earnings) and 
understanding business and financial risk is required to estimate the cost of capital 
to value future cash flows (or estimate and value EVA stream). These four 
approaches are all mathematically equivalent. The standard textbook of Copeland, 
5 One could dwell too much on asset pricing theory. However, focus is kept on valuation bias, the 
subject of this thesis. For discussion and tests of CAPM and APT, see for example, Fama and 
MacBeth (1973), Dybvig and Ross (1985), Gultekin and Bulent Gultekin (1987), Wei (1988), and 
Fama. and French (1996), also Elton and Gruber (1995) is a standard textbook that covers these 
asset pricing theories 
6 Merton (1973): An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) that generalizes the 
original CAPM. According to the Lucas (1978) model, in a rational expectations general 
equilibrium rational asset prices may have a forecastable element that is related to the 
forecastability of consumption. According to the Breeden (1979) model, a stock's beta is 
determined by the correlation of the stock's return With per capita consumption. 
7 The concept of EVA was developed by Stem Stewart, a major consulting firm. APV is based on 
the famous Modigliani & Miller propositions on capital structure developed in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. 
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Koller, and Murrin (2000) discusses these valuation approaches in great detail; 
also Damodran (1996) and Brealey and Myers (2000) deal with the same. 
CAPM and APT are classical models that provide the required rates of return for 
fundamental valuation. In a theoretical ideal world, stock prices would represent 
the present value of future outcomes discounted at a rate of return that can be 
justified by an equilibrium model where average stock returns are the same as the 
discount rates. There is sufficient confirmation in the literature for the importance 
of profitability, growth and risk (discount rates) in equity valuation as shown later 
in this section. Below is a review of articles relevant to fundamental valuation. 
One type of research concentrated on fundamental-based analysis to 
address explaining or predicting stock returns. For example, all of Rosenberg, 
Reid and Lanstein (1985), DeBondt and Thaler (1987) and Chan, Hamao and 
Lakonishok (1991), and Fama and French (1992) find a relation between book-to-
market equity and stock returns. Other research shows other variables are related 
to subsequent stock returns, such as earnings yield [Jaff, Keirn and Westerfield 
(1989)], cash flow yield [Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991)] and historical 
sales growth [Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994)]. Campbell and Shiller 
(1988) find (a) long moving average of real earnings helps to forecast future real 
dividends, (b) the ratio of earnings to current stock price is a powerful predictor of 
the return on stock. Goetzmann and Jorion (1993) find no strong statistical 
evidence indicating that dividend yields can be used to forecast stock returns. 
Fama and French (1993) show that size and book-to-market equity ratio are 
proxies for sensitivity to risk factors that capture strong common variation in 
stock returns and help in explaining the cross-section of average returns [see also 
Fama and French (1995) on the relation between average stock returns and size, 
and average return and book-to-market equity]. Robertson and Wright: (2002) 
show that Tobin's q strongly predicts stock returns. In their paper on 'the good 
news and the bad news about long-run stock returns' (2002b), they show that the 
predictive power of valuation criteria significantly reduces the uncertainty 
associated with long-run stock market returns. In another paper by them (2003), 
they provide evidence on the predictive power of dividend yields for aggregate 
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stock returns in which, following Miller and Modigliani (1961), they construct a 
measure of the dividend yield that includes all cashjlows to shareholders. Dupuis 
and Tessier (2003) show that, for the long-run variance decomposition, 76 percent 
of the low-frequency dynamics in stock prices are explained by permanent shocks 
to dividends and the remaining 24 percent are explained by permanent shocks to 
real interest rates. 8 
Another type of fundamental-based research addresses direct stock 
valuation, and here are some relevant examples. According to Miller and 
Modigliani (1961), a share value represents the present value of (a) normalised 
earnings from existing assets, plus (b) the present value of future growth 
opportunities. Grossman and Shiller (1981) find that the present value of 
dividends since 1881 had only a thin relation to actual stock prices in the US. 
Feltham and Ohlson (1999) provide a general version of the accounting-based 
valuation model that equates the market value of equity to book value plus the 
risk-adjusted present value of expected abnormal earnings. The risk adjustments 
consist of certainty-equivalent reductions of expected abnormal earnings. 
Abnormal earnings are calculated after a capital charge measured on the period 
opening book equity using the risk-free rate. They show that the traditional risk-
adjusted expected cash flow model as a special case of their general model. 
Schwartz and Moon (2000) apply real-options theory and capital-budgeting 
techniques to valuing Internet companies. In their valuation approach, the 
expected sales growth rate follows a mean-reverting process with a time-varying 
drift. They argue that the value of an Internet stock may be rational if revenue 
growth rates and their volatility are high enough. Ang and Liu (2001) specify 
affine processes for selected accounting variables and derive a nonlinear relation 
between market-to-book ratio on one side and interest rates, profitability, and 
growth in book value on the other assuming the last three variables are stochastic. 
Bakshi and Chen (2001) develop a stock valuation model using net earnings-per-
8 The literature on explaining stock returns is very extensive. For more research, see for example, 
Day (1984), Restoy and Rockinger (1994), He, Kan, Ng and Zhang (1996), Perez-Quiros and 
Timmermann (2000), Davis (1994), Fama (1990), and Daniel and Titman (1997). Dimson and 
Marsh (200 I) in their paper "U.K. Financial Market Returns, 1955-2000," present and analyse new 
monthly index data for the UK financial assets to estimate equity and bond premium and to draw 
meaningful international comparisons. They also use the data to investigate stock market 
seasonality, real dividend growth, and small-fmn effect and compare with the US. 
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share, expected earnings bTfowth, and interest rate in which the expected earnings 
growth rate follows a mean-reverting process. The pricing errors of their model 
are highly persistent over time and correlated across stocks, suggesting the 
existence of factors that are important in the market's valuation but missing from 
the model. Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2002) conclude that future variation in 
profits can explain 75 to 80 percent of the cross-sectional variation in book-to-
market ratios. Jung and Shiller (2002) show for US stocks that, cross sectionally, 
the price-dividend ratio is a strong forecaster of the present value of future 
dividend changes. Smithers and Wright (2004) make an interesting statement 
reflecting on how the behaviour of the stock market does not seem to accord with 
fundamental rational valuation, "Two fundamental, and perhaps disconcerting 
questions, immediately occur when considering how to value stock markets. They 
are "Why attempt to do it?" and "Can it be done?" 
Some literature studies the relation between inflation, as an economic 
fundamental, and stock prices. Wadhwani (1986) finds some evidence that 
inflation impacts stock valuation negatively as it increases bankruptcy rates and 
default premium. Sharpe (2002) finds that the negative relationship between 
equity valuations and expected inflation is the result of a rise in expected inflation 
coincides with both lower expected earnings growth and required real returns.9 
Inflation impacts earnings, cost of borrowing, and cost of equity resulting in some 
offsetting. Therefore, it is believed that inflation per se is unlikely to hold a major 
part of the explanation for the severe ups and downs in stock market levels in the 
recent history. That is because of its simultaneous impact across all valuation 
factors, and because the 1990s onwards were associated with relatively low and 
stable inflation levels. However, as a final point, high historic inflation memories 
might have had a psychological impact on investors to expect high stock returns 
despite the fall in inflation, which might have contributed to driving prices up 
away from fundamentals. 
Central to our first study in Chapter 3, it has been recognized that the 
valuation of newly issued stocks can be difficult to explain using standard 
9 For more about inflation and stock price levels, see Wadhwani, Cecchetti. and Genberg (2002). 
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valuation tools. Fama and French (2001) documented that, on average, more than 
550 new companies were listed every year in the US stock market between 1980 
and 2000 compared to less than 150 companies in the previous two decades. The 
valuations of some of these new companies appear very high to accord with 
reasonable assumptions about future profitability. 10 
Ayrer, Upper, and Werner (2002) study behavioural differences of market 
reaction to changes in fundamentals between new companies listed on Neuer 
Market in Germany and old companies from DAX 100. They find that news 
impact on stock prices of new and old stocks was asymmetric under different 
market conditions. In up market, new stocks reacted more strongly to favourable 
news than old stocks while no significant difference in reaction was found to 
unfavourable news. In declining market, new stocks reacted more pronouncedly to 
unfavourable news than old stocks while no significant difference in reaction was 
found to favourable news. They argue that this was due to behavioural bias in 
viewing both categories of stocks. Valuation asymmetry between new and 
survivor stocks, along with the relation between valuation differences and market 
condition, is the focus of our first study. 
Investors are faced with major uncertainty about future profitability when 
valuing newly listed companies. Pastor and Veronesi (2003), using annual US 
data for the years 1963 through 2000, II argue that this uncertainty contributes to 
the high valuations of these companies, and that learning about profitability in 
calendar time resolves this uncertainty and tends to be associated by a decline in 
the valuation ratios. So, valuations that appear excessively high initially are not 
necessarily the result of investor irrationality. Their argument is broadly 
consistent with Lewellen and Shanken (2002), who "emphasize that many tests of 
market efficiency cannot distinguish between a market with learning and an 
irrational market" . 
The work of Pastor and Veronesi (2003) is the closest to our first study on 
valuation bias and stock age. They develop a learning model for stock valuation 
focusing on cash flow and modeling it using accounting information such as 
earnings and book equity. However, they do not focus much on modelling risk 
10 For example, more than I in 10 of all companies listed between 1962 and 2000 are traded at a 
multiple of more than seven times their book value at the end of their year of listing, and almost 1 
in 50 companies is traded at more than 20 times its book value. 
II From the CRSP/COMPUSTAT database. 
13 
and its impact on valuation as they deal with risk in fairly standard fashion; once 
assuming a contact discount rate and then by using a stochastic discount rate. 
Their model predicts MIS to decline with firm's age due to learning, the 
predictions of their model are confirmed empirically. The idea of their model is 
illustrated with the following simple mathematical exposition. 
M = E{ exp[(g - r)T]} = exp[(g + 0"2 12 - r)T] 
B 
where B is the firm's book equity at time 0 and g is its constant growth rate of 
book value growth from profitability. Thus, the book equity will be at time T: 
B[exp(gT)], then they assume as competition eliminates abnormal earnings by T 
the market value at time T equals its grown book value, discounted to today's 
value by the discount rate r. The expression to the right assumes that g is 
unknown and normally distributed. 
It is clear that MIS, in the above model, increases with the uncertainty about 
growth or profitability. They argue that the uncertainty declines over time due to 
learning and as a result, younger firms have higher profitability or growth 
volatility and hence higher M/B ratios holding average growth and discount rate 
constant. 
The model is formulated to use average profitability and its volatility in estimating 
MIS, which led to model predictions that are confirmed by the empirical data. 
This link between the high volatility of profitability and high valuation could be 
circumstantial (spurious). Moreover, in their study, risk deferential between 
younger and older stocks is not addressed, where first the discount rate was left as 
constant and second modelled as a stochastic variable. 
According to Pastor and Veronesi, there is an economic rationale for the higher 
MIS of new stocks; that is rational learning. However, the long-standing evidence 
on the long-tenn underperfonnance of IPOs would contradict their conclusion 
[see on IPOs evidence, for example, Gompers and Lerner (2003) and Espenlaub, 
Gregory and Tonks (2000)]. We show later that our evidence on new stocks and 
age groups is consistent with the evidence of the IPOs systematic 
underperformance. 
Higher profitability volatility implies higher risk and should lead to lower 
valuations. Despite their technically impressive work trying to rationalise the 
behaviour of the market in valuing younger stocks by learning, they do not 
14 
address the possibility of bias driven by investor expectations about new stocks 
that can be exaggerated due to the relatively limited knowledge about them. 
Producing a model that can predict the patterns exhibited in the data is not 
necessarily the answer. Some economic rationale or investment logic is still 
needed to underlie the pattern of the declining M/B with age or it would be due to 
behavioural bias. 12 
12 For further literature on learning see, for example, Jovanovich (1982), Timmerman (1993), 
David (1997). Routledge (1999), Veronesi (1999, 2000), and Brennan and Xia (2001). Bernardo 
and Chowdhry (2002). 
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2.3 Behavioural Bias 
The literature under Section 2.2 covers rational explanations of value by 
fundamentals and rationalised processes such as learning or mean-reversion. The 
1990s witnessed significant research in behavioural finance recognizing the 
importance of psychology and sociology in finance. That followed the failure of 
the efficient markets theory and its rational explanations, that dominated the 
1970s, to justify stock market levels and its too many anomalies,13 including the 
excessive volatility in the 1980s and 1990s and the 1987 crash where fundamental 
values and explanations were rendered irrelevant. 14 Shiller (2002) emphasises that 
the collaboration between finance and other social sciences that has become 
known as behavioural finance has led to a profound deepening of our knowledge 
of financial markets. Behavioural aspects are important to the explanation 
especially that behavioural bias is involved in the valuation process in the stock 
market as long as humans are involved. Below is a summary of relevant literature. 
Psychologists Andreassen and Kraus (1988) showed that people tended to 
behave as if they extrapolate past price changes. Smith, Suchanek and Williams 
(1988) created experimental markets which generated bubbles that are consistent 
with feedback trading. ls According to De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman, 
(1990), combining feedback traders and smart money in one model, the smart 
money tended to amplify, rather than diminish, the effect of feedback traders, by 
buying in ahead of the feedback traders in anticipation of the price increases they 
will cause. And in a related model, rational expected-utility-maximizing smart 
money never choose to offset all of the effects of irrational investors because they 
are rationally concerned about the risk generated by the irrational investors, and 
do not want to assume the risk that completely offsetting these other investors 
would entail. Marimon, Spear and Sunder (1993) showed experiments in which 
13 Anomalies such as: Equity premium puzzle (realised equity premium is higher than can be 
justified by standard efficient markets theories), and Size Effect (smaller firms producing higher 
returns), etc. 
14 See Shiller (1982), (1989) and (1990) on market volatility. 
15 Feedback traders follow trends, while Smart Money traders move the other way. 
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repeating bubbles were generated if subjects were preconditioned by past 
experience to fonn expectations of bubbles. 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) suggest that over-extrapolation 
effect, a well known fonn of behavioural bias according to which investors tend 
to over-extrapolate past problems into the future, could be the reason behind the 
low PIE effect, the finding that fonns an important support for investing in value 
stocks being undervalued because of a behavioural bias. 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) propose a theory of 
securities market under- and over-reaction based on two well-known 
psychological biases. These are: (a) Investor overconfidence about the precision 
of private infonnation. They define an overconfident investor as one who 
overestimates the precision of their private infonnation signal, but not of 
infonnation signals publicly received by all. (b) Biased self-attribution, which 
causes asymmetric shifts in investors' confidence as a function of their investment 
outcomes. 16 Their theory is based on investor overconfidence, and variations in 
confidence arising from biased self-attribution. They made a reference in their 
paper to evidence on security returns that has presented a sharp challenge to the 
traditional view that securities are rationally priced reflecting all publicly 
available infonnation. They state that, owing to biased self-attribution, those who 
acquire wealth through successful investment may become more overconfident. 
They have also shown that the psychological principle of biased self-attribution 
can also promote feedback. 
Scott, Stumpp, and Xu (1999) examine the consequences of behavioural 
biases in the context of valuation theory. They provide empirical evidence 
concerning the ability of an array of commonly used active strategies, such as 
value and growth tilts, to exploit biases. They grouped behavioural biases into two 
general categories: (a) overconfidence and (b) prospect theory. I? Overconfidence 
16 Biased self-attribution, identified by psychologist Daryl Bem (1965), is a pattern of human 
behavior whereby individuals attribute events that confirm the validity of their actions to their own 
high ability, and attribute events that disconfirm their actions to bad luck or sabotage. 
17 Tversky's prospect theory (1979) suggests that individuals are far more upset by losses than they 
are pleased by equivalent gains; in fact, individuals are so upset by losses that they will even take 
great risks with the hope of avoiding any losses at all. The effects of this pain of regret have been 
shown to result in a tendency of investors in stocks to avoid selling losers. But the same pain of 
regret ought to cause short sellers to want to avoid covering their shorts in a losing situation. 
People prefer to avoid putting themselves in situations that might confront them with 
psychologically difficult decisions in the future. 
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bias means, according to Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), that 
human beings develop, and stick, to stronger views than warranted by impartial 
analysis of the data. It also suggests that investors adjust their expectations only 
slowly. Prospect theory posits, according to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and 
(1991), that utility depends on deviations from moving reference points rather 
than on absolute levels of wealth or consumption. Prospect theory predicts that 
investors will tend to gamble in losses (hold onto their positions) and be risk 
averse in gains (move quickly to realise their gains). They find that biased 
responses to news have larger impact on the stock prices of fast-growth 
companies, and biased estimates of normalised earnings have a profound impact 
on the stock prices of slow-growth companies but a relatively small impact on 
those for fast-growth companies. 
Goetzmann and Massa (1999) provides evidence that it is reasonable to 
suppose that there are two distinct classes of investors: feedback traders who 
follow trends and the smart money who move the other way. 
Massa and Simonov (2002) investigate the way investors react to prior 
gains and losses and familiarity bias. Familiarity bias means that investors tend to 
invest in familiar stocks while ignoring the principles of portfolio theory. They 
focus on the determinants of portfolio choice by testing and comparing different, 
some are competing, behavioural theories, behavioural and rational explanations 
to familiarity.18 (a) Behavioural theories: Loss aversion; that is prior losses 
increase risk taking and vice versa for prior gains. House-money effect; prior 
gains provide investors with a cushion that makes future losses less painful and 
hence increase risk taking. Mental accounting or narrow framing; according to 
which investors, in different categories of wealth, may react differently to gains 
and losses depending on their categories. For more information, see for example 
Odean (1998) and Shefrin and Statman (1985). (b) Behavioural and rational 
hypotheses: Pure familiarity; the tendency to focus heavily on information that is 
salient or is often mentioned rather than on information that is blended in the 
background. Information-based familiarity; an alternative approach according to 
which investors buy and hold stocks that they have enough information about. 
They find that investors react to previous gains and losses according to house-
18 This paper is briefly presented just as an example to highlight the presence of wide range of 
complex behavioural biases in investment. 
18 
money effect. They find no evidence of mental accounting. With respect to stock 
picking they provide evidence in favour of the information-based hypothesis. 
Some research addresses over-reaction; another form of bias. For example, 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) find that subsequently to being classified as loser or 
winner portfolios, loser portfolios outperform the market and winner portfolios 
under-perform it, the empirical evidence that is consistent with overreaction 
hypothesis. 19 
It is worth noting that other research covered biased forecasts of earnings 
or earnings growth being too optimistic (overestimates) which would affect the 
market. See for example, DeBondt and Thaler (1990), Trueman (1990), Schipper 
(1991), Francis and Philbrick (1993), Clayman and Schwartz (1994), Chan, 
Karceski, and Lakonishok (2000), and Sougiannis and Yaehura (2001). 
19 Lifetime Planning Concepts, P.C., financial advisors, (2003) as published on their website 18 
December 2003 titled 'Behavioural Aspects of Investment Risk' discuss behavioural biases in the 
context of investment advice. They state that behavioural bias is as real as human nature. The more 
humans involved in the process, the more impact behavioural bias can have on investment 
decisions. The typical chain of investor, advisor and mutual fund or money manager make for a 
dangerous blend of emotions and bias. Here is a summary of the discussion. 
a) Under-reaction: A Marriage of Over-confidence and Anchoring: They explain how investor 
expectations can to a large degree influence stock prices. Since investor expectations are formed 
by a set of information and a model to process the information, it is clear that errors can occur 
when either the model or the process of interpreting the model is flawed. As in most areas, the 
behavioural bias, acquired through life, affects investment decisions and frequently helps create 
mental mistakes. Investor bias tends to encourage them to over- or under-react to new information 
and as a result misprice the value of an investment. Under-reaction to new information generally 
comes from over-confidence or anchoring. At times investors place too much confidence in their 
existing information or knowledge and thus ignore new information. Examples of those include 
money managers who avoided the stock market in the US from 1994 through 1999 because they 
were confident the market was priced too high, i.e. the PIE ratio of 23 was overvalued. Anchoring 
is the process by which investors become tied to a previous view or opinion. Anchoring can apply 
to an individual stock, a market segment or the market as a whole. On individual stocks, investors 
tend to anchor to the expected earnings estimate or PIE level. When new information becomes 
available, those who under-react are often anchored to their previous viewpoint of the company. 
Applied to market segments or the total US market, anchoring keeps investors from seeing the 
change until it is obvious to everyone else. For example, in the 1980s, America was counted out; 
the perception of investors was that international investing was the place to make money. Even as 
America cleaned up its fiscal and monetary policies, the new information was ignored by those 
anchored to their opinions of America's labour, management, tax system, and debt structure. 
b) Over-reaction: Stereotypes and Exaggerating Probabilities: Over-reaction that results in sell-
offs can also be caused by investor behavioural bias. Investors overreact as a result of stereotyping 
(representativeness) and overestimating probabilities. By stereotyping they take a single 
observation and conclude it is representative of an entire population. A good example of 
overestimating probabilities is when a plane crash occurs people tend to overestimate another 
occurrence. When a stock experiences a long period of disappointing news that results in a long 
period of price under-performance, investors become conditioned to the poor performance and 
project continued poor performance into the future. Emotions based on behavioural bias create an 
over-reaction. 
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2.4 Stock Market Levels 
The eighties and the nineties witnessed excessive volatility in stock prices 
which even went to the extreme of crashing in 1987 [see for example, Seyhun 
(1990) and Siegel (1992) on the 1987 crash], and to the high levels of 1999 
followed by the severe drop in stock prices up to 2002. Campbell and Shiller 
(1988) find stock prices and returns are too volatile to accord with simple present-
value model. Shiller (1988) shows that there is substantial unexplained variation 
in the log dividend-price ratio. Even for before the eighties, Shiller (1981) shows 
that measures of stock price volatility are far too high to be attributed to 
information about future real dividends. The stock market's pronounced volatility 
triggered a large-scale search to explain stock market fluctuations and levels.2o 
There are many competing explanations proposed in the literature for the 
excessive volatility in stock prices. Some of those explanations reject the present 
value model, some reject rational expectations, and some reject the assumption of 
rational optimising agents.21 
Consistent with efficient markets, is that stock price movements can be 
rationalised by fluctuations in discount rates, which have not been correctly 
modelled [Grossman and Shiller (1981), Mehra and Prescott (1985), Epstien and 
Zin (1991)]. Cochrane (1994) and Fama and French (2001) argue that the high 
equity prices were the result of a decline in the equity premium and in the rate at 
which investors discount expected future real dividends. Consistent with rational 
expectations, but not with the present value model, is the possibility of rational 
bubbles in stock prices [West (1988), Flood (1990)], or that price movements may 
be explained by market frictions [Weil (1989)]. In more recent articles on bubble 
theory, Youssefmir, Huberman, and Hogg (1993) show that when speculative 
trends dominate over fundamental beliefs, bubbles form, leading asset prices away 
20 Bulkley and Harris (1997) test whether the documented excess volatility in stock prices in the 
US Can be explained by excess volatility in earnings forecasts. They find no statistically significant 
correlation between analysts' forecast earnings growth over five years and realised growth and that 
earnings forecasts are over estimates. This supports their hypothesis of the failure of the market in 
forming rational expectations. They also fmd that the market earnings growth expectations and 
stock prices are positively correlated with analysts' forecasts, which means that analysts 
contributed to the excess volatility. 
21 Bulkley and Harris (1997) provide a useful survey of these explanations. 
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from their fundamental value making the system increasingly susceptible to any 
exogenous shock, thus eventually leading to a crash, Brooks and Katsaris (2002) 
state that periods where fundamental value was irrelevant, such as stock price 
levels before 1929 and 1987 crashes, led researchers to look for factors beyond 
fundamentals such as speculative bubbles that could explain the major deviations 
from fundamentals?2 
At the opposite extreme is the idea that irrational fads and fashions may 
explain stock price fluctuations [Shiller (1989)]. 
In between these two extremes is the possibility that the market may price 
stocks by the present value model but not insert into this model rational 
expectations of future dividends. This in tum may be either because the true 
dividend model is unknown and must be learnt over time [Bulkley and Tonks 
(1989) and (1992), Barsky and DeLong (1993)] or because agents simply use 
irrational and inappropriate mechanisms to forecast dividends, for example by 
overreacting to current information [DeBondt and Thaler (1985)]. Others argue 
that innovations in information technology have driven stock prices to historically 
high levels in the 1990s [Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001)]. 
More recent research addressed overvaluation in stock prices explicitly. 
Cole, Helwege, and Laster (1996) report that traditional market indicators have 
pointed to an overvalued stock market in the 1990s in the US with record low 
dividend yield and high market-to-book ratio. Though, the stock market has 
performed well, which leads to question whether the behaviour of these indicators 
has changed and they became invalid predictors of stock returns. They examined 
the predictive power of these measures and find that equities tend to perform 
poorly when dividend yields are low and market-to-book and price-earnings are 
high and vice versa. 
22 The literature on rational speculative bubbles to explain economically unjustified stock market 
levels and fluctuations is extensive. Brooks and Katsaris (2002) provide a good summary referring 
to research that concentrated on the presence of: (a) deterministic bubbles [Flood and Garber 
(1980), Flood, Garber, and Scott (1984)], (b) fads [Summers (1986), Fama and French (1988), 
Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1991)], (c) periodically collapsing speculative bubbles [McQueen 
and Thorley (1994), Somette and Johansen (1997)]. Also see on bubble theory, Diba and 
Grossman (1988), Froot and Obstfeld (1991), Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993), Allen and 
Gale (2000). 
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Campbell and Shiller (1998) believe that dividend-price and price-earnings 
ratios have a special significance when compared with many other statistics that 
might be used to forecast stock prices. They say "it seems reasonable to believe 
that prices are not likely ever to drift too far from their normal relations to 
indicators of fundamental value, such as dividends or earnings. Thus, one might 
expect that when stock prices are very high relative to these indicators, as they are 
in 1997, prices will fall in the future to bring the ratios back to more normal 
historical levels." They show that since 1872 up to 1983 the dividend-price ratio 
was fluctuating around its historical mean 4.73 percent and after 1983 the ratio 
has been below its mean ever since. They find the denominator of the ratio (the 
price) that brings the ratio back to its mean. They state that these ratios in 1997 
are extraordinary bearish for the US stock market, and hence they find that US 
equity market is extraordinarily overvalued. They predicted a substantial decline 
in stock prices and real stock returns close to zero over the next ten years (from 
1997), which we have actually witnessed during 2000-2002.23 
Heaton and Lucas (1999) analyse three broad categories of fundamentals-
based explanations for the stock price rise in late 1990s in the US. These are: 
changes in corporate earnings growth, changes in consumer preferences, and 
changes in stock-market participation patterns. Otherwise, a bubble is likely to be 
the cause of the price rise. Using Gordon growth model, they find the value 
obtained for expected growth is large in historical standards and unlikely to be the 
sole explanation and it is unlikely that large shifts in the expected rate of return 
have taken place to justify such stock price levels. They find that changes in the 
fundamentals can account for perhaps half of the observed increase in price-
dividend ratio.24 They also conclude that changes in stock-market participation 
patterns over the last decade are unlikely to be a major part of the explanation. 
Siegel (1999) suggests that higher value of equity might be stemming from 
a fall in the required rate of return to equity from its historical average, because 
new technologies in financial services have lowered transaction costs; and from 
23 They relied on testing the level of each ratio against its historical average and they used some 
regression analysis for their predication. 
24 These fundamentals were earnings growth and two socio-economic factors. 
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faster growth. Because fast-growth industries are heavily represented in equity 
indices and that strong growth in earnings is expected to continue.25 
Kiley (2000) compares the predictions for the market value of firms from 
the Gordon growth model with those from a dynamic general equilibrium model 
of production to explain the skyrocketing stock prices in the US in the second half 
of the I 990s. His results suggest that this run-up in stock prices is inconsistent 
with the production performance of the economy in recent years. He showed 
quantitatively that faster growth is not the explanation of the phenomenon and that 
a drop in the required rate of return generates an increase in the market value 
about half that observed in the market. 
Shiller (2001) argues in his popular book 'Irrational Exuberance' that in 
year 2000 the stock market was overpriced and that it is still likely to do poorly. 
We saw that happening. His confidence surveys showed that despite the poor 
performance in that year, people confidence in the stock market has declined only 
a little. This raises the issue of investor expectations role in driving stock prices 
away from their fundamentals. He reported that there is almost no historical 
connection between major movements in aggregate real stock prices and 
movements in the present value of real aggregate dividends and also no 
substantial relationship between such movements in real prices and major 
movements in real earnings. He reported a huge gap between economic growth 
indicators and corporate earnings on one side and stock prices on the other side. 
He also showed that there is no substantial long-term historical relationship 
between corporate profits and stock prices. He reports that the US stock market 
ups and downs over the last century have made virtually no sense ex post. He 
continues saying: it is curious how little known this simple fact is. 
Smithers and Wright (2004), being rightly sceptical, say "How can the 
market be worth five times as much as it was 10 years before? Surely it must have 
been obvious that it was either too cheap at the start or too expensive at the end? 
Can it really be claimed that a market that swings around in such a manner is 
always efficient?" Using the q ratio and the cyclically adjusted price-earnings 
ratio, they report that at the end of 2003, when the S&P 500 stood at 1058, Wall 
25 Fast growth industries would expose investors to higher risk, which is reflected in higher rates of 
return demanded by investors. Thus, the two reasons, suggested by Siegel (1999), seem to have 
some contradiction. 
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Street was overvalued by at least 60 per cent.26 They state that it is possible for 
stock markets to become over- or under-valued, which is consistent with the 
common sense observation that stock markets rise and fall too much to be 
justified by changes in fundamentals. 27 
It is worth mentioning that the empirical evidence on the equity premium 
puzzle is related to the issue understudy. That is, equity returns have been 
significantly higher than what is consistent with standard finance theories. This 
high equity risk premium could indicate that stock prices are driven by return 
expectations rather than by fundamentals. On equity risk premium, see for 
example, Mehra and Prescott (1985), Weil (1989), Siegel and Thaler (1997), 
Siegel (1999), Pastor and Stambaugh (2001), Brennan and Xia (2001), Bansal and 
Lundblad (2002), Fama and French (2002). 
In a UK-based research, Brooks and Katsaris (2003) show by applying 
speCUlative bubble theory, that UK stocks were overvalued in the late 1990s as 
they deviated too far from their fundamental values, which was then followed by 
an eventual and complete correction leading stock price levels back to its 
fundamental value level. Hence, they conclude that the bubble has fully burst and 
stocks are no longer overvalued by the time of this artide.28 In a later paper by the 
same authors (2003b), they find that stock prices in the UK have deviated 
significantly from their fundamental values during the late nineties, and that this 
deviation has all the characteristics of a bubble.29 
26 q ratio: calculated as the ratio of the market value of companies to the replacement cost of their 
assets. Cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio: calculated as the ratio of current stock price to 
average earnings (on an inflation-adjusted basis) over the past 10 years [Shiller (2001)]. 
27 See also "Valuing Wall Street: Protecting Wealth in Turbulent Markets" book by Smithers and 
Wright (2002). 
28 According the same article by Brooks and Katsaris (2003), "a speculative bubble is marked by a 
persistent and increasing deviation of actual stock prices from their fundamental values ... Early 
theories of speculative bubbles had two properties that made them fundamentally flawed. First, 
they implied that bubbles could only be generated by irrational investor behaviour, and second, 
that bubbles would grow and then collapse completely to zero. However, more recent research has 
suggested not only that bubbles can be periodically appearing and partially collapsing, but also that 
the existence of bubbles in asset prices is entirely consistent with rational investor behaviour and 
efficient markets." 
29 They used three different empirical methodologies to examine whether this deviation can be 
explained by reference to the presence of a speculative bubble. These are: variance bounds tests, 
bubble specification tests, and cointegration tests based on both and data. 
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2.5 Property Investment Stocks Discount: Related 
Literature 
The role of investment knowledge in rational ising stock prices is analysed 
10 our third study (Chapter 5) by exploiting the investment characteristic of 
property investment stocks. 30 Therefore, it is worth reviewing the related literature 
on UK property investment stocks and their enduring discount with the related 
literature on US real estate investment trusts (REITs) and closed-end funds as they 
also trade at a discount to net asset value. 
Some research emphasised the relation between the underlying assets 
(properties) and the vehicles that hold them (property companies and REITs), 
which is in the centre of our third study.3) For example, Barkham and Geitner 
(1995) examine the securitised (public) and unsecuritiesd (private) commercial 
property markets in the US and the UK for evidence of price discovery. They find 
that, over the long-term, the value of property company shares is fundamentally 
linked to the performance of the underlying property market. They argue that 
price discovery occurs in the public indirect market in both countries, and that this 
price information does not fully transmit to the private direct markets for a year or 
more. However, they find the two markets appear to be more closely linked in the 
UK than in the US. 
Matysiak and Brown (1997) conducted a time-varying analysis of 
abnormal performance of UK property companies using time-varying measures of 
J enen' s excess performance and beta. They find that over 1980-1995, the majority 
of property companies exhibited an enduring risk-adjusted underperformance 
profile. This underperformance was not statistically significant. Only few 
30 Brooks, Tsolacos and Lee (2000), as an implication of their analysis on the cyclical relations 
between traded property stock prices and aggregate time-series, refer to a sign of market efficiency 
for property stocks pricing as they find that information about the economy and the property 
market conveyed by the variables of gross domestic product, rents, property yields, consumption, 
dividend yield. and long-term interest rate is incorporated speedily in the prices of property stocks. 
This conclusion offers some support for using property stocks as a control case to address the role 
of investment knowledge in rationalizing stock price. 
31 If we know enough about the underlying assets and operations of a company in terms of their 
values reflecting reasonable information about expected cash flows of these assets and growth, we 
would be able to rationally price this company's share in the light of market levels of return 
expectations so this share could deliver investor return expectations. 
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companies found to have delivered positive abnormal performance, but that was 
not statistically significant too. 
Barkham and Ward (1999) document the parallels between closed-end 
funds and UK property companies as in both types the market capitalization is 
commonly below the net asset value of the assets held.32 They examine two 
hypotheses to explain the discount of property stocks; (a) the discounts are the 
result of agency costs, contingent capital gains tax liability, and a number of other 
firm specific factors, (b) the discounts result from the interaction of noise traders 
and rational investors. Their evidence suggests that both hypotheses have utility in 
explaining property company discounts. They rely on the two approaches that 
were used to investigate the discount of closed-end funds. The first, is the rational 
approach which links the discount-to-NAV to company unique factors 
(management, tax liability, stock mix, etc) which has not successfully explained 
the closed-end fund discount or its variation over time. The second, is the noise 
trader or sentiment approach. It posits the existence of two types of investors in 
the market; rational trader and noise trader where the activities of noise traders 
provide additional risk that affects stock value and returns. The noise trader model 
predicts that security prices will deviate from fundamental values over the short 
term and that securities will be priced below fundamental values in equilibrium. 
The noise trader approach has been applied with some success to closed-end fund 
discounts by Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991). 
Related recent literature on Real Estate Investment Trusts REITs is briefly 
reviewed to complement that on property investment stocks discount as REITs 
also trade at a discount-to-NAV. But REITs have a very special corporate form 
different from that of property companies.33 Gentry, Kernsley, and Mayer (2003) 
argue that a REIT's price should be below its NAV if its tax basis in its properties 
is below market value. Also, a REIT would trade below its NA V if operating it 
32 They regard property stocks discount as a very intriguing phenomenon in the market of UK real 
estate securities. They state it is worth investigating because: (a) Property companies publish both 
book value and market values of their investment properties annually which implies that the 
discount is not a pure artifact of accounting standards or practices, (b) The second is that property 
companies may be regarded as a special case of closed-end fund which trade at a discount to NA V 
and there is a rich literature about them. (c) The third is the lack of research on the discount of 
rroperty stocks . 
. 3 See Campbell. and Sirmans (2002) paper for some background about the debate about REITs as 
a corporate structure for Europe. 
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requires additional costs that are not associated with alternative real estate 
investment structures including the costs of potential conflicts of interest. They 
exploited the institutional characteristics of REITs for evidence about the 
capitalisation of dividend taxes impact into share prices trying to avoid some of 
the complications encountered in previous empirical work with general 
industries.34 They test the hypothesis that investors capitalise the shareholder-level 
tax benefits from tax basis into share prices. They find that the market assigns a 
positive value to tax basis (that creates future dividends tax deductions), 
suggesting that REIT prices appear to capitalise future dividend taxes. 
Gentry, Jones, and Mayer (2003) start with posing the following question 
"Do stock prices reflect fundamental values?" They highlight the difficulty of 
assessing fundamental values for most operating companies because they are 
dependent on estimating future outcomes and valuing them against appropriate 
risk levels. They look at REIT premiums and discounts to NAV, and whether they 
can be used to generate trading profits. They document that REIT stock prices 
deviate from net asset values (NAV). They find that a strategy of buying REIT 
stocks trading at a discount to NAV and shorting those trading at a premium 
would yield significant positive excess returns for little risk exposure. They 
reported that frictional costs and short-sale constraints are not prohibitive.35 They 
find that some variation in price-to-NA V is reasonable as premiums are positively 
related to recent and future growth in NA V where they find that variation in price-
to-NAY predicts future NAV growth. They conclude also that, as aggregate price-
to-NAY appears to be stationary and mean-reverting, trading on mean-reversion 
could be profitable given that there is too much variation in price-to-NA V. 
Finally, they report that their results, although related to similar findings in the 
closed-end fund literature, it is unlikely that REIT premiums and discounts reflect 
the investor sentiment hypothesis of Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) on closed-
34 The special characteristics of REITs they exploit for their research. as listed in their paper. are: 
First, a REIT's tax basis in its assets provides depreciation tax shields and reduces taxable gains on 
the sale of properties. Second. RElTs do not pay corporate taxes. so any benefit they derive from 
tax basis reduces shareholder-level taxes only. Third, analysts regularly appraise the market value 
of REIT properties, and the tax basis REITs have in their properties invariably differs from the 
market value of the assets. Fourth, REITs are required to payout most of their taxable income as 
dividends, limiting the extent to which these firms can use dividends for signalling purposes and 
eliminating the tax benefit associated with share repurchases as a substitute for dividends. 
35 That is surprising! Is it that obvious? What about arbitrage? 
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end funds, because REITs have much higher institutional ownership compared to 
closed-end funds stocks that are mainly held by individuals. 
It is worth noting that price-to-NA V according to their research was close to one 
on average for US REITs while UK property stocks price-to-NA V ratio is 
signiticantly and persistently below one even after correcting their NA V to 
liquidation level as shown in Chapter 5. The reason for this difference comes 
mainly from that US REITs are tax-advantaged vehicles where they almost pay no 
corporate tax at all while UK property stocks are taxed on operating income and 
realised capital gains like any other company. At 30 percent UK tax rate for 
property companies, one could justify the difference in price-to-NA V. In their 
paper, they use Green Street NA V estimates where analysts compute NA V by 
detennining the fair market value of each property owned by a REIT. However, 
they do not talk about adjusting for the impact of property contingent capital gains 
tax as REITs are, subject to specific asset and income tests discussed in Chapter 5, 
exempt from paying corporate tax on property capital gains. Also, they do not 
address the impact of debt market value movements on NA V although, according 
to Gentry, Kemsley, and Mayer (2003), mean (median) Debt-to-NAV ratio is 72 
(68) percent. 
As some parallels could be drawn between the discount of closed-end fund 
and property investment stocks discount, a literature review is included here to 
deal with the Closed-End Funds Discount. 36 The literature on closed-end fund 
discounts is very rich. Therefore, here is a summary review based on a survey by 
Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (1999) who summarized the findings of more than 
70 studies. They sum up by saying that since the many studies attempted to 
explain the discount-to-NAV and its behaviour by emphasizing biases in 
calculating NAV, agency costs, tax-timing options, and market segmentation have 
36 Closed-end funds are firms similar to any corporation where they differ as they specialize in 
investing in other corporations' securities and managing these investments in terms of generating 
income and capital profits. They are called Closed-end funds because their capitalization (number 
of shares) is fixed or closed. In contrast, open-end funds are characterised by the continual selling 
and redeeming of their units at or near to net asset value, and this al the requesl of any unit holder. 
Therefore, open-end funds have a variable number of shares in issue. A closed-end fund share 
price is a direct function of the supply and demand for the fund's shares and has an indirect link to 
the value of the fund's underlying assets. 
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not provided a full explanation, some researchers resorted to models of limited 
rationali~v. 
Closed-end funds commonly trade at a discount to their NA V, which is 
one of the most puzzling phenomena in tinance. Shares in US and UK funds are 
issued at a premium (5 to 10 percent) representing the underwriting fees and start-
up costs associated with the flotation. Subsequently, within months, these shares 
drop in price to trade persistently at a discount fluctuating in a mean-reverting 
pattern. In cases of fund termination, whether liquidation or open-ending, the 
discount gap disappears [Brauer (1984), Brickley, and Schallheim (1985»). The 
same is observed but in a more pronounced way for property investment stocks in 
cases of liquidation or take-over. 
Explanations in the literature can be classified under two categories: (a) 
economic, and (b) behavioural, where the second category emerged after failing to 
find a full explanation in the first one. The economic explanations for why closed-
end fund prices would differ from NAV include. for example, expected future 
trading and management costs [Malkiel (1977)], the expected performance of fund 
managers [Chay and Trzcinka (1999)], the impact of tax liabilities and timing 
[Brickley, Manaster, and Schallheim (1991)], and market segmentation [Bonser-
Neal, Brauer, Neal, and Wheatley (1990)]. Nevertheless, it is difficult to properly 
explain the discount and its behaviour over time without seriously considering the 
behavioural aspects of irrational investor behaviour [see for example: Lee, 
Shleiter, and Thaler (l991»).37 
Here is also a review of some UK-based studies on closed-end funds. 
Levis and Thomas (1996) using UK and US traded closed-end country funds, 
investigate the notion of investor sentiment. 38 They find that the prices of these 
funds are significantly influenced by: (a) price changes in the stock markets of the 
underlying investments (positive relation), (b) price movements in the World 
Index (positive relation but much weaker than 'a'), and (d) the discount level at 
J7 Closed-end fund discounts are not the subject of this thesis. However. amongst other things 
covered in the literature, investors could be discounting closed-end fund stocks for the inherent 
market valuation bias (as discussed for example in Chapters 3 and 4) and for the risks associated 
with their underlying assets of losing significantly in value because of such biases as was 
experienced between 1999 and 2002 where the stock market lost over 40 percent of its value. 
38 That is fluctuations in discounts in closed-end fund prices (to NA V) are driven by changes in 
individual investor sentiment. 
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the start of the period while movements in the local capital markets mainly 
intluence changes in NAY where the funds invest. Their empirical results strongly 
support the notion that changes in the level of the discount is influenced by 
individual investor sentiment, proxied by the volume of unexpected individual-
investor money flowing int%ut of the corresponding mutual fund sector, as the 
average discount level narrows when such money flows in. They find no evidence 
to suggest that changes in the discount level of UK-traded country funds are 
associated with the activities of institutional investors despite the fact that these 
investors hold the majority of counrty fund equity. 
Fuertes and Thomas (2004) investigate the short-term behaviour of closed-
end fund prices following large market-wide shocks. They establish that shocks 
cause large jumps in fund prices relative to NAYs. They find, after a shock, the 
discounts to NAYs of small and difficult-to-arbitrage funds take longer to revert 
to pre-shock levels compared with large and easy-to-arbitrage funds. The discount 
reversion happens faster for the small funds group when the difficult-to-arbitrage 
funds are excluded, which imply that the ease-of-arbitrage for small funds is the 
key factor. For large funds, both ease-of-arbitrage and size are intrinsically linked. 
Finally, Gentry, Jones, and Mayer (2003) draw some parallels between 
their results on RElTs and the literature on closed-end funds. They mention for 
example, that their basic result on excess returns of low Price-to-NA Y REITs 
against high Price-to-NAY REITs is similar that of Thompson (1978) and Pontiff 
(1994). Chay and Trzcinka (1999) show that Price-to-NA Y predicts subsequent 
changes in net asset value for closed-end funds. They report that RElT premiums 
and discounts appear to exhibit similar behaviour to closed-end fund discounts, 
while, in some ways REITs are very different because, for example, REITs pay 
significantly higher dividends. Pontiff (1996) finds that paying higher dividends 
leads to higher valuation (lower discounts) for closed-end funds. As another 
example, REITs have much higher inside ownership. Coles, Suay, and Woodbury 




In this chapter, we have brought together relevant research from different 
areas to serve our objective of investigating valuation bias via examining relative 
valuations and the overall stock market levels and fluctuations. The main themes 
about equity valuation from this review can be summarised under (a) Efficient 
Markets Theory/Fundamental Explanations, that could not fully justify or explain 
levels, anomalies, and excess volatility, to which Rational Processes were 
introduced in some studies (e.g., learning and mean-reversion), (b) Behavioural 
Explanations to explain what cannot be explained by fundamentals; of those, there 
arc rational explanations (e.g., speculative bubbles) and irrational ones (e.g. 
behavioural biases). 
We have looked at fundamental valuation literature, where the articles 
reviewed concentrate on efficient markets theory and fundamentals to explain 
stock valuations. The literature emphasises the importance of growth, profitability 
and risk as valuation fundamentals. Some research resorted to processes such as 
learning or addressing uncertainty of some fundamentals to refine valuation 
models and explanations. 
There is an empirical confirmation in the literature about valuation 
differences between new and older stocks; Pastor and Veronesi (2003) explained 
that fundamentally by learning about profitability. In our first study, we address 
valuation bias as another explanation or part explanation for the higher valuations 
of new stocks relative to older ones rather than just learning using UK data. This 
is broadly consistent with the findings of Ayrer, Upper, and Werner (2002) of 
biased asymmetric reactions to news for each group, who explained the 
phenomena by behavioural bias. We explore whether these valuation differences 
can be explained by differences in fundamentals or by bias otherwise. Consistent 
with the literature, we use accounting information focusing on cash flow through 
profitability and growth.39 However, we model and incorporate risk explicitly to 
take into account industry-specific risk and the impact of firm-specific capital 
39 Profitability and growth detennine cash flow. We also decompose profitability into it 
components: trading profitability, efficiency and leverage. 
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structure. In addition to incorporating the age factor to study the impact of 
survival time (age) on valuation, we incorporate the size factor inline with its 
established importance in the literature. 
The literature confirms that fundamental explanations cannot fully account 
tor stock market levels and their changes. Therefore, it is important to tum to 
behavioural explanations. The literature on behavioural finance clearly agrees that 
behavioural biases are important to understanding stock pricing and that biases 
such as over-extrapolation, over-confidence, self-attribution, etc have utility in 
explaining stock market levels, fluctuations, and valuation ditlerences that do not 
accord with reasonable economic or fundamental explanations. Obviously, 
fundamental-based valuation and behavioural finance complement each other. 
It is clear that the literature on stock market levels agrees on the presence 
of economically unexplained stock price levels and fluctuations referring to record 
low levels of earnings-price ratio and dividend yields, overvaluation, etc. Work by 
leading researchers, such as Shiller, focuses mainly on macro levels and uses 
market-based indicators. Our work in the second study, on examining stock 
market levels against fundamentals, utilises their ideas such as testing the relation 
between value and profitability and efficiency and the relation with economic 
growth. However, we focus more on micro/corporate-level on the underlying 
corporate-based fundamentals on the basis that these variables should capture the 
impact of the relevant macro and micro factors on value. Consistent with the 
techniques used in the literature, we test stock market levels concentrating on 
earnings yield (and its relation with growth and risk), profitability levels, growth 
expectations, and return expectations versus discount rates. Moreover, most of the 
literature on stock market levels and valuation uses US data and there is clear 
shortage of substantial research using data of other countries including the UK, 
which is one of the motives to undertake this work using UK data. 
The article by Gentry, Kemsley, and Mayer (2003) is just one example of 
exploiting the special characteristics of a special corporate fonn (REITs) to seek 
empirical evidence about a certain relation. We also exploit the special investment 
characteristics of the UK property investment stocks and their underlying assets, 
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where a reliable investment knowledge is available to investors. We seek evidence 
about the role of investment knowledge in rational ising stock prices (or limiting 
valuation bias) and the implication of the absence of such knowledge on 
behavioural bias. Hence, we have presented a review of the literature on property 
investment stocks, and the related literature on their closet relatives; real estate 
investment trusts and the further relatives; closed-end funds. Two types of 
explanations exist in the literature for the discount-to-NA V; rational and 
behavioural. We seek the explanation together from (a) company unique factors, 
such as operating expenses, contingent capital gains tax liabilities, the impact of 
debt market value movement, capital growth, the risk of the un-crystallised capital 
gains, and leverage that is consistent with the rational approach referred to in 
Barkham and Ward ( 1999), (b) the nature of the economics of property 
investments themselves in terms of return and growth characteristics and the 
quality knowledge about these characteristics, and (c) the relative stability of the 
behaviour of property stock prices relative to the economy, their underlying value, 
and the overall stock market. This is hoped to explain the discount of property 
stocks rationally to establish the role of investment knowledge in stock price 
rationalisation. Unlike the literature reviewed, we correct NA V to its liquidation 
value by taking into account the impact of debt market value movements and 
contingent capital gains taxes to test using a more accurate measure of the 
underlying value. 
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3 Chapter Three: Valuation Bias and Stock Age: 
New Stocks versus Survivors 
Abstract 
We investigate valuation bias in the UK market by examining the valuation of new 
stocks relative to that of older or survivor stocks. We establish the presence of significant 
differences, with new stocks having relatively higher valuation. We thus confirm the 
same pattern of declining market-to-book with age for the UK market as has previously 
been documented for the US market. Moreover, the valuation gap significantly increases 
in bullish markets and declines in bearish markets, perhaps indicating investor 
overoptimism about new stocks relative to survivor stocks, i.e. in bullish markets investor 
overoptimism drives prices too high subsequently leading to severe corrections in down 
markets when the economy is gloomy and the gap is too apparent to be justified. 
We develop a value explanatory model incorporating profitability, growth and risk 
levels as well as age and size. The value model assigns a significant negative coefficient 
to age, un-backed with any known economic rationale with relatively lower profitability 
levels for new stocks that is inconsistent with their higher valuations, with no consistent 
or concrete evidence of higher earnings growth, and no evidence of lower risk. On the 
contrary, the evidence, as well as common sense of investment, indicates that new stocks 
would have higher risk. This evidence is in favour of rejecting the hypothesis that these 
valuation differences are explained by differences in fundamental profitability, growth 
and risk factors, which is in favour of the alternative hypothesis that valuation bias does 
exist. The research also test and reject another competing hypothesis of rational behaviour 
based on pricing the long-term potential for new stocks. The evidence in this study does 
not imply that we accepted the valuation of survivor stocks as rational or otherwise as it is 
a relative analysis. 
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3. 1 Introduction 
Previous research by Pastor and Veronesi (2003) has established a 
negative relationship between market valuation and the survival time (age), i.e. 
the period that has elapsed since the stock was first issued. Pastor and Veronesi 
attribute this observation to the market learning about the profitability and growth 
rates of new stocks, although this theory seems to imply some degree of investor 
irrationality since investors fail to anticipate the decline in growth rates that 
occurs as firms mature. 
The literature on behavioural finance offers alternative perspectives on 
valuation differences. For example, Ayrer, Upper, and Werner (2002) argue that 
the asymmetric impact of news on stock prices of new and old stocks is due to 
behavioural bias. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subralunanyam (1998) suggest that 
those who acquire wealth through successful investment may become more 
overconfident, suggesting that the long-term performance of the stock market 
might have led investors to be overconfident about their future expectations. This 
does not however explain why newer stocks are overvalued relative to survivor 
stocks. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) suggest that investors tend to 
over-extrapolate past problems into the future, an analysis that can explain why 
survivor stocks are valued below new stocks, simply because new stocks by 
definition have no bad history. This analysis would suggest that survivor stocks 
would do well in booms, when history is relatively favourable. 
The objectives of the present research are to investigate whether a survival 
time effect similar to that found in the US is observed in the UK stock market; and 
to examine if this can be explained by differences or changes in valuation 
fundamentals, including profitability, growth, and risk. Rejection of these 
explanations will suggest that stock prices are driven by investor expectations 
deviating from the underlying fundamental corporate and economic factors, i.e. 
suggesting the presence of valuation bias. We also examine the changes in the 
valuation bias between new and survivor stocks in different market conditions (in 
calendar time). 
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Our procedure is as follows. Stocks are split every year according to a certain 
survival criteria into new stocks and Survivor stocks (or mature stocks). The first 
objective is to establish and document the presence of differences in market 
valuations between survivor stocks and newer stocks. Section 3.2 discusses the 
data. Section 3.3 examines the differences in market valuation between new 
stocks and survivor stocks using descriptive and weighted average statistics for 
pooled data (not in calendar time) and for time-series data supported by equality 
testing, and relating that to the IPO evidence in the literature. We find statistically 
significant differences in market valuation ratios between new and survivor 
stocks. More specifically, new stocks have relatively higher market-to-book ratio 
and lower earnings-to-price and cash flow-to-price ratios. Table 3-2 page 48 and 
Table 3-3 page 48 present these valuation differences. Section 3.3 further 
documents the variation of the valuation gap between the two groups over time. 
Our second objective is to establish whether these differences reflect fundamental 
differences or stem from some kind of stock market behavioural bias. This 
requires establishing the relation between stock valuations and underlying 
corporate-based value indicators. A substantial part of this exercise is the 
development of an appropriate supplementary valuation model in Section 3.4. The 
model is used to: (a) Identify the value-relevant variables that reflect or measure 
the impact of the underlying corporate and economic factors on value so the 
research can be based on the relevant variables. (b) Compare model valuations of 
the new and survivor groups. (c) The model will serve as the joint statistical 
testing for the profitability, growth and risk factors as to whether the model can 
explain valuation differences. Model predictions are explicitly used to study stock 
age effect on market valuation. 
Section 3.5 provides a further analysis of the consistency between valuation 
differences and differences in individual value fundamentals. All tests are 
performed for the following categories: (a) profitability and efficiency, (b) 
growth, and (c) risk. Risk is examined through three risk indicators: systematic 
risk, stock returns volatility and liquidity argument, and finally age and the death 
of public limited companies. 
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We use the above empirical analysis to investigate the following null hypothesis: 
Ho: Differences in fundamentals can explain the differences in market 
valuation benveen new stocks and survivor (older) stocks. 
If the research concludes by rejecting Ho, that will be implicitly in favour of HI. 
HI: The stock market is biased in valuing new stocks relative to survivor 
(older) stocks. 
The research will also look into another version of Ho (Competing Null 
Hypothesis) in Section 3.6. That is: The market is rational in valuing new stocks 
higher than survivor stocks because of pricing the future long-term potential and 
status of new stocks. Where future growth is already priced in and hence new 
stocks do not produce significant positive stock returns until they can be classified 
as survivors, while their stock price variability in the interim is a combination of 
noise and revisions of expectations. Section 3.7 concludes this chapter. 
Figure 3-1 illustrates the various steps of the analysis, from Section 3.3 to 
Section 3.6. Following different routes on the flow chart can show other cases in 
which the research hypotheses would have been rejected or not rejected. 
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N and S stand for New and Survivor stock respectively. The figure only contains the main flow 
chart steps in a question format (for illustration purposes) as followed in this chapter where the 
sequence of questions and their answers lead to the conclusion. The rectangular boxes marked (8), 
(b), (c), (d), (e), and (t) briefly refer to the empirical analyses and techniques used to answer the 




This section provides a brief discussion of the data used in this analysis. 
Further details are provided in the data appendix (Appendix 3.8.1). This research 
uses annual data from the database of Datastream-Thomson Financial for the 
years 1989 through 2002.40 The dataset constitutes of the UK domestic research 
stocks that are compiled by Datastream in a list called 'FBRIT', which contains 
all UK traded stocks. Financial stocks are excluded because of their different 
nature from general industries, for example: regulations, different capital 
structure, liabilities are part of the operations for banks and not only financing 
items, different risk-return characteristics, and the different efficiency 
characteristics. It is common in the literature for this type of analysis to exclude 
them. 
Table 3-1 below presents the number of stocks in the sample every year and the 
corresponding market-cap. 
Year Number of Non- Market-Cap 
Financial Stocks £ billion 
1989 465 236 
1990 496 225 
1991 504 269 
1992 513 298 
1993 532 380 
1994 574 402 
1995 619 457 
1996 696 537 
1997 789 612 
1998 852 756 
1999 895 996 
2000 1012 1290 
2001 1121 1060 
2002 1179 870 
Table 3-1. Stocks in the Dataset and the Corresponding Market-Cap 
Number of non-financial stocks is based on stocks with valid share price. The market-cap reported 
corresponds with the reported number of non-fmancial stocks. Total market-cap including 
financial stocks was £347bn and £1116bn in 1989 and 2002 respectively, that means the sample in 
these two years excluding financials represents 67 and 78 percent respectively of the total market-
cap (based on Datastream Total Market-Cap Index TOTMKUK). 
40 Annual frequency is, of course, used because of the use of accounting data. 
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The data items retrieved include all those required for the construction of the 
supplementary valuation model i.e., as well as age, book, and market valuations. 
We thus collect statistics on (a) market valuation measures, (b) profitability, 
efficiency, & leverage, (c) growth, and (d) several measures of risk. Table 3-17 in 
Data Appendix 3.8.1 presents the raw data items retrieved from Datastream with 
the given symbols used in this research besides Datastream codes. The symbols 
are also listed with their definitions at the beginning of the thesis for all chapters. 
Central to our analysis is the division of the sample between new and 
survivor stocks. There is no standard criteria or definition for firm survivorship.41 
In this study, 'survivor stocks' (S or SUR) will be defined as those that have 
survived in listing for at least 14 years (throughout the whole sample period), i.e. 
those which were listed since or before the beginning of the sample period 1989 
and survived through 2002 and newer stocks, 'new stocks' (N or NEW) are those 
listed after 1989; the beginning of the sample period.42 
As 14 years cut-off point, selected because it is the sample period, appears a long 
time for defining survivor stocks, we looked, while working on chapters 3 and 4, 
at the empirical results with survivors defined as those aged 10 years or more and 
found that does not change the conclusions. Notwithstanding that, age group 
analysis was used to overcome the limitations of the 14 years arbitrary cut-off 
where companies are analysed according to their age every year regardless of 
calendar time as in Pastor and Veronesi (2003). The two analyses are consistent. 
Stocks that have died (went bankrupt) partway during the sample period are 
excluded due a logistical problem that Datastream does not distinguish in dead 
lists between bankrupt and taken-over/merged. However, the sample is fairly 
representative of the market as it contains companies that have survived so far and 
might still fail without complicating the modelling process with the extreme 
values exhibited by failing companies. This exclusion should not affect the 
conclusions of chapters 3 and 4, where the data used, because companies running 
41 Ball and Watts (1979) defined survivorship criterion as firms' that survived, at least, for a 
specified number of years. Evans (1987) classified a firm as 'survivor' if it was on the dataset in 
both the beginning and end of the sample period and as a non-survivor if it was on the dataset in 
the beginning but not in the end. 
42 The terms 'survivor stocks' or 'survivors' are used interchangeably throughout this work. 
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to bankruptcy display low profitability, low growth, and high risk. Hence, their 
inclusion could even strengthen the evidence on overvaluation. 
In this study, the concentration is on the overall stock market level. However, it is 
worth noting that there could be sector biases because the typical survivorship 
rates could vary a lot between sectors. The impact of technology stocks could be 
the subject of a separate future research to address. 
A brief discussion of the construction of the financial indicators 
(characteristics) is provided below; grouped according the above-mentioned four 
categories (after a group of some essential items). More detailed discussions are in 
the Data Appendix 3.8.1. 
Book equity BE is calculated, as in Pastor and Veronesi (2003) and in Conrad, 
Cooper, and Kaul (2003), as Ordinary equity capital and reserves OEQ plus 
balance sheet Deferred taxes DTBS. Investment tax credit, which appears in US 
based studies, is not applicable for UK companies. Earnings EGS are calculated, 
as in Pastor and Veronesi (2003), as Net income, earned for ordinary NI minus 
Extraordinary items EXOR plus Deferred taxes for the year DTIS. Cash flow CF, 
as in Conrad, Cooper, and Kaul (2003), is calculated as Net income; earned for 
ordinary NI minus Extraordinary items EXOR plus Depreciation and Amortisation 
DPAM. This cash flow calculation measures just the firm's performance before 
the major non-cash expense elements (depreciation and amortisation). Net 
operating profit after tax NOPAT is calculated as earnings before interest and 
tax EBIT minus taxes TAX. Some textbooks and valuation techniques use 
NOPLAT instead; that is net operating profits less adjusted taxes, where taxes are 
adjusted to cash basis on an unlevered basis while the impact of tax shield is 
captured by the net of tax cost of debt capital (this is consistent with the 
traditional definition of the after-tax WACC). See for example Copeland, Koller, 
and Murrin (2000). Invested capital Ie (Capital Employed CE) is the sum of all 
interest-bearing and/or non-current liabilities and capital elements. As in Pastor 
and Veronesi (2003) who followed Fama and French (2001), Age AGE, refers to 
the age of the company in listing. Every single year, age is calculated as the 
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current calendar year minus the stock trading beginning year (first share price 
appearance in the database) plus one. For example, the age calculated in 1999 for 
a company its stock started trading in 1993 is 7 years (1999 - 1993 + 1). 
10g(AGE) is used in the statistical model as referred to in Pastor and Veronesi 
(2003) as appropriate. They also mention that even using AGE defined as plain 
age (number of years) resulted in slightly weaker but still significant results. We 
tested this too and found the same. 
(a) Market-to-book equity MBE, is calculated as in Pastor and Veronesi (2003), 
as the market value of equity MVE divided by book equity BE. The idea of using 
market-to-book equity as a valuation measure remains simple and valid. That is 
relating market capitalisation of future outcomes (future cash flows generated by 
profitability and growth and assessed according to their risk) to the actual capital 
physically injected into the business to generate these cash flows (book equity is a 
proxy). Market-to-book value of firm MBF, is calculated as in Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), as the book value of total assets TA minus book equity BE plus 
market value of equity MVE divided by book value of total assets TA. Earnings-
price ratio EP or Earnings yield EY (the inverse of price-earnings ratio PIE) 
is calculated as earnings EGS divided by the market value of equity MVE (exactly 
the same as EPS, adjusted as for EGS, divided by share price). Cash flow-price 
ratio CFP, is calculated as in Conrad, Cooper, and Kaul (2003), as cash flow CF 
divided by market value of equity MVE to relate the pre-depreciation and 
amortisation outcome to market capitalisation. Annualised stock returns R, are 
calculated as the cumulative monthly percentage returns over 12-month period. 
Dividend-based indicators are not included to keep the research more general to 
dividend-paying and non-paying firms. 
(b) Return on equity ROE is calculated as earnings EGS divided by book equity 
BE. This is a measure of equity investment profitability as book equity represents 
the actual equity capital invested in the business. Return on invested capital 
ROlC (Return on capital employed ROCE), after-tax, is calculated as Net 
operating profit after taxes NOPAT divided by Invested capitallC; it measures the 
profitability to total invested capital from firm or all investors' perspective. Net 
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profit margin NPM is calculated as earnings EGS divided by turnover TUR; it 
measures the net trading profitability. Profit margin PM is calculated as Net 
operating profit after tax NOPAT divided by turnover TUR; it measures the gross 
trading profitability. Asset turnover A TV is calculated as turnover TUR divided 
by total assets TA; this is a measure of the firm's efficiency in using its assets to 
generate revenues. The profitability on capital is a function of net trading 
profitability/trading profitability and efficiency. Leverage (LVG) can be 
measured in different ways; consistent with Du Pont analysis of the ROE, 
leverage is calculated as total assets TA divided by book equity BE. Section 
3.8.1.4 of the Data Appendix 3.8.1 provides more discussion following the way 
leverage is defined by Conrad, Cooper, and Kaul (2003), and Pastor and Veronesi 
(2003). Cash flow-to-book equity ratio CFBE is calculated as cash flow CF 
divided by book equity BE; this is similar, in structure, to CFP but it uses book 
equity instead in order to related cash flow to the equity capital that is physically 
invested in the business rather than to market capitalisation to indicate the firm's 
underlying cash flow generating ability. 
(c) Growth is calculated as both percentage and logarithmic change in EPS, EBIT 
and turnover. Growth in EPS (called growth in earnings GEGS) is the selected 
measure for historic growth as growth in EBIT and turnover, in their absolute 
monetary values, are affected by growth from external equity capital additions 
while EPS is scaled per share and would reveal the historic growth patterns year 
on year. Also, growth in turnover does not give a clear idea about growth in 
earnings; it is rather an indicator for growth in volume, size, or market share. 
(d) Annualised stock return volatility orR) is calculated as the monthly standard 
deviation multiplied by the square root of 12 as while variance is linear with time 
standard deviation is linear with square root of time. Historic leveraged beta 
HBET A is estimated using Datastream. The procedure is the traditional single 
index mode1.43 Historic beta might be a poor approximation for the ex ante beta 
that should be used in the cost of capital calculation especially that the required 
43 5-year monthly logarithmic stock returns are used. The stock returns are regressed against 
Datastream total market index returns. Extreme values are excluded i.e. monthly changes over 
41.42 percent. The beta estimate is further modified by a Bayesian adjustment. The procedure is 
based on Cunningham (1973). 
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rate of return or the cost of capital is an economic ex ante measure. Therefore, the 
ex ante systematic risk and the cost of capital are estimated based on some well-
established thoughts in finance literature. The formula that links the leveraged 
beta (systematic financial and business risk) to the unlevered beta (systematic 
business risk), taxation and capital structure, based on Modigliani and Miller 
(1963) and Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), is given below. See Copeland, 
Koller, and Murrin (2000) for more details about this formula and for their 
recommended procedure, described below, to estimate the ex ante beta.44 The 
procedure can be summarised in the following three steps. 
D P L = Pu [1 + (1- T)-] 
E 
from which P _ PI. u- D 
1+ (1- T)-
E 
1. For every year, historic betas were de-geared to isolate business risk 
(stemming from operational and industrial factors) from financial risk 
(stemming from leverage) using this formula producing the unlevered beta 
UBETA (beta of the assets or operations; business risk). 
2. Unlevered betas were averaged for every sector every year to derive a sector-
level systematic business risk measure; sector unlevered beta SUBETA. 
3. Then, for every year, sector unlevered beta of that year was re-geared for 
every firm using the above formula applying the firm's own tax rate and 
capital structure for the same year. This yields an estimate for the ex ante beta 
EBETA that reflects both business and financial risk, which is used in the 
CAPM formula to estimate the cost of equity. 
Cost of equity using CAPM: K£ = RF + fll.[E(RM ) - RF ]. The literature is rich 
with research that used CAPM to estimate the cost of equity and others that 
discuss and debate CAPM itself. Here, the purpose is to use CAPM, as in too 
many papers, quoting for example Kaplan and Ruback (1995), so the basis of 
estimation is well established in finance theory and practice and very familiar. 
Risk-free rate; the rate on the 10-year UK government bond is used as 
44 Denotation used for beta estimation: K£ is the cost of leveraged equity. Ku is the cost of 
unJevered equity. KD is the cost of debt. WACC is the weighted-average cost of capital. PL is the 
leveraged beta (beta of equity: reflects business and financial risks). Pu is the unlevered beta (beta 
of the assets: reflects only business or operating risk). RF is the risk-free rate. RM is the expected 
return on the market. T is the tax rate. D is the value of debt. E is the market value of equity. 
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recommended in Copeland, Koller, and Murrin (2000) where they argue based on 
Campbell and Viceira (2001) that the 10-year rate approximates the duration of 
the stock market index portfolio and its use is therefore consistent with the betas 
and market risk premiums estimated relative to these market portfolios.45 As 
Kaplan and Ruback (1995) did, the expected return on the market is also 
estimated using the general recommendation in finance texts [see for example 
Copeland, Koller, and Murrin (2000) and Srealey and Myers (2000)]. The 
procedure: It should be measured on as long period as possible (10-year period is 
selected) using arithmetic average of rate of return, and adjusting downward by 
1.5 percent to account for survivorship bias. Copeland et at. estimated the 
downward adjustment by 1.5 to 2 percent based on the tables used by Jorion and 
Goetzmann (1999). The weighted average cost of capital WACC is calculated 
using the traditional formula below. For more discussion see the appendix. 
D E WACC==KD(l-T)--+KE--D+E 'D+E 
Size is measured in two different ways: Total assets TA or 10g(TA) and Market 
value of equity MVE. The total assets measure is a good proxy for firm size as it 
represents the total size of the operations while the market value of equity reflects 
the market capitalisation for future outcomes to equity. 
4S Just for example, Kaplan and Ruback (1995), in their paper about the valuation of cash flow 
forecasts, choose to use the rate on the long-term Treasury bond for the risk-free rate. 
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3.3 Differences in Market Valuation, Valuation Gap 
Behaviour, and IPO Evidence 
This section provides a preliminary descriptive analysis of the data, 
establishing clear differences in valuation between new and survivor stocks. We 
examine a number of different valuation measures, market-to-book equity, 
market-to-book of firm, earnings-price ratio, and cash flow-price ratio. We go on, 
in the following section, to attempt to build a valuation model that can explain 
these valuation differences, i.e. to address explicitly the null hypothesis of 
fundamental valuation. 
Table 3-2 shows that the two groups have statistically different market value 
indicators where survivor stocks have lower market-to-book of equity MBE and 
market-to-book of firm MBF and higher earnings-price EP and cash flow-price 
CFP (higher EP and CFP mean lower price-earnings PIE and price-cash flow 
PCF respectively) indicating relatively lower valuation for survivors.46 Table 3-3, 
where companies are sorted into 13 different age groups, reveals the same. Means 
confirm the same findings as from medians; they are not reported because the 
presence of some extreme values that distort them. Therefore, median values are 
thought to be more meaningful. Both tables below establish the presence of 
statistically significant valuation differences between survivor and new stocks. 
46 p-value of the difference in medians (test of equality) is used, hereinafter. It is calculated using 
seven different non-parametric tests as provided in the econometrics package EViews 4.1. These 
tests are WilcoxonlMann-Whitney, WilcoxonIMann-Whitney (tie-adj.), Med. Chi-square, Adj. 
Med. Chi-square, Kruskal-Wallis, Kruskal-Wallis (tie-adj.), and van der Waerden. See EViews 
User Guide or Integrated Help for more information. The highest p-value of the above tests is 
reported. A p-value less than 0.01 indicates that the difference is statistically significant at I 
percent level. 
47 
Age Group MBE MBF EP CFP Obs 
Percent Percent 
All (A) 1.81 1.41 5.46 8.71 9893 
Survivors (S) 1.65 1.33 6.38 10.25 6972 
New (N) 2.36 1.75 1.77 3.62 2921 
S-N -0.71 -0.43 4.61 6.63 
(S-N)/S Percent -42.70 -32.05 72.24 64.72 
E-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 3-2. Differences in Market Valuation, Survivor and New Stocks 
Survivor stocks'S' are those listed since or before 1989 and still traded in 2002. New stocks • N' 
are those listed in or after 1990. 'A' stands for all (both survivors and new together). MBE is 
market-to-book equity. MBF is market-to-book of finn. EP is earnings-price ratio. CFP is cash 
flow-price ratio. See Data section 3.2 and Data Appendix 3.8.1 for detailed calculations. The table 
reports medians, which are calculated from pooled data over the period 1989-2002. The last row 
reports the p-values of the differences in medians between S and N. a p-value less than 0.01 
indicates that the difference is statistically significant at I percent level. Obs is the average number 
of observation as available for the calculated measures. 
Age Group MBE MBF EP CFP Obs 
Percent Percent 
Up to 2 (G2) 2.87 2.08 1.57 2.65 804 
3 2.28 1.68 2.15 4.33 637 
4 2.30 1.66 4.01 6.47 533 
5 2.28 1.72 4.04 6.59 512 
6 1.92 1.49 4.35 7.11 488 
7 1.98 1.47 4.24 7.06 432 
8 2.02 1.59 5.20 7.92 356 
9 2.05 1.58 5.54 8.62 318 
10 2.02 1.54 5.62 8.55 278 
11 1.81 1.46 5.82 8.64 260 
12 1.83 1.47 6.21 9.55 252 
13 1.73 1.38 5.49 8.94 247 
14+ (GJ4) 1.53 1.26 6.44 10.70 4742 
G14-G2 -1.35 -0.82 4.87 8.05 
(G14-G2)/GJ4 Percent -88.34 -64.60 75.64 75.24 
,e-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 3-3. Differences in Market Valuation, Age Groups 
Finns are grouped for the pooled data according to their age regardless of calendar time. For 
example, a company aged 9 years in 1999 will appear in the 9-year age group while the same 
company will appear in the 10-year age group in 2000. The last row reports the p-values of the 
differences in medians between the youngest group G2 and the oldest group GU. See Table 3-2 
above for other clarifications about the table. 
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The declining pattern of MBE with age is consistent with the predictions of the 
statistical model estimated later in Section 3.4.2 and with the findings of Pastor 
and Veronesi (2003) in the US who find that aging in the life of a firm tends to be 
accompanied by a decrease in M BE. The median is one statistical representation 
for the population understudy. Therefore, to view the pattern of MBE at a more 
representative market level across age groups of all firms a weighted average 
MBE is calculated for common samples of each group. This is to allow the weight 
of each firm in the stock market to affect the measure. The formula used to 
calculate this weighted average MBE is as follows: 
" LMVE; 




Table 3-4 shows the weighted average MBE and Figure 3-2 plots the paths of 
median MBE and weighted average MBE for comparison. 
£ billion MVE BE MBE Obs 
Pooled 8280.0 3420.0 2.42 9768 
Upto2 168.1 72.6 2.32 667 
3 133.0 45.4 2.93 648 
4 169.0 49.3 3.43 534 
5 165.0 59.6 2.77 512 
6 188.0 75.8 2.48 491 
7 205.0 70.2 2.92 438 
8 210.0 73.8 2.85 355 
9 203.0 72.7 2.79 321 
10 191.0 79.5 2.40 278 
11 178.0 83.7 2.13 259 
12 201.0 83.3 2.41 252 
13 367.0 211.0 1.74 248 
14+ 5900.0 2440.0 2.42 4765 
Table 3-4. Weighted Average Market-to-Book Ratio for Age Groups 
Weighted average MBE is calculated for common samples by dividing the sum of market-cap 
MVE by the sum of book value of equity BE for all firms in every age group over the period 1989-
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Figure 3-2. Median and Weighted Average MBE for Age Group 
Medians and weighted average MBE 's are calculated in Table 3-3 and Table 3-4 respec tive ly with 
trend lines (the straight lines) added to show the overall pattems of MBE behaviour with age 
(declining pattem in both; the median and weighted average). 
Figure 3-2 reveals some differences between the path inferred from the traditional 
descriptive statistic, the median, and that of the weighted a erage. The median 
MBE is declining with age at different rates (with some variability) a in Pa tor 
and Veronesi (2003) , while the weighted average MBE i changing ignificantly 
in both directions with age. Notably, up to group 4 (G4) it i increasing with age 
and the same for groups 7, 12 and 14+ (G7, G12, and G 14 re pectively). 
However, the overall patterns for both are clearly declining a shown by the trend 
lines. 
In general , weighted average MBE values are higher than the median. It can be 
argued that the weighted average is more representativ for mark t level . The 
conclusion derived from medians for the younge t 4 group and the olde t group 
is the opposite of that derived from the weighted average measure. Th median 
shows MBE of 2.87 for G2 declining to 1.53 for G 14, while the weighted average 
shows MBE of 2.32 for G2 rising up to G4, and then fluctuating in a declining 
trend up to G14 where the value is 2.42. The ignificance of thi finding is to 
understand the relation between age and value while accounting for firm ' 
weights in the market. Firm weight is an important factor while relying olely on 
the medians leads to overlook some differences due to firm weighting. However 
this could be the result of the sample size for young stocks, therefore exploring 
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the comparative evolutional patterns of market va luation in calendar time could 
help to show whether same valuation differences that are found via the age group 
analyses, not in calendar time, can be confirmed in calendar time (time-series) 
analysis. The rationale behind thi s evolution te t i to confinn valuation 
differences taking into account changing market conditions over time rather than 
only using pooled data over the whole period 1989-2002 and to under tand the 
evolutional patterns of market valuation over time. 
Figure 3-3 shows the variation over time in market valuation for both urvivor and 
new stocks, as measured by median MBE. New stocks MBE has almost always 
been higher than that of survivors from year to year. MBE for urvivor seems 
more stable which is consistent with the declining pattern of MBE with age where 






























Figure 3-3. Evolution of Median MBE Over Time 
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SUR is for survivor stocks listed in or before 1989 and NEW is for newer tack Ii ted after 1989 . 
The graph is constructed in ca lendar time (time erie basis) . The W line starts at 1990 for the 
gap where the data starts for new stocks. 
To evaluate the robustness of this pattern reported in Figure 3-3 d rived from 
medians, an alternative weighted average MBE is shown in Figure 3-4. In which 
finn specific weights in the market are taken into account (while th m dian giv 
all finns the same weight). Figure 3-4 shows a simi lar pattern to Figure 3-3 again 
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Figure 3-4. Evolution of Weighted Average MBE Over Time 
SUR is for survivor stocks listed before or in 1989 and NEW i for new r stocks listed after 1989. 
The graph is constructed in calendar time. Weighted average MBE i calculated a the sum of 
market va lue of equity for all firms in each group every year divided by the carre ponding sum of 
book equities. The NEW line starts at 1990 for the gap where the data tarts for new tacks. 
These findings are similar to what can be observed in Pa tor and Veronesi (2003) 
in which new and old stocks are sorted relative to midpoint age u ing S data 
covering the period 1965-2000. In either comparison, the arne conclu i n i 
evident on market valuation differences (the pre ence of a gap) where new stocks 
have relatively higher valuation. However they also how that valuation of 
survivors is relatively more stable overall compared to that of new tock . 
An interesting reading of Figure 3-4 above i that market valuation peaked 
111 1999 for both groups when the valuation gap between them wa at it 
maximum. Then, market values declined sharply towards the end of the ample 
period 2002 narrowing the gap to an insignificant difference. The pattern f the 
valuation gap, since 1992, suggests that the gap size overall increa in bulli h 
markets and decreases in beari h market . Thi could be dri en by inve tor 
overoptimism about profitability and growth potential for new tock relative to 
survivor stocks in bullish market . Figure 3-5 clarifie thi further by plotting the 
percentage valuation difference calculated as [(New MBE - Survivor 
MBE)/Survivors MB£] from Figure 3-4 against the FTSE All Share Price Index. 
The gap ranged between - 15.03 and +86.58 percent closing at ju t +4.62 percent 
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Figure 3-5. Valuation Gap Behaviour and Stock Market Levels 
The va luation gap is the percentage va luation difference calculated a [(New MBE - Survivor 
MBE)/Survivors MBE] from Figure 3-4 and plotted against the FTSE All hare Price Index. The 
gap ranged between - 15.03 and +8 6.58 percent clo ing at +4.62 percent by the end of 2002. The 
line starts at 1990 for the gap where the data starts for new stocks. 
That is not to say that survivor stocks are neces aril y fa irly valued or not. 
What we have reported here is only a relati ve comparison where inve tor 
expectations appear to be exuberant (biased) for new tock relative to older 
stocks. It is possible that investors can have exces ively opti misti c expectations 
with regard to new stocks while learn ing about them ov r tim . The role of 
investment knowledge in limiting valuation bias is explored in hapter 5. 
Size appears, in the regression model estimated later in Section 3.4, a a 
significant valuation factor. Therefore, we compare again the valuation of new 
and survivor stocks, taking size difference into account. We do thi s using both 
market capitalisation MVE and total assets TA fo r size (both indicator are 
di scussed under the Data Section 3.2). Market-to-book equity MBE (for market 
valuation) is again selected for market valuation. Table 3-5 pr ent median MBE 
ratios for the different size/age groups where size is defined by market value of 
equity. Reading the rows, for all size groups MBE decline with age so the 
finding with respect to age and MBE holds regardle s f size. Reading the 
columns, regardless of age MBE increases with size.47 
47 The same analysis is repeated using total asset to define size in Appendix 3.8.2 .2. 
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£ million/years All Agc<=5 5<Age<=10 10<Age<=13 Age>=14 Obs 
All 2.45 2.00 1.B1 1.53 9901 
MVE<=I 0.31 0.60 0.18 0.25 0.25 95 
1 <MVE<= 10 1.02 1.50 1.16 0.90 0.75 2231 
1 O<MVE<=I 00 1.70 2.91 1.99 1.70 1.19 3844 
MVE>IOO 2.44 3.93 2.70 2.57 2.24 3731 
Obs 9901 2494 1883 759 4765 9901 
Table 3-5. MBE for Age and Size Groups (Market-Cap for Size) 
The table reports median MBE for the different size/age groups calculated from the pooled data 
over the period 1989-2002. Obs is the number of observations represents the sum of observations 
for all 4 age groups in rows and for all 4 size groups in columns. 
The above documentation of relative overvaluation of new stocks tallies 
with the evidence from Initial Public Offerings literature. Looking at the long-
term performance of IPOs could give some insight into the above identified 
valuation patterns. Gompers and Lerner (2003) examine the performance for five 
years post-listing of 3,661 US IPOs from 1935 to 1972. They find that the sample 
displays some underperformance when event-time buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
are used. A UK based study on the long-term underperformance of UK IPOs by 
Espenlaub, Gregory and Tonks (2000) re-examine the evidence on the long-term 
returns of UK IPOs over the period 1985-1992. They find substantial negative 
abnormal returns to an IPO after the first 3 years while the underperformance is 
still present but less dramatic over the 5-year period after an IPO. Overpricing 
IPOs (i.e. overpricing new stocks initially) relative to older stocks is a possible 
explanation for the relative subsequent long-term underperformance when stock 
valuations are consistent with firm performance and potential in the longer run. 
To further confirm the findings and the consistency with the above two papers the 
median annual stock returns are calculated for the pooled sample over the period 
1989-2002 (not in calendar time). The results are consistent with the above 
inferences where median annual stock returns was 7.8 percent for survivor stocks 
(6,972 observations) and only 0.4 percent for new stocks (2,921 observations) 
with a p-value of 0.0000 for the difference between the two. The significantly 
lower stock returns of new stocks which concurs with the long-term 
underperformance documented in the IPO literature implies that new stocks are 
overpriced in the early trading period which could explain the declining pattern of 
market-to-book when valuations are more inline with performance and potential. 
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3.4 Valuation Model and Joint Testing 
3.4.1 Valuation Framework and Model Structure 
This study is concerned with mapping differences in market valuation 
against differences in the underlying fundamentals to establish whether the 
differences in fundamentals can explain the differences in market valuation. 
Therefore, a statistical value-explanatory model will be constructed to: (a) first, 
identify these fundamentals and establish their value-relevance to ensure that all 
empirical conclusions are derived relying upon value-relevant variables, (b) use 
model predictions to explicitly study stock age effect on market valuation, and (c) 
to serve as the joint statistical testing of fundamentals in explaining value and 
valuation differences besides the individual tests performed in Section 3.5. This 
section discusses next the valuation framework based on which the valuation 
model is built followed by the structure of the model. 
Standard finance theory postulates that the value of a capital asset is 
determined by the present value of its future cash flows. For a company, cash flow 
drives value and cash flow is driven by return on investment (relative to the cost 
of capital) and growth in income. From this essential premise value fundamentals 
can be classified into the following three main categories: 
1. Profitability, 
2. Growth, and 
3. Risk. 
i.e. equity value is function of profitability. growth, and risk, where profitability 
and growth determine future free cash flows. The selected factor categories are 
expected to have sufficient explanatory power to explain value simply because the 
impact of all systematic and unique factors that are value-relevant to companies 
will be eventually reflected in those indicators. So, they should serve as good 
proxies for the underlying value-drivers. If the impact of a systematic or unique 
value or risk factor does not affect one of the above measures, then such factor is 
value-irrelevant. Appendix 3.8.2.1 presents a simplified illustration on value, cash 
flow, income and return on investment. 
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Utilising the above-discussed basis of finance theory and common 
practice, value drivers can be identified from two perspectives; Firm Perspective 
and Equity Perspective. Figure 3-6 and Figure 3-7 present the two respectively. 
ROIC - NO PLAT .;- Revenues 




Assets) Revenues -+- Assets 
- (Asset or Capital Turnover) 
FCFF I--
Firm Growth in 
Value NOPLAT 
MBF Cost of Capital 
(WACC) 
Figure 3-6. Value Driver Tree - Firm Perspective 
All indicators are expressed to all capital providers. MBF is market-lo-book value of firm, FCFF is 
free cash flow to firm, ROlC is return on invested capital calculated as NOPLAT divided by lC (or 
Assets), NOPLAT is net operating profit less adjusted taxes (see Data in Section 3.2 for more 
details about NOPLAT and its consistency with WACC construction), WACC is the weighted 
average cost of capital. ROlC = Profit margin x Assets turnover. Note that Invested capital (lC) = 
Short-term debt + Long-term debt + Book equity + Minority interest = Assets (A) = Fixed assets + 
Current assets - Non-interest bearing current liabilities. Model variables are in bold face. 
EGS .;- Revenues 
(Net Profit Margin) 
r-- EGS -+- Assets Revenues .;- Assets 
. 
(Asset or Capital 
ROE - Turnover) 
(EGS ~ 
Equity) 










Figure 3-7. Value Driver Tree - Equity Perspective 
All indicators are expressed to common-equity-holders. MBE is market-to-book value of equity, 
FCFE is free cash flow to equity, ROE is return on equity capital calculated as earnings divided by 
equity capital, EGS is net income or earnings, KE is the cost of equity. ROE = Net profit margin x 
Asset turnover x Leverage. Model variables are in bold face. 
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The equity perspective is selected for the analysis. Consistent with equity 
perspective, market-to-book of equity will be the dependent variable of market 
valuation and equity perspective variables will form the main explanatory 
variables. The rationale behind this choice comes from: 
I. The objective of this research is to explore market valuation of equity and the 
capitalisation of all factors and information into equity prices; 
2. The practical difficulties associated with using firm perspective of value 
drivers in the analysis, in particular: 
a) Estimating the market-to-book value of firm (MBF) is unviable as market 
values of debt and other non-common equity financing are not available. 
b) As company-specific cost of debt is not available for the sample, 
estimating the weighted-average cost of capital (WACC) is a major 
difficulty and might introduce significant error into the data. 
3. Market-to-book of equity MBE as a valuation measure consistent with equity 
perspective remains simple and valid, as it relates market capitalisation of 
future outcomes (future cash flows generated by profitability and growth and 
assessed according to their risk) to the actual capital physically injected into 
the business (book equity is a proxy). The simple exposition below illustrates 
the idea and why MBE represents equity perspective of valuation: 
MVE = NA V + £Premiurn, (BE is a proxy for NA V) 
MVE = BE + £Premiurn, dividing by BE gives: 
MBE = 1 + Percentage Premium Rate 
4. Other equity-perspective market value indicators such as earnings-to-price EP 
and cash flow-to-price CFP are not dissimilar to market-to-book of equity 
MBE in terms of representing market valuation. However, as they have 
outcome measures in their construction, such as earnings and cash flow, they 
exhibit major volatility and extreme values, which complicates the modelling 
process. Therefore, it was decided to model market-to-book MBE based on the 
above and consistent with Pastor and Veronesi (2003) and the discussion of 
Smithers and Wright (2004).48 
48 See Smithers and Wright (2004) for a discussion of five tests "q" meets as a useful measure of 
value. Cyclically adjusted PIE (or its inverse) meets them too. However, there is a practical 
difficulty for the cyclical adjustment at flJlll level. 
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Based on the above, the basic structure of the model is: 
Equity valuation = f (Profitability. Growth. Risk) 
The general notion of this structure is similar to that used by Pastor and Veronesi 
(2003). Size and age are also introduced to the model to examine their impact on 
value. Hence, the model is specified as follows: 
Equation 3-2: 10g(MBE); = /30 + /3,NPM; + /32ATU; + /33TABE; + /34GEGS; 
+ /3s KE; + /3610g(TA}; + /3710g(AGE); + G; 
It reads: 10g(MBE;} = Constant + /31 (Trading Profitability) + /32 (Efficiency) 
+ /33 (Leverage) + /34 (Growth) + /35 (Cost of Capital) 
+ /36 (Size) + /37 (Age) + Disturbances 
where MBE is market-to-book of equity. 10g(MBE) is the rate of the value 
premium assigned by the market to book equity. NPM is net profit margin. ATU is 
asset turnover, TABE is total assets to book equity (for leverage). GEGS is growth 
in earnings (logarithmic). KE is the cost of equity (for risk). TA is total assets (for 
size). AGE is the age of the stock in listing. For more details on variable 
construction, calculation and discussion see Data Section 3.2 and Data Appendix 
3.8.1. Note that ROE = EGS = EGS x 1VR x TA , i.e. ROE = Trading 
BE TUR TA BE 
Profitability NPM x Efficiency ATU x Leverage LVG. 
It is worth discussing briefly the model time lag. As price-sensitive 
information flows throughout the year into the market, it can be expected that 
share prices capitalise most information that will be revealed at the financial year 
end gradually due to interim reports, profit warning, analyst direct relations with 
companies, etc. Bartov and Goldberg (2001) find similar results when regressing 
12-month stock return, measured over the fiscal year, on net income and cash 
flow realised during the same year to those results when extending stock return 
window 3 months after the fiscal year end and to those with extending it to the 
latest month in which annual reports are required to be filed. Old research also 
supports this, e.g., Ball and Brown (1968) indicate that most of the information in 
the financial statements is incorporated into share prices prior to their formal 
release. Hence, the relation is tested in this research between market values at time 
t and financial drivers calculated as published at the same time. 
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The key papers by Fama and French that addressed size and M/B are "Size And 
Book-To-Market Factors In Earnings And Returns" (1995), "Common Risk 
Factors In The Returns On Stocks And Bonds" (1993), and "The Cross-Section 
Of Expected Stock Returns" (1992). They use Book-to-Market B/M (the inverse 
of M/B) and MVE for Size. According to them, low MlB signals poor future 
earnings and vice versa. Our research and models are consistent with these signals 
because M/B reflects prospective (future) profitability as demonstrated by the 
theoretical and empirical models presented in this chapter and the following 
chapter. 
F&F argue that size (MVE) and B/M must proxy for sensitivity of common risk 
factors in returns. F&F (1995): "Size (MVE) and B/M remain arbitrary indicator 
variables that, for unexplained reasons, are related to risk factors in returns". 
However, size defined as MVE and B/M is calculated using MVE, subsequent 
stock returns are calculated from changes in MVE. Thus, they would reflect 
common risk factors. 
MVE (F&F-defined size) and B/M reflect the capitalisation of future outcomes. 
Two ways of looking at this, Stock price performance or levels against 
PV[E(Dividends)] and/or E(Price Appreciation) or against underlying corporate 
performance PV[E(cash flows) or E(eamings)], simply, different sides for the 
same token. Theoretically, they should yield identical results. We concentrate on 
the second side: Value = f(underlying corporate performance and risk). Stock 
returns, MVE, B/M are all expressions of market valuations that represent the 
capitalisation of other underlying fundamentals, so, we use the latter group to 
explain the former rather than searching for predications or signals that are 
implied in market indicators. BIM or MIB model is just a variation of the MVE 
model and stock returns are the percentage changes in MVE. 
Our methodology, although not on explaining or predicting stock returns, is still 
consistent with the foundation of F &F work. It is just another type of research that 
concentrates on the long-term market value overall levels, while research in stock 
returns concentrates on MVE dynamics over shorter periods (say monthly or 
annual stock returns, whether explaining of predicting). 
59 
Of course, F&F methodology is different due to their different objectives as they, 
for example: relate future stock returns to proxies of risk factors (size and 81M), 
address stock returns and earnings predictability, use size and 81M ranking and 
study subsequent perfonnance. Our methodology and type of research in this 
chapter and the following one are closer to the valuation literature rather than 
F&F type of research [e.g., Miller and Modigliani (1961), Kaplan and Ruback 
(1995), Pastor and Veronesi (2003), Ang and Liu (2001), 8artov and Goldberg 
(2001), Clayman and Shwartz (1994), De Heer and Koller (2001), Feltham and 
Ohlson (1999), Freeman, Ohlson and Penman( 1982), Penman and Sougiannis 
(1998), Sougiannis and Yaehura (2001), Campbell and Shiller (1998), Campbell 
and Shiller (1988), Cole, Helwege and Laster (1996), Flood and Garber (1980), 
Heaton and Lucas (1999), Kiley (2000), Lansing (2002), Sharpe (2002), Shiller 
(1981), Summers(1986)] 
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3.4.2 Model Estimation and Age Effect: Does the Model Explain 
Valuation Differences? 
Table 3-6 below presents the results of estimating the valuation joint 
testing model in a pooled regression using pooled data for the period 1989-2002. 
The reading that stands out is the negative sign and significance of the age 
coefficient; i.e. the older the company the lower the relative valuation, what kind 
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Total number of observations 
Table 3-6. Value RelevancelExplanatory Model 
Coefficient p-value Expected Sign 
0.07 0.4669 0 
2.04 0.0000 + 
0.21 0.0000 + 
0.10 0.0000 + 
0.18 0.0000 + 
-1.44 0.0000 






The dependent variable is the natural log of market-to-book which measures the rate of market 
value premium/discount over book value; C is the constant tenn; NPM is the net profit margin (net 
trading profitability), ATU is asset turnover (efficiency); TABE is total assets-to-book equity ratio 
~ I + Debt-to-equity ratio (leverage); Note that NPM x ATU x TABE = ROE. The use of ROE 
instead of its components yields similar results with a higher R-squared: GEGS is growth in 
earnings measured as 10g(EGS/EGS,.,). KE is the cost of equity capital (risk); TA is total assets 
(size); AGE is the finn's age every year. Total number of observations is 7,108 for pooled data for 
all survivor and new stocks for the period 1989-2002. Method of estimation is least squares pooled 
regression. Robust estimation technique (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & 
Covariance) is used to correct the standard errors as the model exhibited heteroskedasticity. Finns 
with MBE smaller than 0.01 or larger than 100 were excluded as in Pastor and Veronesi (2003). 
As Table 3-6 above shows, the estimated model confinns the expected signs and 
significance for the selected variables. Below is a discussion for every coefficient. 
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The Constant term: As the model is structured to explain the rate of value 
premium or discount the market assigns over the book equity (proxy for equity 
invested capital) it was expected that the constant should not be statistically 
different from zero as the premium is expected to be related to the underlying 
profitability, growth and risk factors and not to be a constant at all. To clarify this, 
when the same model is estimated using market-to-book as the dependent variable 
rather than its natural logarithm, the signs and the significance are very similar for 
all coefficients except for the constant term where it is statistically close to unity 
(slightly higher) indicating that the constant term reflects the capital physically 
invested in the business while other variables explain the premium or the 
discount. The simplified exposition below illustrates this idea. 
MVE = NA V + £Premium, (BE a proxy for NA V) 
MVE = BE + £Premium, dividing by BE gives MBE: 
MBE = I + Percentage Premium Rate, by taking the natural logarithm and 
as (I + Percentage Premi urn Rate) = (eLogarithmic Premium Rat): 
10g(MBE) = log( eLogarithmic Premium Rat} = Logarithmic Premium Rate 
The fact the constant term is not statistically different from zero provides some 
comfort about the model structure, specification, and the explanatory power of its 
variables. 
Net profit margin, asset turnover and earnings growth are positive and significant 
as logically expected. 
Leverage is positive and significant indicating that leverage was favoured by the 
stock market perhaps because of tax shield. This is consistent with standard 
finance theory especially that the negative impact on value from financial risk 
associated with leverage is captured by the cost of equity variable as beta was 
estimated for every company to reflect its specific capital structure every year. 
Cost of equity capital: negative and significant, as expected, being the ex ante 
measure of the investor-required rate of return reflecting the risk of the 
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investment. This is consistent with standard finance theory and common practice 
in investment. 
Size: positive and significant. This is consistent with Evans (1987) who found that 
firm failure decreases with size. Similarly, Koke (2001) identifies size as one of 
corporate failure determinants where small-sized firms exhibit a higher likelihood 
of failure relative to large-sized firms. This relation between size and age could be 
the main reason behind the positive market valuation of size information. Also 
some evidence and contra-evidence are documented in stock return literature with 
respect to size, for example, Dimson and Marsh (1998) find that in the UK large 
firms apparently yield higher stock returns than small tirms while Downs and 
Ingram (2000) find that average stock returns and size are not related at all. 
Age: negative and significant. This was anticipated given the hindsight of the 
declining pattern of MBE with age and not based on any clear economic rationale. 
One can argue that lower age is associated with higher value because of the higher 
expected growth for younger stocks. However, growth was captured with earnings 
growth factor (positive and significant), realised logarithmic earnings growth and 
10g(AGE) have a next to zero correlation -0.02. What about the higher risk of 
newer stocks in passing the test of time? Could this valuation assigned to the age 
factor be a false hope about growth? The remainder of this chapter attempts, in its 
context, to answer these questions. 
R-squared: Model explanatory power is good in such a regression analysis. 
However, the selected explanatory variables with the demonstrated significance 
and correct signs that explain MBE should capture the impacts on value of (a) the 
systematic factors; as demonstrated by the regression model, while (b) the finn-
unique factors are not believed to be captured in such a regression estimation. 
They would be only captured by firm in-depth analysis. Thus, in this case their 
impact would appear in the disturbances. 
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Estimating the same equation over different periods, including for single years, 
showed that model is stable over time in its ability to explain value by the selected 
fundamental variables. 
The impact of the age factor is highlighted in isolation from other factors 
in Figure 3-8, which plots a model-generated pattern for MBE against the age 
factor. The model pattern clearly shows how age is factored into market valuation. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Age Groups 
Figure 3-8. Age Impact on Market Valuation 
Model predictions for age group valuations (measured by Model MBE) are estimated using the 
overall model estimated on the pooled data shown in Table 3-6. Model 10g(MBE) is first 
calculated, then Model MBE is calculated based on the structure of the model using the following 
formula: Model MBE = exp[Modellog(MBE)]. All variables, except age, were controlled using 
sample grand medians 1989-2002. The age variable is varied to illustrate its impact isolated from 
other factors. 
To help answer the question as to whether the model estimated on the 
entire sample in Table 3-6 predicts differences in market valuation (MB£) 
between new and survivor stocks, model predictions for age group valuations are 
estimated using the median values for every age group. Figure 3-9 plots the 
model-generated values (Model MB£) versus the Historic median MBE showing 
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that the pattern of historic MBE declining with age is matched closely by the 
model-generated values (in-sample model predictions).49 
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Figure 3-9. Model versus Historic MBE; Age Groups 
10 11 12 13 14+ 
Historic MBE is the observed historic median MBE for age groups over the period 1989-2002. 
Model MBE is the model-generated MBE. Model MBE is estimated for every age group using the 
overall model estimated on the pooled data shown in Table 3-6 where model 10g(MBE) is first 
calculated and then Model MBE is calculated based on the structure of the model using the 
following formula: Model MBE = exp[Mode\ 10g(MBE)]. All variables were controlled using 
sample medians for every age group 1989-2002. 
Next, we estimate the model predicted percentage differences in valuation 
between survivor and new stocks using the same methodology and model as in 
Figure 3-9 while model values are calculated separately for each group to 
understand more about the power of the model in explaining valuation 
differences. 
Figure 3-10 depicts the comparison in a scatter plot format. Observed median 
MBE is 1.65 and 2.36 for survivors and new stocks respectively making the 
difference in valuation 43 percent above survivors. Model predicted values, 
including age variable are 1.70 and 2.12 respectively, reducing the gap to 25 
percent also explaining 25 percentage points of the 43 percentage points 
49 From Figure 3-9 one can observe that model values suggest overstated MBE for age groups up 
to 10 years, for which model values were almost always below observed values. The model seems 
to be reducing the level and the slope of the declining MBE for these up to 10-year groups. 
Notwithstanding that, the model is built using historic data, therefore it will not be a perfect 
correction but can be taken as an indicator. It is interesting that model and observed values are 
almost the same for firms aged over 10 years. 
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difference (that is 58 percent of the gap). The remaining 18 percentage point (42 
percent of the gap) can be ass igned to the disturbances and latent estimation 
errors. Model predicted values, excluding age variable are 1.76 and 1.48 for 
survivors and new stocks respectively, inverting the gap to - 16 percent. Given the 
disturbances and latent estimation error , the version of the model that excludes 
the age variab le (because of the lack of economic rigour) sugge t that th 
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Figure 3-10. Model versus HistoricMBE; Survivor and New rock 
Sand N denote survivor and new stocks respectively. Hi toric MBE is the ob erved hi toric 
median MBE over 1989-2002 for each group of the two. Model MBE i the model-generated MBE. 
Model MBE is estimated using the overall model e timaled on the pooled data hown in Table 3-6 
where Model 10g(MBE) is first calculated, then Model MBE is calculated ba ed on the structure of 
the model using the following fonnula : Model MBE = exp[Model 10g(MBE)). All variable wer 
con trolled us ing sample medians for each of the two groups 1989-2002 . The arne model of Table 
3-6 was re-estimated without the age variables. The sign and ignificance of the re-estimated 
model are similar 10 that with age apart from the constant term, which b came nega tiv and 
significant apparentl y capturing the negative impact of the dropped age factor, Table 3-20 in 
Appendix 3.8.2 .3 reports the re-estimated model. he percentage differences hown on the graph 
between each two points are calculated a [(Model Value - Hi loric Median Value)fHi toric 
Median Value). 
To further understand the difference in market aluation a rev aled by 
the regression analysi , the same tati tical model e timat d in Table -6 wa 
estimated separately for survi vor and new tocks. Table 3-7 pre ent the re ult . 
The estimation for survivor stocks i similar to that of the pooled data. ew tocks 
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model shows the following differences: The constant tenn is negative but still 
insignificant. Net profit margin is less significant compared with survivors 
indicating a weaker link between market valuation and this important profitability 
indicator, given the higher level of market valuation for new stocks, this indicates 
the presence of other factors, perhaps behavioural factors that are at work (such as 
underestimating risk). The cost of equity is positive and significant indicating 
either a distorted valuation structure for new stocks that contradicts the basics of 
finance and investment or significantly underestimated risk for new stocks where 
value is driven more by investor expectations. Size is negative and insignificant, 
this negative sign was expected for new stocks given they have smaller size with 
relatively higher valuation compared with survivors. And finally, age is still 
negative indicating the tendency of market valuation to decline with age but it is 
insignificant compared to being significant for survivors because age is not yet 
important at the new stock stage. 
Sun'ivors New 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Dependent variable: log(MRE) 
C 0.00 0.9713 -0.37 0.2657 
NPM 2.00 0.0000 2.40 0.0090 
ATU 0.18 0.0000 0.25 0.0000 
TARE 0.10 0.0000 0.16 0.0000 
GEGS 0.16 0.0000 0.25 0.0000 
KE -1.63 0.0000 8.04 0.0004 
log(TA) 0.07 0.0000 -0.01 0.5815 
log('.!.<!§) ..... -0.23 0.0000 -0.07 0.3728 
. . ..... , ....... ~ •....... ........... ............... .... . .. 
R-squared 0.21 0.23 
Adjusted R-squared 0.21 0.22 
p-value (F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 
Total number of observations 5.394 1.714 
Table 3-7. Value RelevancelExplanatory Model; Survivors versus New 
Survivor stocks are those listed since or before 1989 and still traded in 2002. New stocks are those 
listed in or after 1990. See Table 3-6 for more explanations. Total number of observations is 5.394 
and 1.714 for survivors and new stocks respectively from the pooled data over the period 1989-
2002. Robust estimation technique (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & 
Covariance) is used to correct the standard errors as the model exhibited heteroskedasticity. 
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Comparing age coefficients of the two groups indicates that age is a 
discriminating variable once stocks are old according to the survivorship criteria 
selected for this research, where the market is not assigning importance to the age 
of new stocks as for survivors. Overall, the valuation model for new stocks, unlike 
for survivors, seems inconsistent, in its entirety, with standard finance theory and 
practice. However, comparing age and cost of equity variables indicates age 
discrimination without a known economic explanation for this. Perhaps, it is a 
valuation bias resulting from underestimating risk for new stocks. More detailed 
analyses follow to explore the possibility of valuation bias further. 
The model is reasonably successful in predicting valuation differences between 
new and survivor stocks and explaining that by age factor and perhaps risk 
underestimation. These results seem to point into the direction that the presence of 
such valuation discrepancies between stocks of different age groups is not 
explained by differences in fundamental factors, which would lead to reject the 
null hypothesis in favour of the alternative. Therefore, the following analyses 
concentrate on analysing and comparing stock fundamental characteristics to 
study this phenomenon and back this possible conclusion. 
68 
3.5 Differences in Individual Fundamentals versus 
Valuation Differences 
Following the model joint analysis and testing of fundamentals, we tum in 
this section to seek confinnation to the inferences drawn above by examining 
differences in individual fundamentals (value detenninants: profitability, growth 
and risk) to establish whether these differences (if any) can explain the 
documented differences in valuation between new and survivor stocks. The 
approach here is once again descriptive (like Section 3.3) rather than econometric 
(like Section 3.4), examining whether there are obvious differences in these 
fundamental factors between the two groups of stocks, that might not have been 
captured in the econometric estimates. 
3.5.1 Differences in Profitability and Efficiency 
The task here is to explore the first possible explanation or part 
explanation; differences in profitability levels between survivor and new stocks. 
That is, growth and risk being equal, just for the time being, stocks with higher 
profitability levels should be valued relatively higher. 
Table 3-8 and Table 3-9 show a profitability comparison across age groups using 
equity perspective (ROE) and finn perspective (ROIC) and their trading 
profitability, efficiency and leverage components as discussed before in Section 
3.4.1 (Figure 3-6 and Figure 3-7). 
ROE =f(NPM, ATU, TABE) 
ROle = f (PM, ATU) 
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Age Group ROE ROle NPM PM ATV TARE CFBE Obs 
Percent Percent Percent Percent X X Percent 
All (A) 11.03 10.98 4.06 5.42 1.18 2.00 17.86 9893 
Survivors (5') 12.08 12.01 4.38 5.85 1.25 2.07 19.39 6972 
New(N) 5.67 6.21 2.47 3.34 0.90 1.80 10.63 2921 
S-N 6.41 5.80 1.91 2.51 0.34 0.27 8.76 
(S-N)/S Percent 53.06 48.31 43.60 42.88 27.59 13.02 45.17 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 3-8. Profitability, Efficiency and Leverage; Survivor and New Stocks 
The table reports medians calculated from the pooled data over the period 1989-2002 for ROE 
return on equity, ROIC return on invested capital, NPM net profit margin, PM profit margin. ATV 
asset turnover, TARE total assets-to-book equity (leverage), and CFRE cash flow-to-book equity 
ratios. See Section 3.2 for detailed calculations. Other pieces of infonnation in the table are the 
same as in previous tables. The total number of observations in this table is higher than that 
reported in model estimation in Table 3-6 and Table 3-7 because of excluded observations where 
values are unavailable for all variables. for example, there is a loss of observations because of the 
use of the logarithmic growth rates with negative earnings. This comment applies to different 
tables in this document. 
Age Group ROE ROle NPM PM ATV TARE CFRE Obs 
Percent Percent Percent Percent X X Percent 
Up to 2 (G2) 5.15 6.23 3.13 4.28 0.78 1.61 8.10 804 
3 5.66 6.90 2.62 3.45 0.97 1.82 10.87 637 
4 11.86 11.32 4.39 5.06 1.12 1.90 17.49 533 
5 10.81 10.80 3.92 4.81 1.14 1.94 17.56 512 
6 10.02 10.20 3.71 4.75 1.09 1.87 16.50 488 
7 9.52 9.65 3.15 4.21 1.19 1.95 15.95 432 
8 11.53 10.84 3.90 4.93 1.18 1.95 18.81 356 
9 12.63 11.56 4.51 5.38 1.20 2.02 19.65 318 
10 13.52 13.01 4.81 5.89 1.17 2.02 19.92 278 
11 13.15 12.23 4.90 5.86 1.18 2.02 19.98 260 
12 12.95 13.49 5.32 6.37 1.14 1.99 19.99 252 
13 11.64 11.21 4.36 5.43 1.18 1.99 19.77 247 
14+ (GJ4) 11.32 11.34 4.11 5.70 1.25 2.11 18.61 4776 
G14-G2 6.17 5.11 0.98 1.43 0.47 0.50 10.50 
(G 14-(2)/G 14 Percenl 54.49 45.07 23.89 24.99 37.71 23.70 56.44 
~-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 3-9. Profitability, Efficiency and Leverage; Age Groups 
The table reports medians calculated from the pooled data over the period 1989-2002 for ROE 
return on equity, ROIC return on invested capital, NPM net profit margin, PM profit margin, A TU 
asset turnover, TABE total assets to book equity (leverage), and CFBE cash flow to book equity 
ratio. Other pieces of infonnation in the table are the same as in previous tables. See Section 3.2 
for detailed calculations. 
70 
Both tables provide evidence that survivor stocks have statistically higher 
profitability, efficiency and cash flow ratios over the long run having been 
estimated from 14-year pooled data. Therefore, differences between profitability 
and efficiency cannot explain the lower valuation of survivors. On the contrary, if 
growth and risk were the same for both groups, survivors should be valued higher 
because they offer higher profitability and cash flow generating ability. 
Hence, the explanation will be sought next by exammmg growth 
differences, where new stocks are expected to have a higher growth consistent 
with the general notion of younger stocks and growth potential and their higher 
valuations. 
3.5.2 Differences in Growth 
Having found that profitability would be priced to result in a higher 
valuation for survivor stocks and expecting survivors to be perceived as less risky 
than new stocks, the attention is turned to growth potential to explain the higher 
valuation of new stocks. Accordingly, new stocks are expected to show a 
significantly higher growth than survivors to explain value differences after 
offsetting the impact of profitability and efficiency differences. 
Table 3-10 and Table 3-11 show that the differences in medians are not significant 
for realised growth in earnings per share. However, the differences are statistically 
significant for the growth in EBIT and turnover at 5 percent level in both tables. At 
face value. this could demonstrate that survivors have realised lower growth than 
new stocks consistent with the general notion and the expectation and their 
valuation. Nevertheless, the difference between growth in EBITbetween youngest 
and oldest groups in Table 3-10 is barely significant at I percent level and not 
statistically significant in Table 3-11 at 1 percent level and barely significant at 5 
percent level. 
Moreover, an important fact should be clarified in this regard, that EPS is a 
comparable figure (scaled/standardised per share) for growth calculation year on 
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year while EBIT magnitude is affected by profits generated from external capital 
additions or reductions. Therefore, growth in EPS is a more accurate measure for 
organic b7fowth, while growth in turnover reflects size or market share growth 
rather than growth in outcome and it is affected by capital changes as well. Hence, 
EBIT and turnover growth would be overstated by external growth from 
additional capital. All three measures are equally subject to the impact of inflation 
and thus the comparison remains valid as far as inflation is concerned. 
Age Groups Growth in Obs 
Percent EPS ERn TUR 
All (A) 1.30 6.65 8.79 9893 
Survivors (S) 1.92 6.12 7.52 6972 
New (N) -0.20 9.85 16.01 2921 
S-N 2.12 -3.72 -8.49 
(S-N)/S Percent 110.28 -60.78 -112.84 
e-value 0.9005 0.0065 0.0000 
Table 3-10. Realised Growth; Survivor and New Stocks 
The table presents median realised growth calculated as the annual percentage change calculated 
from the pooled data over the period 1989-2002. p-values of the differences in medians between S 
and N lead to the same conclusion on statistical significance of the difference using all the 7 non-
parametric tests referred to before. 
Age Group Growth in Obs 
Percent EPS ERn TUR 
Up to 2 (G2) -8.91 15.39 23.80 804 
3 8.73 18.38 24.84 637 
4 2.37 10.30 16.92 533 
5 2.48 8.90 13.48 512 
6 1.14 9.76 12.73 488 
7 -7.49 0.88 8.31 432 
8 3.72 7.11 9.92 356 
9 3.01 7.94 8.96 318 
10 11.29 15.38 12.53 278 
11 4.21 8.28 11.69 260 
12 4.21 9.70 9.65 252 
13 -5.05 -0.28 7.76 247 
14+ (G14) 0.36 4.45 6.21 4776 
G14-G2 9.28 -10.94 -17.58 
(G14-G2)/G14 Percent 2553.14 -246.08 -283.02 
e-value (G14 I' G2) 0.5813 0.0439 0.0000 
Table 3-11. Realised Growth; Age Groups 
The table presents median realised growth rates calculated as the annual percentage change 
calculated from the pooled data over the period 1989-2002 for each age group. p-values of the 
differences in medians between G14 and G21ead to the same conclusion on statistical significance 
of the difference using all the 7 non-parametric tests. 
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Based on the above and given the mixed readings of different growth measures, it 
can be concluded that realised growth in earnings (EPS) for both groups are not 
statistically different and hence realised growth fails to provide any sound 
explanation or part explanation for the differences in market valuation leaving the 
phenomena perhaps lending itself to valuation bias driven by investor 
expectations. This is confirmed by the model estimation for survivor and new 
stocks Table 3-7 where for both groups growth in EPS was positive and 
significant, which is consistent with finding no significant difference between the 
two median growth rates of the two categories. Notwithstanding that, if the market 
takes growth in EBIT and turnover as differentiating factors, at face value as a 
misperception, growth could explain behaviourally, at least in part, the differences 
in market valuation, which is likely to be the case~ knowing the general notion 
about new stocks and growth potential. Given the above statistical analysis one 
can conclude that growth is most likely to be part of the explanation, but it is 
unlikely to reasonably account for the whole or majority of the gap in valuation 
between new and older. 
3.5.3 Differences in Risk 
Just by thinking from investor perspective it can be argued that new stocks 
are perceived riskier than survivors and that entails a relatively higher ex ante 
discount rate for new stocks and hence should lead to lower valuations. This 
section compares risk using different basic techniques. These are systematic risk, 
stock returns volatility, and finally age and the death of public limited companies. 
3.5.3.1 Systematic Risk 
Leveraged beta reflects systematic financial risk (the risk associated with 
leverage) and systematic business risk (operating risk; the risk of the assets). Beta 
estimation is covered under Data Section 3.2. The impact of company-specific 
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leverage was reflected in beta estimation.5o A simple and quick test for historic 
beta is carried out to continn whether new stocks are perceived as riskier than 
survivor stocks. The weighted average historic beta is calculated for the pooled 
sample over the whole period understudy where market values of equities are used 
as the weights to represent what would be the market perception about the 
systematic risk of each category measured by beta. 
The calculations resulted in a weighted average historic beta of 0.92 for survivors 
and 0.97 for new stocks. As expected, survivor stocks are perceived to have lower 
risk than new stocks as measured by beta. However, this difference in the 
weighted average historic beta does not seem to be dramatic. But, at least it 
indicates that risk for survivors is not higher from that of new stocks. The 
illustration in Table 3-12 uses CAPM to support this argument; where the 
difference in beta does not lead to a major difference in the cost of equity. 
Therefore, based on this CAPM prediction, market risk perceptions do not seem 






Expected return on the market 
Cost of Equity 
Estimation II: 
Risk-free rate 
Expected return on the market 




















Beta is the weighted average historic beta for each group with market-cap used for weighting. Two 
estimation scenarios are used; the first is inline with 1989 data (market return level) and the second 
with those of 2002. CAPM is used to estimate the cost of equity. 
so Appendix 3.8.2.4 includes a discussion about leverage. 
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3.5.3.2 Stock Returns Volatility and Liquidity Argument 
Another way of looking at market perception about risk is by comparing 
stock return volatilities of different age groups measuring total risk systematic and 
. Ip 2 2 2 51 
umque as a i = V i aM + a i •1i • 
Table 3-13 shows that survivor stocks median annualised stock return is higher 
than that of new stocks while survivors exhibit lower annualised stock returns 
volatility. p-values confirm the significance of the difference for both returns and 
volatility. Again, based on stock returns volatility the data do not seem to support 
that survivor stocks could be riskier than new stocks, on the contrary the data 
reveal the opposite. One could introduce a liquidity argument; that is higher 
volatility means higher liquidity and hence higher value. We know that larger 
older stocks are more liquid and hence this type of arguments is not promising to 
pursue. 
Age Groups Stock Returns Volatility 
Survivors versus New 
Survivors (S) 7.77 33.87 











Up to 2 (G2) 0.00 48.59 
14+ (Gl4) 6.14 32.82 
G14-G2 








Table 3-13. Stock Returns and VolatUity 
Medians are reported. Stock returns are annualised; calculated as the cumulative percentage 
monthly returns over 12 months. Annualised volatility is measured as the monthly standard 
deviation multiplied by the square root of 12. Medians were calculated across all observations for 
the pooled sample 1989-2002 for each group. p-values are for the differences in medians. 
SI where a 2i is the variance, Pi is the stock beta against the stock market, a~ is the variance of 
market returns, and ai~& is the variance of the disturbances. 
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3.5.3.3 Age and PLe Death 
To fonn an idea about the relation between public limited company death 
and age, the data of UK dead listed public limited companie ince 1970 are u ed 
to calcul ate the ex post based death hi storic probability for different age group. 
Total number of finns in UK Dead Lists from Data tream i 4, 174 companies. 
164 finn s were excluded because their start or end date is not a ai lable. Thi 
leaves the sample of 4,0 I 0 finns. Figure 3- 11 how a hi togram with the hi toric 
cumulative probability of dead listed companie with re pect to age group. The 
hi storic frequency of finn death with respect to age i 54 percent for tho e below 
14 years old and 46 percent for above, implying that there i n ub tantial r a on 
in the historic data to believe that th re are ri k differenc with r spect to the 
likelihood of death between survivor and new tock. Another reading from the 
data supports the arne conclu ion i that the likelihood of death, in g neral 
declines with age. Note the declining slope of the cumulative probability curve. 
Stronger evidence i documented by Evans (19 7) from xamlntng the U 
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Figure 3-11. Age and Dea th for Listed Public Limited ompanie 
This histogram is const ructed using UK dead listed public limit d ompanie a compiled by 
Datastream for the period 1970-2003. Total number of fim1s in UK Dead Li t fr m Data tream i. 
4,174 companies. 164 firm with no availab le start or end date .. ere excluded I a ing th ample 
of 4,010 firm . The cumulati ve frequency for companie below the age of 14 y ar i 54 per ent. 
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3.5.4 Net Effect of Fundamental Differences 
Summarising the above evidence and analyses, market valuations, 
measured by MBE, MBF, PIE and P/CF for new stocks are higher than for mature 
stocks. One would expect that this should be driven by a favourable combination 
for new stocks of differences in profitability, growth andlor risk. Otherwise, it 
could be due to behavioural reasons. We find that profitability for mature stocks is 
higher than for new stocks and with mixed readings of the data on growth 
providing insufficient evidence that new stocks have provided higher realised 
earnings growth. Growth expectations would be part of the behavioural 
explanation. Moreover; new stocks have higher risk than mature stocks. 
Hence, from the above analyses under both Section 3.4 and Section 3.5, we reject 
Ho that differences in fundamentals can explain the differences in market 
valuation between new stocks and survivor stocks. This rejection is implicitly in 
favour of HI that the stock market is biased in valuing new stocks relative to older 
or survivor stocks. From HI perspective, the differences in valuations would be 
driven by investor unrealistic expectations about corporate performance and 
growth for new stocks and perhaps underestimating their risk, we call that 
Valuation Bias a form of behavioural biases driven by investor irrational 
expectations rather than by corporate and economic fundamentals. 
This is a relative argument between new and survivor stocks and it is not 
meant to say that survivor stocks are rationally valued. 
One last argument here, what if the market is factoring each variable in 
possibly pricing the very long-term expected profitability (Le. when new stocks 
become classified as survivors) while pricing the shorter term growth potential of 
these new stocks, i.e. pricing the favourable outcome of the two. If it is the case, 
the impact of risk factor is ignored or even mispriced in an inconsistent market 
pricing fonnula. This leads to the next section that examines the competing null 
hypothesis. 
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3.6 Competing Hypothesis; Pricing the Long-Term Future 
3.6.1 Competing Hypothesis Introduction 
This section explores a competing hypothesis to the main valuation bias 
hypothesis in explaining valuation differences between survivor and new stocks. 
The competing hypothesis as introduced in Section 3.1: The market is rational in 
valuing new stocks higher than sunJivor stocks because o/pricing the/wure long-
term potential and status o/new stocks. 
In simple words, according to this hypothesis, in the early period of the stock 
trading a new stock is priced according to its future stable status, and up to that 
time the stock price appreciates at a lower rate relative to book equity growth or 
does not appreciate at all on average across all young stocks leading the growth in 
book equity to match, in say 10 to 14 years, the early market-assigned price level. 
The stage, after which, stock returns are positive matching or exceeding book 
equity growth as future growth opportunities are to be capitalised too. 
Therefore, stock returns for new stocks are supposed to be almost zero, on 
average, because the initial pricing for stocks in their first age group reflects the 
long-tenn future outcome when they are supposed to have survived. Therefore, 
stock prices do not appreciate much. Price changes before the stock classifies as 
survivor are either stock trading noise or revisions of investor expectations about 
future outcomes or a combination of the two. The empirical evidence supports this 
with, on average, zero stock returns for new stocks as shown earlier in Table 3-13 
of Section 3.5.3.2. 
The reason for the decline in market-to-book with age is the above stock pricing 
argument and the growth of book equity from retained earnings at a higher rate 
than that of the stock price. Of course, improved profitability leads to higher rate 
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of growth in book equity. This competing hypothesis IS illustrated using the 
simple exposition in Figure 3-12 below. 
Siock Life Classificalion 
Stock price level 
Book equity per share 
MBE 
New 
Almost the same or rising 









differential increase rate 
The major component of book equity growth is retained earnings. Therefore, to 
test the above competing hypothesis, two tests are carried out as shown below and 
followed by a simulated illustration. 
1. Growth in market value of equity versus growth in book equity 
2. Retained earnings and growth 
3. Simulating market and fundamental valuations 
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3.6.2 Competing Hypothesis Testing 
3.6.2.1 Growth, Market Value versus Book Equity 
To test whether stock prices are growing at a lower rate than book equity 
tor new stocks, consistent with the competing hypothesis, which would explain 
the declining MBE with age, the following procedure is used to perform a 
calendar time test. 
For a common sample, the following sums are calculated separately for all 
survivor stocks and all new stocks every year to track the growth. 
• Sum of equity market values 
• Sum of book equities 
• Sum of number of shares (for scaling) 
The second step is calculating a weighted average market value per share (by 
dividing the sum of equity market values by the sum of number of shares) and the 
weighted average book equity per share (by dividing the sum of equity book 
values by the sum of number of shares). Annual growth rates in both equity 
market value per share and book value per share are calculated as the annual 
percentage change in the above calculated weighted averages values per shares. 
Both market value per share and book value per share are subject to same scaling 
errors and hence the comparison is expected to be acceptable in relative terms 
however individual year growth levels per se might not be representative or 
meaningful. 
In order not to reject the competing hypothesis, the rate of growth in equity 
market value should be lower than of equity book value for new stocks opposite 
of the case of survivors. Figure 3-13 shows how the growth in equity market value 
is, in general, higher than that in book equity for new stocks while Figure 3-14 
shows the same for survivor stocks as expected. Therefore, this rough test leads to 
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reject the competing hypothesis as a possible competing explanation to the 
valuation bias explanation. 
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Figure 3-13. Growth in Market Value and Book Equity, New Stocks 
New stocks are those I isted after 1989. The graph shows annual growth rates in both equity market 
value per share MVE and book value per share BE calculated as the annual percentage change in 
the weighted average values per shares. Total number of observations is 2,919. Both market value 
per share and book value per share are subject to same standardisation errors and hence the 
comparison is expected to be acceptable in relative terms however individual year growth levels 
might not be representative or meaningful. 
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Figure 3-14. Growth in Market and Book Values, Survivor Stocks 
Survivor stocks are those listed in of before 1989. The graph shows annual growth rates in both 
equity market value per share MVE and book value per share BE calculated as the annual 
percentage change in the weighted average values per shares. Total number of observations is 
6,982. Both market value per share and book value per share are subject to same standardisation 
errors and hence the comparison is expected to be acceptable in relative tenns however individual 
year growth levels might not be representative or meaningful. 
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3.6.2.2 Retained Earnings and Growth 
The second test to the competing hypothesis examines retained earnings 
per share to book equity and equity market value, both per share, and compares 
with stock returns. 52 The rationale behind this test is that retained earnings per 
share represent the most important item in book equity growth while stock returns 
represent the growth in the share price. 53 Therefore, comparing retained earnings-
to-book equity REBE (a measure for book value growth from profit retention) 
with retained earnings-to-price REP and stock returns R (all scaled per share for 
comparability) will help in assessing the competing hypothesis as argued below. If 
the competing hypothesis is true, retained earnings-to-book equity should be 
higher than stock returns for younger stocks according to this hypothesis as future 
stable performance is already priced in and book values are growing from 
retention so book value level matches market value level at the survivor 
classification stage. 
Table 3-14 depicted in Figure 3-15 shows that stock returns R on older groups (12 
to 14) and retained earnings-to-book equity REBE are inline with each other with 
R slightly higher because of the capitalisation of future growth opportunity. This 
observation is consistent with the pattern detected via the weighted average MBE 
shown in Figure 3-2 Section 3.3 which showed that contrary to the medians and 
Pastor and Veronesi (2003) the weighted average MBE is changing in both 
directions with age but declining overall with notable exception for the group 
aged 14 or more. The table and graph show that the pattern for younger age 
groups is inconsistent with the competing null hypothesis. Hence, and given the 
first test, the evidence is weighted more to reject the competing hypothesis. 
Retained earnings-to-price REP is just an additional measure to highlight the 
inconsistency between old and new stock valuations. Where the REP ratio is 
rising with age adjusting the young-stock overpricing by increasing the book 
value from retained earnings at an increased rate with age. 
52 Retained earnings per share = Earnings per share EPS - Dividends per share DPS. 
53 Other items such as revaluations and goodwill, discussed under Data section, also affect book 
equity. 
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While the previous test led to reject the hypothesis, the evidence suggests that this 
competing hypothesis could be the market misperception about new stocks but 
cannot be accepted as economically rational investor behaviour. 
Age Groups Stock Retained Earnings- Retained Earnings-
Percent 































Table 3-14. Value Growth and Retained Earnings 
















The table reports medians. Retained earnings per share REPS is calculated as EPS minus DPS. 
Retained earnings-to-book equity REBE is calculated as REPS divided by book equity per share. 
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Figure 3-15. Value Growth and Retains Earnings 
The figure plots Table 3-14, which reports medians. Retained earnings per share REPS is 
calculated as EPS minus DPS. Retained earnings-to-book equity REBE is calculated as REPS 
divided by book equity per share. Retained earnings-to-price REP is calculated as REPS divided 
by stock price. 
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To turther clarity this competing hypothesis and test. a simulated 
illustration is introduced in the following section. 
3.6.3 Market and Cash Flow Simulated Valuations 
This section presents simple simulated valuations; one is based on 
standard finance theory and practice and investment logic and another one based 
on the pattern observed in market valuation. 
The illustration uses a theoretical newly listed company projecting its book equity. 
profits and cash flows based on realistic assumptions. The company's equities are 
valued using the standard DCF valuation with a terminal growth of 4 percent, as 
in Kaplan and Ruback (1995) and Sougiannis and Yaehura (2001). The continuing 
or terminal value is estimated using the traditional cash flow continuing value 
formula: 
Equation 3-3: cv = FCFr 
KE-gr 
See Copeland, Koller, and Murrin (2000) for further discussions on estimating the 
continuing value. The cash flow at the beginning of terminal period FCF T 
(ongoing concern) is extrapolated from the cash flow of year n the last year in the 
explicit forecast period as: 
Equation 3-4: FCFr = FCF" (1 + g r ) 
Annual free cash flows are calculated as in Copeland, Koller, and Murrin (2000) 
as follows: 
Gross cash flow 
Gross investment 
= Earnings + Depreciation 
= Depreciation (replacement) + New Investments 
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Free cash flow = Gross cash flow - Gross investment 
= Earnings - New investments 
New investments are calculated from the changes in invested capital. 
For clarification, some are familiar with another equivalent form of presenting 
free cash flow calculation. Assuming all equity financing so both cash flow to 
firm and to equity are the same: 
Free cash flow = Earnings + Depreciation 
- Changes in working capital 
- Capital expenditure 
Note that Replacement of depreciated assets + New investments is equal to 
Changes in working capital + Capital expenditure. See also Damodran (1996). 
Simulated market price is calculated to approximate the observed pattern for age 
groups (consistent with the pattern documented in this study and also with that 
documented by Pastor and Veronesi (2003) for US stocks) by assuming that 
market price P grows at an increasing percentage p of the growth in book equity 
BE according to the following formula: 
Equation 3-5: p,::;; P'-I (1 + P x g BE) 
Table 3-15 shows the results of the simulation and Figure 3-16 plots the patterns 
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MBE [Market] 2.35 2.34 2.32 2.30 
Table 3-15. MBE Simulatiou 
8 9 10 11 
114 118 124 130 
6.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 
6.6 9.1 10.6 12.4 
3.3 4.5 5.3 6.2 
3.3 4.5 5.3 62 
3.3 4.5 5.3 6.2 
3.3 4.5 5.3 6.2 
232 244 256 267 
2.04 2.06 2.07 2.06 
3~ 4~ 45 5~ 
54.4 62.2 69.9 77. 7 






















5.5 6.0 6.0 
85.5 93.2 101.0 
283 299 317 
2.16 2.13 2.10 2.08 2.07 2.06 2.06 
The inputs of this table are hypothetical for illustration purposes. Dividends payout ratio is 
assumed to be constant at 50 percent. The cost of capital used in the present value calculating is 7 
percent. The terminal growth used is 4 percent. FCF is free cash flow. E(P) is the price estimation 
by discounting future cash flows. MBE U(FCF)} is market-to-book equity simulated as a function 
of the present value of future cash flows. MBE [Market} is the simulated observed pattern of 
market-to-book equity. The columns for years 4 to 7 are not reported because of the table size. pis 
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Figure 3-16. MBE Simulation 
This figure plots the simulated values of MBE in Table 3-15. MBE U(FCF)j is market-to-book 
equity simulated as a function of the present value of future cash flows. MBE {Market} is the 
simulated observed pattern of market-to-book equity. 
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The striking reading of Table 3-15 and Figure 3-16 is that the present value of 
cash flow valuation predicts, contrary to market pattern, an increasing MBE with 
age flattening from the age of 9 onwards after which both patterns track each 
other closely. This standard-theory based simulation is in favour of rejecting this 
competing null hypothesis. 
Finally we comment on the learning model of Pastor and Veronesi (2003), 
relating M/B to expected profitability and therefore to the volatility of profitability 
as shown below in the following equation. 
M = E{exp[(g-r)T]}=exp[(g+u2 12-r)T] 
B 
where B is the firm's book equity at time 0 and g is its constant growth rate (i.e. 
book value growth from profitability), so the book equity at time Tis B exp(gT}. 
They then assume as competition eliminates abnormal earnings by T the market 
value at time T equals its grown book value, discounted to today's value by 
discount rate r. the expression to the right assumes that g is unknown and 
normally distributed. So M/B in the above model increases with the uncertainty 
about growth or profitability which is their argument that uncertainty declines 
over time due to learning and as a result, younger firms have higher volatility in 
profitability or growth and hence higher M/B ratios holding average growth and 
discount rate constant. 
Our analysis provides evidence that, on the contrary, the profitability of survivor 
stocks is statistically higher than for newer stocks. Moreover, we can question 
whether it is reasonable that the higher the volatility of the return on equity the 
higher the value? While this can be expected to be true ofun-diversifiable risk, the 
higher the systematic (beta) and volatility of the profitability the higher the priced 
risk and hence the higher the required rate of return ( discount rate) and hence the 
lower the value. Our valuation model of Section 3.4 suggests that indeed higher 
risk should be associated with lower valuation. So, both the level and volatility of 
profitability of new stocks seem to shed further lights on the analysis of Pastor 
and Veronesi. In their analysis, they do not focus much on modelling risk and its 
impact on valuation as they deal with risk in fairly standard fashion; once 
assuming a contact discount rate and then by using a stochastic discount rate. 
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According to Pastor and Veronesi, there is an economic rationale for the higher 
M/B of new stocks; that is rational learning. However, the long-standing evidence 
on the long-term underperformance of IPOs would contradict their conclusion 
[see on IPOs evidence, for example, Gompers and Lerner (2003) and Espenlaub, 
Gregory and Tonks (2000)]. We show later that our evidence on new stocks and 
age groups is consistent with the evidence of the IPOs systematic 
underperformance. ] 
This analysis of the competing rational explanation suggests that if investors 
are pricing and buying today the future level of performance of new stocks they 
might be underestimating the risk associated until achieving that maturity status. 
Hence, this study is in favour of rejecting the competing hypothesis and still reject 
the main null hypothesis in favour of the alternative hypothesis. 
88 
3.7 Conclusion 
This work documents that the differences in valuations between UK new 
and older stocks are evident and persistent. New stocks have relatively higher 
valuations that decline with age with changing valuation gap size. We examine 
the hypothesis that these differences can be explained by differences in the 
underlying fundamentals against an alternative valuation bias hypothesis. Another 
competing hypothesis of rational behaviour based on pricing the long-term 
potential is tested too. In the course of this research, explanations are sought in the 
fundamental value determinants over the period 1989-2002 using the data of all 
UK traded non-financial stocks. The fundamentals examined in the course of 
testing the hypothesis are profitability and growth that determine cash flows and 
risk levels to value these cash flows besides age and size. 
The evidence is clearly tilted towards rejecting Ho, that the differences in 
fundamentals can explain the differences in market valuation between new stocks 
and survivor stocks in favour of HI that the stock market is biased in valuing new 
stocks relative to older or survivor stocks. Such bias manifested as valuation 
differences, which could be driven by investor expectations that are inconsistent 
with the differences between the underlying fundamental corporate and economic 
characteristics. The balance of this concluding section briefly summarises the 
particulars behind this conclusion. 
A statistical model was built to establish the value-relevance of the selected 
fundamental factors and to serve as the joint testing of these fundamentals' 
ability in explaining the differences in valuation. The estimated model predicts 
differences in market valuation between new and survivor stocks. The pattern of 
historic MBE declining with age is matched closely by the model-generated 
values. The model established an inverse significant relation between value and 
age. The fundamental model explained 58 percent of the valuation gap where the 
remaining 42 percent is believed to be the result of the disturbances and latent 
estimation errors. When the age variable is excluded because of the lack of 
economic rigour, model predicted valuation gap was inverted (-16 percent). 
89 
Again, while taking into account the disturbances and estimation errors, this result 
suggests that the valuation of new stocks is biased upwards relative to the 
valuation of survivor stocks. Comparing age and cost of equity variables between 
the two models estimated separately for each group indicates age discrimination 
without a known sound economic explanation and perhaps risk underestimating 
for new stocks. The results suggest that the model is reasonably successful in 
predicting valuation differences between new and survivor stocks and explaining 
that by age factor and perhaps risk underestimation. These results seem to suggest 
that the presence of such valuation discrepancies between stocks of different age 
groups is the result of a behavioural bias rather than an economically rational 
behaviour. 
Then, individual differences in fundamentals were examined. Profitability 
is statistically lower for new stocks than for older stocks providing contrary 
evidence in explaining valuation differences as to which profitability differences 
should lead to higher valuations for survivors. Realised growth test shows that 
new stocks have higher growth rates, as expected, the conclusion is not robust as 
the evidence is not concrete because of the lack of statistical significance in the 
organic growth measure (growth in EPS) and the inconsistent significance levels 
for the un-scaled growth in EBIT that is affected by external growth from 
additional capital. Hence, this could be affecting market perception and it can be 
argued that growth is most likely to be part of the explanation, but it is unlikely to 
reasonably account for the whole or majority of the gap in valuation between new 
and older stocks. Finally, risk is examined. It does not require a thorough 
examination to conclude that new stocks do not have lower risk levels than older 
stocks. Three risk comparisons are utilised;· systematic risk, and stock returns 
volatility, age and the death of public limited companies, none of which provide 
evidence that new stocks could be less risky than survivors and hence should, 
holding other factor the same, command higher valuations. However, the opposite 
that older stocks should be perceived as less risky would be a more valid 
argument. To sum up, lower profitability levels are inconsistent with the higher 
market valuation levels for new stocks relative to survivor stocks, with no 
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consistent or concrete evidence of higher earnings growth, and no evidence of 
lower risk. 
A significant finding with respect to the pattern of the valuation gap itself 
between new and survivor stocks, is that the gap size overall increases in bullish 
market and decreases in bearish market. The gap ranged between -15.03 and 
+86.58 percent closing at just +4.62 percent by the end of 2002. This could be 
driven by investor overoptimism about corporate profitability and growth 
potential for new stocks relative to survivor stocks in bullish markets where 
investor overoptimism drives prices too high. 
A competing hypothesis is formulated and tested too. According to which, 
the market is rational in valuing new stocks higher than survivor stocks by pricing 
the future long-term potential and status of new stocks and hence new stocks do 
not produce positive stock returns till they can be classified as survivors; the stage 
when stock returns are positive matching or exceeding book equity growth (as 
future growth opportunities are to be capitalised too). While the variability of 
share prices for new stocks is a combination of noise and revisions of 
expectations. And hence the reason for the declining market-to-book with age is 
the above stock pricing argument and the growth of book equity from retained 
earnings at a higher rate than that of the stock price, which is at its future level 
from the start. Three tests are used to examine the competing hypothesis. Growth 
in market value of equity versus growth in book equity, retained earnings and 
growth, and simulating market and fundamental valuations of which the evidence 
suggests that the competing hypothesis can be rejected in favour of the main 
valuation bias hypothesis because risk differential is ignored. This competing 
hypothesis can be accepted only if risk were correctly priced where the analysis 
suggests that it is not the case as the long-term future potential is priced at future 
risk levels when the firm is more stable and has survived a good test of time. 
We also find that our conclusion is consistent with the evidence from IPOs 
long-tern underperformance, that is the significantly lower stock returns of new 
stocks or the long-term underperformance ~f IPOs is a result of overpricing new 
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stocks in the early period of stock trading which is consistent with the subsequent 
decline in market-to-book to normalise the relation between stock valuations and 
its performance and potential. We hope that this linkage contributes to the debate 
about IPOs long-term underperformance and provides supporting evidence that 
early overpricing is very likely to underlie the subsequent long-term IPOs 
underperformance. 
An important caveat is worth making at the end, that the above conclusion 
ofthis work does not imply at all that survivor stocks are fairly valued. It is only a 
relative comparison. Chapter 4 examines the overall stock market levels in the 
UK to cover these grounds. 
And finally, it is worth stating that investor expectations about new stocks 
could be exaggerated relatively more than for older stocks due to the limited 
knowledge about them, while this exaggeration is relatively more limited for older 
stocks because of the relatively better knowledge available about them. Chapter 5 
examines the role of investment knowledge in stock price rationalisation, 
seeking evidence from property investment stocks. 
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3.8 Appendix 
3.8.1 Data Appendix 
3.8.1.1 Sample Period, Excluded Financial Stocks, and Data Items 
As of 15 December 2003, the FBRIT list contained 1675 stocks including 
financial stocks but excluding investment trusts, starting with 151 stocks (117 
non-financial) in 1964. Only in 1989 the number of stocks becomes reasonable for 
research; with 653 stocks (529 non-financial) in existence in or before 1989, those 
are the 'survivor stocks' or 'survivors' where by 2002 they survived for at least 14 
years (1989-2002). 1022 companies (791 non-financial) joined the list during the 
period 1990-2002; these are the 'new stocks'. Total number of stocks in the 
sample is 653+1022 = 1675 (529+791=1320 non-financial). Table 3-16 shows the 
categories of excluded financial stocks. 
Description Number of Stocks 
Total FBRIT List 1675 
Excluded financial categories 
Asset managers 17 
Banks 12 
Consumer finance 13 
Gambling 11 
Insurance brokers 8 
Insurance non-life 15 
Investment banks 25 
Investment companies 23 
Life assurance 7 
Mining finance 5 
Mortgage fmance 2 
Other financial 90 
Other insurance 1 
Property agencies 7 
Real estate 77 
Real estate insurance 1 
Un9.uoted e9.uities 5 
Total excluded financial 319 
Non-financial 1356 
Excluded multi-type stocks 36 
Non-financial samEle 1320 
Table 3-16. Dataset Firms and Excluded Financial Stocks 
These categories are as classified in Datastream. Date of list last retrieval/update is 15 December 
2003. Multi-type stocks refer to firms with different traded stock issues; they are excluded because 
their accounting data are reported for all stock iisues against market values for every specific 





























Datastream industry code 
Stock trading beginning date 
The year which the data belong to (current year) 
Depreciation and amortisation for the year 
Dividends per share 
Deferred taxes (balance sheet account) 
Deferred taxes for the year (P&L) 
Earnings before interest and taxes 
Earnings per share 
Extraordinary items after tax 
Historic leveraged or geared beta 
Invested capital or Total capital employed 
Total loan capital (long-term debt> 1 year) 
Market value of equity (market-cap) 
Net income, earned for ordinary shareholders 
Number of shares outstanding 





Total debt (long and short-term) 
Total trading income (turnover) 


























Data source: Datastream - Thomson Financial. Date of data last retrieval/update: 15 December 
2003. The codes under symbols are those used in this document. (t-l) refers to I-year lagged data 
used for growth calculations. Beta estimation is described under Section 3.2. Stock prices are 
retrieved for 13 consecutive months, starting June (t+ 1) every year, to calculate 12-month 
cumulative stock returns and annualised stock return volatility. 
3.8.1.2 Supporting Calculations 
Book equity BE is calculated, as in Pastor and Veronesi (2003) and in 
Conrad, Cooper, and Kaul (2003), as Ordinary equity capital and reserves OEQ 
plus balance sheet Deferred taxes DTBS. Deferred taxes are added back because 
they stem from timing differences to reflect the impact of actual cash taxes on 
book equity. This calculation excludes preference shares. Investment tax credit, 
which appears in US-based studies, is not applicable for UK companies. 
Equation 3-6: BE = OEQ + DTBS 
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Earnings EGS, as in Pastor and Veronesi (2003), are calculated as Net 
income, earned for ordinary NI minus Extraordinary items EXOR plus Deferred 
taxes for the year DTIS. Extraordinary items are excluded to arrive at the 
normalised earnings level and annual deferred taxes are added back to correct for 
timing differences to reflect actual cash taxes in earnings. 
Equation 3-7: EGS = NI - EXOR + DTIS 
Cash flow CF, as in Conrad, Cooper, and Kaul (2003), is calculated as Net 
income; earned for ordinary NI minus Extraordinary items EXOR plus 
Depreciation and Amortisation DPAM. 
Equation 3-8: CF = NI - EXOR + DPAM 
This cash flow calculation measures the firm's performance before the major non-
cash expense element (depreciation) because of the subjectivity that could be 
involved in asset depreciation. A full calculation of cash flow to equity for other 
purposes is different as it also takes into account changes in working capital, 
capital expenditure and cash flows to non-common equity capital holders as 
follows: 
Cash flow to equity = Net income + Depreciation and Amortisation 
- Changes in working capital - Capital expenditure 
+ Changes in debt capital 
- Net cash flows to other non-common equity holders 
However, this cash flow to equity metric is not used in this study as it suits equity 
valuation using fully projected financial statements (ex ante) for a long-enough 
period to, at least, encompass a full business cycle of the company's industry and 
not to evaluate performance on a one-year basis. 
Net operating profit after tax NOPAT is calculated as earnings before 
interest and tax minus taxes TAX. 
Equation 3-9: NOPAT = ERIT - TAX 
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Invested capital Ie (Capital employed eE) is the sum of all non-current 
liabilities and capital elements, comprising of: Total share capital & reserves, 
Total long term deferred liabilities, Minority interest, Total long term loans 
including subordinated loans and all interest-bearing short-term liabilities. 
Age, in every single year, AGE is calculated as the current calendar year 
minus the stock trading beginning year plus one. For example, the age calculated 
in 1999 for a company its stock started trading in 1993 is 7 years (1999 - 1993 + 
I). For simplicity, this calculation regards the beginning year as a full year 
regardless of when the trading started during that year. 
3.8.1.3 Market Valuation Indicators 
Market-to-book equity MBE, as In Pastor and Veronesi (2003), is 
calculated as the market value of equity MVE divided by book equity BE (as 
adjusted under Supporting Calculations). 
Equation 3-10: MBE=MVE 
BE 
It should be always borne in mind that market-to-book is affected by accounting 
practices through the denominator. The above calculation adjusts for the impact of 
deferred taxation on book equity, which were recognised as tax charges in the 
P &L while they are deferred to a future period to be paid. There are other 
accounting treatments that could affect book equity. One of the most important 
ones is the treatment of goodwill. Goodwill amortisation or write-offs affects the 
book equity and could even lead to negative book equity. The argument to 
whether goodwill should be amortised or written off whether impaired or not is 
very extensive and there is no general consensus on how to regard it from an 
economic or investment perspective. 
It can be argued that the goodwill should not be amortised or written off unless it 
is impaired by the firm's performance. A 'counter-argument is that the goodwill 
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should be completely written off so equity capitals for all companies are 
comparable by reflecting the net asset value excluding acquisition-generated 
goodwill. 
As there is no one correct or wrong answer for that and given the unavailability of 
all data about cumulative goodwill amortisation and write offs in Datastream, it 
was decided to carry market-to-book calculation inline with the above mentioned 
academic papers without adding back cumulative goodwill amortisation and 
write-offs to avoid distorting the dataset by incomplete goodwill data or wrong 
adjustment. An example for the latter distortion is adding back a goodwill that 
was written off because it was impaired by a persistent underperformance of the 
acquired business. 
The idea of using market-to-book equity as a valuation measure remains simple 
and valid, that is relating market capitalisation of future outcomes (future cash 
flows generated by profitability and growth and assessed according to their risk) 
to the actual capital physically injected into the business (proxied by book equity). 
Market-to-book value of firm MBF, as in Rajan and Zingales (1995), is 
calculated as the book value of total assets TA minus book equity BE plus market 
value of equity MVE divided by book value of total assets TA. 
Equation 3-11: MBF= TA-BE+MVE 
TA 
This ratio should be ideally calculated as the market value of firm measured by 
the market value of all company capital securities (ordinary shares, preference 
shares, debt, etc) divided by the book value of the same capital elements. Alas, 
market value is only available for ordinary shares. Therefore, researchers have 
devised the above calculation as an approximation. This ratio reflects firm 
perspective, which is discussed under Section 3.4.1. 
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Earnings-price ratio EP or Earnings yield EY (the inverse of price-earnings 
ratio PIE) is calculated as earnings EGS divided by the market value of equity 







Cash flow-price ratio CFP, as in Conrad, Cooper, and Kaul (2003), is 
calculated as cash flow CF divided market value of equity MVE to related the pre-
depreciation and amortisation outcome to market capitalisation. 
Equation 3-14: CFP= CF 
MVE 
Annualised stock returns R, is calculated as the cumulative monthly 
percentage return over 12-month period. 
Dividend-based indicators are not included to keep the research more 
general to dividend-paying and non-paying finns. 
3.8.1.4 Profitability, Efficiency and Leverage Indicators 
Return on equity ROE is calculated as earnings EGS divided by book 
equity BE. This is a measure of equity investment profitability as book equity 
represents the actual equity capital invested in the business. 
Equation 3-15: ROE=EGS BE 
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After-tax return on invested capital ROlC (Return on capital employed 
ROCE) is calculated as Net operating profit after taxes NOPAT divided by 
Invested capitallC. It measures the profitability to total invested capital from firm 
or all investors' perspective. 
Equation 3-16: ROlC= NOPAT 
IC 
Net profit margin NPM is calculated as earnings EGS divided by turnover 
TUR. It measures the net trading profitability. 
Equation 3-17: NPM= EGS 
TUR 
Profit margin PM is calculated as Net operating profit after tax NOPAT 
divided by turnover TUR. It measures the gross trading profitability. 
Equation 3-18: PM= NOPAT 
TUR 
Asset turnover ATU is calculated as turnover TUR divided by total assets 
TA. This is a measure of the firm's efficiency in using its assets to generate 
revenues. The profitability on capital is a function of net trading 
profitability/trading profitability and efficiency. 
Equation 3-19: ATU=TUR 
TA 
Leverage (L VG) is measured in four different ways: 
As in Conrad, Cooper, and Kaul (2003) it is calculated as long-term loan 
capital LTD divided by book equity BE. 
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Equation 3-20: LTDBE= LTD 
BE 
As in Pastor and Veronesi (2003) it is calculated as long-tenn loan capital 
LTD divided by total assets TA. 
Equation 3-21: LTDTA= LTD 
TA 
Consistently with Du Pont analysis of the ROE leverage is calculated as 
total assets TA divided book equity BE. 
TA 
Equation 3-22: TABE =-
BE 
EGS EGS TUR TA Note that ROE = --= --x--x-= NPM x ATU x TABE 
BE TUR TA BE 
according to which, equity profitability is decomposed into its underlying 
net trading profitability, efficiency and leverage components. Using book 
values of debt and equity is first justified by the consistency in the above 
Du Pont analysis and by its use in the capital structure literature, for 
example Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth. Aivazian. Demirguc-Kunt. 
and Maksimovic (2001) define leverage using book value of 
liabilities/debt and both book value and market value of equity. 
Note that as TA :::::: long-term loan capital + book equity. the above formula 
can be written as: 
LTD+BE LTD 
Equation 3-23: TABE:::::: = --+ 1 = LTDBE + 1 
BE BE 
See Conrad. Cooper. and Kaul (2003) definition of leverage above. 
The last one is measured as long-term loan capital LTD divided by market 
value of equity MVE (ideally, market value of loan capital should be used). 
This form is consistent with the estimation of the ex ante beta. 
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Equation 3-24: LTDMVE= LTD 
MVE 
Note how leverage is factored into equity-perspective profitability: 
EGS EGS TUR TA 
Equation 3-25: ROE = --= --x --x-
BE TUR TA BE 
while it does not appear in firm perspective apart from the impact of tax shield on 
interest expense reflected in NOPAT. Some textbooks and valuation techniques 
use NOPLAT instead. That is net operating profits less adjusted taxes, where taxes 
are adjusted to cash basis but on an unlevered basis, which means the impact of 
tax, shield is eliminated as it will be captured through reducing the cost of debt by 
tax shield. See for example Copeland, Koller, and Murrin (2000). 
Equation 3-26: ROIC = NOPAT = NOPAT x TUR 
IC TUR IC 
Cash flow to book equity ratio CFBE is calculated as cash flow CF 
divided by book equity BE. This is similar, in structure, to CFP but it uses book 
equity instead in order to related cash flow to the equity capital that is physically 
invested in the business to generate these gross cash flows rather than to market 
capitalisation to indicate the firm's cash flow generating ability. 
Equation 3-27: CFBE= CF 
BE 
3.8.1.5 Growth Indicators 
Growth is calculated as the percentage change for EPS, EBIT and turnover 
as follows: 
Growth in earnings: 
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Equation 3-28: GEGS = EPSt -1 
EPSt_1 
Growth in EBIT: 
Equation 3-29: GEBIT = EBIT, -1 
EBIT,_I 
Growth in turnover: 
GTU -- TURt Equation 3-30: 
TURt _1 
1 
They are also calculated using the natural logarithm for the regression analysis, as 
follows: 
Growth in earnings: 
Equation 3-31: GEGS = log( EPSt ) 
EPSt-I 
Growth in EBIT: 
Equation 3-32: GEBIT = log( EBIT, ) 
EBIT,_I 
Growth in turnover: 
Equation 3-33: GTU = log( TURt ) 
TUR/-I 
Growth in EPS (denoted GEGS) is the selected measure for historic earnings 
growth as growth in EBIT and turnover, in their absolute monetary values, are 
affected by growth from external equity capital additions while EPS is scaled per 
share and would reveal the historic organic growth patterns. Also, growth in 
turnover does not give a clear idea about growth in outcome it is rather an 
indicator for growth in volume, size or mar~et share. 
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3.8.1.6 Risk Indicators 
Annualised stock return volatility a(R) is calculated as the monthly 
standard deviation multiplied by the square root of 12, as while variance is linear 
with time, standard deviation is linear with square root of time. 
Historic leveraged beta HBETA is estimated using Datastream. The 
procedure is the traditional single index model. 5-year monthly logarithmic stock 
returns are used. The stock returns are regressed against Datastream total market 
index returns. Extreme values are excluded i.e. monthly changes over 41.42 
percent. The beta estimate is further modified by a Bayesian adjustment. The 
procedure is based on Cunningham (1973). For more information, see Datastream 
beta calculations and Cunningham (1973). The idea is to use a well-known 
traditional method to estimate the historic beta so it is clear what is meant by this 
measure despite the drawbacks of such an estimate (e.g. beta is time-varying). 
Historic beta might be a poor approximation for the ex ante beta that should be 
used in the cost capital calculation especially that the required rate of return or the 
cost of capital is an economic ex ante measure. Historic data can be relied upon 
for estimation, but that should be taken with caution. Therefore, the ex ante 
systematic risk and the cost of capital are estimated based on some well-
established thoughts in finance literature. The formula that links the leveraged 
beta (systematic financial and business risk) to the unlevered beta (systematic 
business risk), taxation and capital structure, based on Modigliani and Miller 
(1963) and Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), is given below. See Copeland, 
Koller, and Murrin (2000) for more details about this formula and for their 
recommended procedure, described below, to estimate the ex ante beta. 54 
D 
Equation 3-34: P L = Pu [1 + (1- T) E]' from which 
54 Denotation used for beta estimation: KE is the cost of leveraged equity. Ku is the cost of 
unlevered equity. KD is the cost of debt. WACC is the weighted-average cost of capital. PL is the 
leveraged beta (beta of equity: reflects business and financial risks). Pu is the unlevered beta (beta 
of the assets: reflects only operating or business ri§k). RF is the risk-free rate. RM is the expected 
return on the market. T is the tax rate. D is the value of debt. E is the market value of equity. 
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Pu = PL 
D 1+ (1- T)-
E 
The procedure can be summarised in the following steps: 
1. For every year, historic betas were de-geared to isolate business risk 
(stemming from operational and industrial factors) from financial risk 
(stemming from leverage) using this formula, which results in the unlevered 
beta UBETA (beta of the assets or the operations; the business risk). 
2. Unlevered betas were averaged for every sector every year to derive a sector-
level systematic business risk measure; sector unlevered beta SUBETA. 
3. Then, for every year, sector unlevered betas of that year were re-Ievered for 
every firm using the above formula applying the firm's tax rate and capital 
structure for the same year. This yields an estimate for the ex ante beta EBETA 
that reflects both business and financial risk, which is used in the CAPM 
formula to estimate the cost of equity. 
Cost of equity using CAPM: 
The literature is rich with research that used CAPM to estimate the cost of equity 
and other that discusses and debates CAPM itself. Here, the purpose is not to 
discuss CAPM, but rather to use it as in too many papers, quoting for example 
Kaplan and Ruback (1995) so the basis of estimation is well established in finance 
theory and practice and it is very familiar. 
Risk-free rate. The rate of the lO-year UK government bond is used as 
recommended in Copeland, Koller, and Murrin (2000) where they argue based on 
Campbell and Viceira (2001) that the 10-year rate approximates the duration of 
the stock market index portfolio and its use is therefore consistent with the betas 
and market risk premiums estimated relative to these market portfolios. Just for 
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example, Kaplan and Ruback (1995), in their paper about the valuation of cash 
flow forecasts, choose to use the rate on the long-term Treasury bond for the risk-
free rate. 
Ex ante beta is estimated as described above based on Modigliani and Miller 
(1963). As Kaplan and Ruback (1995) did, the expected return on the market is 
also estimated using the general recommendation in finance texts [see for example 
Copeland, Koller, and Murrin (2000) and Brealey and Myers (2000)]. The 
procedure is as follows: 
• It should be measured on as long period as possible. 10-year period is chosen, 
• using arithmetic average of rate of return, 
• adjusting the historic arithmetic average downward by 1.5 percent to account 
for survivorship bias. Copeland et al. estimated the downward adjustment by 
1.5 to 2 percent based on the tables used by Jorion and Goetzmann (1999). 
The weighted average cost of capital WACC is calculated usmg the 
traditional formula using the risk-free rate as the cost of debt because of the 
unavailability of the cost of debt data, which will capture the impact of debt 
market but not the company-specific credit quality. Therefore, because of the 
unavailability of market value of debt too besides that this work in concerned with 
equity valuation, firm perspective which uses WACC and requires market value 
and rate of debt, will not be emphasised. 
D E 
Equation 3-36: WACC = K D (1-T)-- + K E--
D+E D+E 
3.8.1.7 Size Indicators 
Size is measured in two different ways: Total assets TA and log(TA) and Market 
value of equity MVE. The total assets measure is a good proxy for firm size as it 
represents the total size of the operations (asset or operating side of the balance 
sheet) while the market value of equity reflects the market capitalisation for future 
outcomes to equity. 
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3.8.2 Empirical Analysis Appendix 
3.8.2.1 Value Drivers - Illustration 
A and B are two companies with the same forecast net income each year, 
same expected growth rate in net income, but different net investment requirement 
each year (i.e. different rates of return on investment). To check how these facts 
impact value, a discount rate of 10 percent is used. Table 3-18 below shows the 
valuation for the outcome of each company over a period of five years. 
Year of Forecast o 2 
£ Million 
Company A 
Net income 100.0 104.0 
Net investment! -20.0 -20.8 
Cash to shareholders l 80.0 83.2 
Growth in net income2 (percent) 4.00 
Return on incremental investmene (percent) 20.0 20.0 
Present value of 5-year cash flows 326 
CompanyB 
Net income 100.0 104.0 
Net investment! -40.0 -41.6 
Cash to shareholders I 60.0 62.4 
Growth in net income2 (percent) 4.00 
Return on incremental investment3 (percent) 10.0 10.0 
Present value of 5-year cash flows 245 
Table 3-18. Value, Cash Flow, Income and Return on Investment 
I Gross cash flow = Net income + Depreciation 
3 4 5 
108.2 112.5 117.0 
-21.6 -22.5 -23.4 
86.5 90.0 93.6 
4.00 4.00 4.00 
20.0 20.0 20.0 
\08.2 112.5 117.0 
-43.3 -45.0 -46.8 
64.9 67.5 70.2 
4.00 4.00 4.00 
10.0 10.0 10.0 
Gross investment = Depreciation (replacement) + Net investment (New investments) 
Cash flow = Gross cash flow - Gross investment 
= (Net income + Depreciation) - (Depreciation + Net investment) 




2 Growth in net income =[NI,-NI,.d + [NI,.d = Return on incremental investment x Investment rate 
3 Return on incremental investment I = Incremental income I + Incremental investment 1.1 
From the above illustration: 
1. Both companies have the same forecast net income and both are forecasted to 
maintain 4 percent growth rate in net income. Should they be worth the same? 
A has higher return on incremental investment than B. Hence, company A 
requires less incremental investments (20 percent of net income) than B (40 
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percent of net income) to maintain the growth in net income. Intuitively A 
should be worth more. 
2. Regardless of the same net income, A generates more cash flow (eF) than B, 
because of different incremental investment needs to maintain the level of net 
income and its growth. 
3. The above is translated into a higher present value of cash flows for A for the 
5-year period than for B. For illustration purposes, the above was by valuing 
only the outcomes of five years rather than on ongoing concern with 
continuing value, the comparison remains the same. 
4. What can be inferred from the above illustration: 
a) Cash flow drives the company's value (it is the value driver); 
b) Return on investment (of course, relative to the cost of capital) and 
growth drive cash flow (they are the drivers of the value driver); 
c) Future cash flowed would be assessed according to their risk level 
reflected in the cost of capital. 
3.8.2.2 Supplementary Analysis for Section 3.3 
The same analysis in Table 3-5 under Section 3.3 is repeated using total 
assets to define size especially that MBE is calculated using market-cap. Table 
3-19 reports the results. Reading rows, overall similar to the conclusion from 
market-cap size definition in Table 3-5 apart from size 1 that showed mixed 
readings. However, size I does not have a large number of observations). This is 
also consistent with the regression analysis discussed later in Section 3.4. Reading 
columns, age I MBE declines with TA size (unlike with MVE size), age 2, apart 
from size 1, size groups have similar MBE. Age groups 3 and 4, apart from size 1, 
MBE increases with TA size (similar to MVE size). The conclusion for MBE-size 
relation derived from TA size is just slightly different from that with MVE because 
MBE size is highly positively correlated with MVE by construction. 
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£million/years All Age<=5 5<Age<= 1 0 1 O<Age<= 13 Age>=14 Obs 
All 2.45 2.00 1.81 1.53 9901 
TA<=\ 3.34 5.37 -0.03 15.68 2.05 129 
\<TA<=IO 1.98 2.73 2.06 1.39 1.06 1709 
IO<TA<=\OO 1.66 2.49 1.95 1.83 1.21 4365 
TA>IOO 1.86 1.97 2.02 1.86 1.82 3698 
Obs 9901 2494 1883 759 4765 9901 
Table 3-19. MBE for Age and Size Groups (Total Assets for Size) 
The table reports median MBE for the different size/age groups calculated from the pooled data 
over the period 1989-2002. Obs is the number of observations represents the sum of observations 
for all 4 age groups in rows and for all 4 size groups in columns. 
This appears in the regression (estimated in Table 3-7 Section 3.4.2) as a positive 
significant relation between MBE and TA size overall and for survivors and in a 
negative insignificant relation for new stocks. 
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Table 3-20. Re-Estimated Value Explanatory Model without Age 
This is the same estimation as in Table 3-6 with AGE the firm age dropped from this estimation. 
The dependent variable is the natural log of market-to-book which measures the rate of market 
value premium/discount over book value; C is the constant term; NPM is the net profit margin 
(trading profitability), ATU is asset turnover (efficiency); TABE is total asset-to-book equity ratio 
:::::: 1 + Debt-to-equity ratio (leverage); Note that NPM x ATU x TABE = ROE. The use of ROE 
instead of its components yields similar results with a higher R-squared; GEGS is growth in 
earnings measured as log(EGS/EGS,.JJ. KE is the cost of equity capital (risk); TA is total asset 
(size); Total number of observations is 7,108 for pooled data for all survivor and new stocks for 
the period 1989-2002. Method of estimation is least squares pooled regression. Robust estimation 
technique (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance) is used to correct 
the standard errors as the model exhibited heteroskedasticity. Firm with MBE smaller than O.Olor 
larger than 100 were excluded as Pastor and Veronesi (2003). 
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3.8.2.4 Leverage 
Leverage, on one hand, exposes finns to financial distress and bankruptcy 
risk, while on the other hand finns benefit from leverage by shielding their profits 
from taxes because as cash payments to shareholders are not tax-deductible 
interest expenses are. Therefore, standard finance theory and practice suggest that 
stable profitable finns should borrow to some extent to enhance value creation 
from tax shield, see Brealey and Myers (2000) for further discussions. 
Table 3-21 and Table 3-22 show that older stocks have higher leverage ratios than 
new stocks regardless of the measure used. Which is expected. This could lead to 
think that survivor stocks are more exposed to financial risk relative to new 
stocks. However, that was reflected in leveraged beta and this relatively higher 
financial risk exposure taken by survivor finns is more than offset by two factors, 
(a) the benefits from tax shield, and (b) the relatively higher profitability and cash 
flow generating ability of survivor finns to justify shielding profits and the higher 
capability to service debt. Hence, it is believed that survivor firms are naturally 
capital structure optimisers and leverage would not contribute to risk differences 
between survivor and new stocks. 
Age Groups LTDRE LTDTA TARE LTDMVE Obs 
Percent Times 
All (A) 10.18 5.49 2.00 5.54 9893 
Survivors (S) 13.04 6.52 2.07 7.32 6972 
New Stocks (N) 3.76 2.74 1.80 1.78 2921 
SeN 9.28 3.79 0.27 5.54 
(S-N)/S Percent 71.19 58.05 13.02 75.68 
p-value (S v N) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 3-21. Leverage, Survivor and New Stocks 
This table reports median leverage ratios expressed in four different ways as discussed in Data 
Appendix Section 3.8.1.4. LTDBE is long-term debt-to-book equity. LTDTA is long-term debt-to-
total assets. TABE is total assets-to-book equity. LTDMVE is long-term debt-to-market value of 
equity. p-value is for the equality test of medians. 
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Age Groups LTDBE LTDTA TABE LTDMVE Obs 
Percent Times 
Up to 2 (G2) 1.50 1.04 1.61 0.45 804 
3 2.77 1.99 1.82 1.39 637 
4 6.31 3.74 1.90 3.05 533 
5 6.12 3.58 1.94 2.90 512 
6 7.48 4.37 1.87 3.92 488 
7 8.59 4.42 1.95 3.54 432 
8 7.13 4.75 1.95 4.11 356 
9 7.41 4.18 2.02 3.67 318 
10 6.99 4.16 2.02 4.16 278 
11 7.57 4.22 2.02 4.66 260 
12 5.93 3.35 1.99 3.25 252 
13 8.64 4.45 1.99 4.00 247 
14+(G14) 16.43 7.91 2.11 9.74 4776 
G14-G2 14.93 6.87 0.50 9.29 
(G14-G2)/G14 Percent 90.88 86.87 23.70 95.34 
E-value (G14 v G2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 3-22. Leverage, Age Groups 
This table reports median leverage ratios expressed in four different ways as discussed in Data 
Appendix Section 3.8.1.4. LTDBE is long-term debt-to-book equity. LTDTA is long-term debt-to-
total assets. TABE is total assets-to-book equity. LTDMVE is long-term debt-to-market value of 
equity. p-value is for the equality test of medians. 
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4 Chapter Four: Stock Market Levels in the UK: 
Earnings Yield, Growth, and Return Expectations 
Abstract 
Having concentrated on relative bias in the previous chapter, we investigate in this 
chapter stock market overall bias (against fundamentals) by examining stock market 
levels in the UK. We first establish the occurrence of major divergences between soaring 
stock prices and economic growth and equity invested capital followed by subsequent 
price falls (corrections). We examine the hypothesis that stock market levels in the UK 
during 1989-2002 can be explained by fundamentals (reasonable expected profitability, 
expected growth and risk) (Ho), along with a variation of this hypothesis that stock prices 
on average over time are correctly valued against fundamentals with temporary 
mispricing periods (Hoa), against the alternative that stock market levels in the UK were 
overvalued on average relative to fundamentals during that period (HI)' On the balance of 
evidence, we believe the conclusion is tilted towards rejecting Ho and HOa in favour of HI. 
For hypothesis testing, we develop a theoretical earnings yield model validated by 
an empirical model to examine stock market levels. We document that the spread 
between earnings yield and the risk-free rate is almost stable on average. To explain this 
negative spread, we explore plausible scenarios for earnings yield, earnings yield 
predictions, corporate profitability, growth expectations, and return expectations. 
The theoretical earnings yield model was successful in predicting in-sample the 
severe fall in stock prices after 1999 peak during 2000-2002 to a very good extent and the 
part recovery to end of 2003 level. The low levels of realised earnings yield relative to the 
risk-free rate and to those obtained from the theoretical and empirical models under 
plausible scenarios imply overvaluation. There were no changes in corporate profitability 
pattern that would explain the soaring stock prices such as those to the of end 1999. 
We also examine implied growth and discount rates. We establish the presence ofa 
gap between implied growth and economic growth against stock market levels with a 
cyclical behaviour in terms of growth expectations where the gap size has a direct 
positive relation with stock price levels. Market expected growth rates as implied in 
market valuation have almost always been higher than both economic growth and realised 
earnings growth suggesting investor overoptimism. An unbiased estimation for the 
expected returns on the stock market is developed and checked for robustness. The 
implied discount rate in market valuation shows that average equity risk premium 
underestimates risk when compared with the evidence in the literature and market 
unbiased expected return. 
Finally, the relative valuation bias analysed in Chapter 3, between new and older 
stocks, correlates with the aggregate valuation bias of this chapter as demonstrated by the 
behaviour of the valuation gap between new and mature stocks and the market implied 
growth gap, where both gaps widen in bullish markets and diminish in bearish markets 




Chapter 3 on valuation bias and stock age was a relative analysis, finding 
that investor expectations for new stocks appear to be biased relative to older 
stocks. Although Chapter 3 explored the valuation of new stocks relative to 
survivor stocks, it did not address the valuation levels of survivor stocks 
themselves or the overall price levels of the stock market.55 Therefore, in this 
chapter, we expand the research into another dimension to study valuation bias at 
the stock market overall level. Valuation bias in this chapter refers to overall bias 
against fundamentals, while the previous chapter tackled relative bias between 
stock categories divided by age. 
Equity valuation continues to puzzle both academics and market 
practitioners. 56 Standard finance theory postulates that the value of any capital 
asset is measured by the present value of its future outcomes. This premise or 
theory is one of the most important comer stones in investment and finance. But, 
often the observed behaviour of stock prices, especially the unexplained 
significant ups and downs, does not seem to accord with this theory.S7 
Market behaviour shown in Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 below provide 
sufficient motivation to explore the area of equity valuation and to seriously 
question market value levels attempting to develop a thorough understanding of 
equity valuation. Both figures compare UK equity prices with major fundamental 
determinants. The difference between these two figures is that in Figure 4-1 the 
comparison is with the underlying economy, while in Figure 4-2 the comparison 
is with the book value of equity. 
S5 The conclusion of Chapter 3 ended with a caveat that it does not imply that older stocks were 
fairly valued. 
56 The complexity of the research in this area stems from the unknown fair value levels, which 
makes it difficult to work in this area. Nevertheless, researchers always work to at least thoroughly 
understand the problem. 
57 For example, Grossman and Shiller (1981) find that the present value of dividends since 1881 
had only a thin relation to actual stock prices in the US, Campbell and Shiller (1988) find that 
stock prices and returns are too volatile to accord with simple present-value model. Smithers and 
Wright (2004) say, "Two fundamental, and perhaps disconcerting questions, immediately occur 
when considering how to value stock markets. They are "Why attempt to do it?" and "Can it be 
done?" 
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Figure 4-1 below shows that the stock market was not in tandem with the 
economy, with major divergences followed by severe stock price corrections (e.g. 
1993-1994, and 1999-2002). Locating the end of the Cold War late 1991 on the 
lower chart reveals possible market over-optimism followed the end of this 
prolonged conflict. FTSE All Share Price Index (FTSE All) closed at an all-time 
year-close high at 3,242.06 by the end of 1999. Since then, the index has declined 
by 41.6 percent to 1,893.73 by the end of 2002, roughly 120 points below its level 
at the end of 1996. What drove stock prices to that high level of 1999 and what 
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Figure 4-1. Stock Market levels versus the Economy 
The upper chart shows FTSE All Share Price Index in index point. The lower one plots the ratio of 
FTSE ALL (index points) divided by UK nominal GDP then all re-based to 1976 ratio to show 
comparative paths or growth patterns. If the stock market and the economy grew at the same rates 
then this ratio would have been constant around 1.00 on the Y-axis. The vertical line at 1991 
indicates the end of the Cold War era. Nominal or inflation-corrected graphs will show the same 
pattern as the same correction multiple (say based on 1976 price level) will be applied to the 



























Figure 4-2. Market-to-Book Ratio, UK Non-Financial Sector 
MBE is market-to-book ratio of equity calculated at aggregate level for all UK non-financial traded 
companies by dividing the sum of market value of equities by the corresponding sum of book 
equities every year. The historic weighted average MBE is calculated by dividing the sum of 
market value of equities for all companies by the corresponding sum of book equities pooled for 
the entire period 1989-2002. 
Figure 4-2 illustrates the major divergence when relating stock prices to book 
equity capital (a good proxy for actual shareholders funds invested in the 
operations), while Figure 4-1 illustrates the divergence relative to the economy. 
Both figures confirm the occurrence of major deviations and corrections. 
Similar divergence has been observed in the US. Alan Greenspan, 
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve System 1996 has 
talked about irrational exuberance in equity prices.58 Shiller (2001) reported that 
the US stock market ups and downs over the last century have made virtually no 
sense ex post. He continues saying: it is curious how little known this simple fact 
is. Another quote from Shiller's book implies some questions that are both 
worrying and fascinating: "Weare unsure whether the market levels make any 
sense, or whether they are indeed the result of some human tendency that might 
58 Alan Greenspan said, " ... how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated 
asset values, which then become subject to unexpected prolonged contractions ... " At that time the 
forward price-earnings ratios on the S&P and Nasdaq were 15 and 19 respectively, while they 
were 21 and 31 respectively in April 2002 (CNN, 2002; Greenspan, 1996). Also, The Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System in its Monetary Policy Report to the Congress dated 
February 27,2002 highlighted the exceptional volatility of equity prices in 2001. Literally: "The 
exceptional volatility of equity prices in 2001 likely reflected the dramatic fluctuations in 
investors' assessment of the outlook of the economy and corporate earnings. Share prices tumbled 
early last year, as pessimism and uncertainty about the direction of the economy were intensified 
by a spate of negative earnings announcements and profit warnings in April and March." 
115 
be calIed irrational exuberance. We are unsure whether the high levels of the stock 
market might reflect unjustified optimism, an optimism that might pervade our 
thinking and affect many of our life decisions. We are unsure what to make of any 
sudden market correction, wondering if the previous market psychology will 
return". 
Some years ago, Bernstein (1985) summed it up saying " .. .investors forecast 
stock prices instead of company earnings. More precisely, today's is a forecast of 
what investors expect tomorrow's price to be, rather than as estimate of present 
value of future payment streams". The above statements express well why 
someone would really be willing to explore the area of equity valuation bias at the 
absolute level and keep working in the field although it looks a very open-ended 
problem. 
The objective of the present research is to investigate whether stock price 
levels in the UK can be explained by fundamentals. The rejection of this 
hypothesis will suggest that valuation bias (mispricing relative to fundamentals) 
exists at market overalI level implying that stock prices are driven by investor 
expectations rather than by fundamentals. 
Specifically we test the following null hypothesis: 
Ho: Stock market levels in the UK during the period 1989-2002 can be 
explained by fundamentals such as reasonable expected profitability, 
expected growth and/or risk levels. 
We also test a variation of Ho: 
HOa: Stock prices on average over time are correctly valued against 
fundamentals, but sometimes there is temporary mispricing. 
If the research concludes by rejecting Ho and its variation Hoa, that will be in 
favour of the alternative hypothesis HI: 
HI: Stock market levels in the UK were overvalued (biased upwards) on 
average relative to fundamentals during the period 1989-2002. 
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The two hypotheses Ho and HI are closely related. The method we adopt is 
essentially testing Ho as to whether it is possible to develop a sensible explanation 
of the levels and movements of stock prices as shown in Figure 4-1 and Figure 
4-2 above using fundamentals. 
The selected method goes through exploring rationalised scenarios for earnings 
yield; earnings yield predictions, corporate profitability, growth expectations, and 
return expectations. Although hard to quantify, the possible outcomes of the 
analyses will be represented by one of the cells on the matrix presented in Figure 
4-3. The conclusion will be located onto the same matrix in the conclusion 
section. 
Pricing Risk 
Overestimated Rational Underestimated 
A B C 
Underestimated 1 Undervalued Undervalued Offsetting 
~1 
.S Rational 2 Undervalued Rational Overvalued 
.1.> (:) (~ Overestimated 3 Offsetting Overvalued Overvalued 
Figure 4-3. The Matrix of Growth and Risk Pricing Impact on Stock Valuation 
AI (top left) and C3 (bottom right) represent the most severe undervaluation and overvaluation 
levels respectively. A3 and C I have an offsetting impact, the underestimation/overestimation 
extent of each variable could result in rational (for the wrong reasons), overvalued, or undervalued 
levels. The relative severity level of B 1 v A2 and C2 v B3 are dependent on the extent of one 
variable under-lover-estimation. Changes in profitability patterns will be rolled out of the 
explanation as shown later under Section 4.5. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Following a description of our data in 
Section 4.2, section 4.3 discusses (a) fundamental drivers of market valuations, 
and (b) the issue that some key drivers such as growth expectations and risk 
perception are not directly observed. This section then presents two earnings-yield 
valuation models (one theoretical, the other empirical) to examine earnings yield 
levels and the prediction capability of the model. The theoretical model is based 
on standard finance theory and common sense of investment and economics, 
while the empirical model is built from historic experience contained in the data, 
the empirical model validates the theoretical one. This will be the initial 
hypothesis testing. 
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Section 4.4 then tests the maintained hypothesis that economic fundamentals, as 
captured by this valuation model, can explain aggregate stock market valuations. 
In Section 4.5, we examine changes in corporate profitability pattern (to assess 
their impact on stock market levels) and market growth expectations via implied 
growth under plausible scenarios against economic growth and realised earnings 
growth. We then tum to developing an unbiased estimate for return expectations 
to compare with the risk-free rate and the market implied discount rate under 
plausible scenarios to evaluate risk-aversion and return-expectations. The 
robustness of these estimates is tested through the correlation with the risk-free 
rate that was not part of the estimation processes. 
4.2 Data 
The same dataset used for Chapter 3 is used for this Chapter. Annual 
accounting, market, and economic data are taken from the database of 
Datastream-Thomson Financial for the years 1989 through 2002 on all UK non-
financial traded stocks. Financial stocks are excluded, as common in the literature 
for this type of analysis, because of their different nature from general industries. 
See Data Section 3.2 and Data Appendix 3.8.1 in Chapter 3 for details on data raw 
items, codes, construction, calculations and discussions. 
In addition to this, the market expectations for inflation rates implied in 
government bond trading as estimated by the Bank of England are used. These are 
discussed further under Section 4.5.3.1 where used. These data were retrieved 
from the Bank of England website (www.bankofengland.co.uk). 
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4.3 Valuation Framework; Earnings Yield Model 
4.3.1 An Earnings Yield Based Model of the Market-to-Book 
Equity Ratio 
George Box said once "all models are wrong but some models are 
useful".59 Therefore, a simple earnings capitalisation model based on a well-
established framework in finance is used concentrating on investment and 
economic logic rather than on sophisticated modelling. The purpose of this section 
is to develop a theoretical earnings-yield model and to estimate an empirical 
earnings-yield model of the observed market-to-book ratio. 
First, it is important to discuss the use of an earnings-based valuation 
model, from different conceptual and practical angles, and it is shown that this is 
equivalent to a model of the market-to-book MBE (this Section 4.3.1). Then the 
model itself is estimated (Section 4.3.2). In the following Section 4.4, this model 
will be used to test hypotheses in which stock market valuations can be explained 
using this fundamentals-based model. Starting with discussing the use of earnings: 
(a) Finance Literature: Several contributions to the literature have emphasised 
the importance of current and future earnings to stock valuation. Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) introduced a valuation concept according to which a share 
value represents the present value of normalised earnings from existing assets 
plus the present value of future growth opportunities in earnings. Campbell 
and Shiller (1988) stated: " ... earnings are constructed by accountants with the 
objective of helping people to evaluate the fundamental worth of a company." 
Feltham and Ohlson (1999) analysis "refutes popular notions that a 
conceptually valid assessment of market value must focus on anticipated cash 
flows rather than anticipated realizations of accounting data. Current book 
value plus the present value of future abnormal earnings provides a general 
framework, and the present value of cash flows formula arises merely as a 
59 George Box is a well-known industrial statistician. 
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special case". Heaton and Lucas (1999) used earnings arguing that they are 
likely to be a more stable proxy for long-run payments to shareholders. Shiller 
(2000) referred to the intrinsic values of businesses 'as measured by the 
expected discounted value of their future earnings stream'. Bakshi and Chen 
(2001) developed a valuation model with net earnings per share, expected 
earnings growth, and interest rate as its inputs. Bartov and Goldberg (2001), 
using stock return, find that earnings are more important than cash flow metric 
for equity valuation in three Anglo-Saxon countries; United States, United 
Kingdom and Canada where capital is traditionally raised in public markets.60 
Others such as Ang and Liu (200 I), Scott, Stumpp and Xu (1999) and 
Sougiannis and Yaehura (2001) used earnings-based valuation model in their 
work. 
(b) The split between retained and distributed earnings is not crucial. Companies 
distribute part of their earnings as dividends and retain the remaining part. 
Dividends can be discounted to present value at a discount rate that reflects 
their risk. Retained earnings increase the value of the business and contribute 
to growth. Thus, retained earnings that would be reflected in stock price 
appreciation can be discounted at a rate that reflects the uncertainty of their 
realisation given that they can be realised by selling the stoCk.61 So, it is 
appropriate to discount earnings (dividends + retained earnings) and their 
growth at a discount rate that reflects the combined risk of total returns 
(dividends and capital appreciation from retained profit). 
(c) At a single company level the differences between annual cash flows and 
earnings can be very significant due to timing differences between cash basis 
and accrual basis of accounting. However, working at market aggregate level 
timing differences are mitigated if not unimportant. 
(d) Also at company level, to some extent, companies can manipulate earnings 
even within the generally accepted accounting standards and practices. It is 
not acceptable that value can be impacted via accounting practices-book 
60 But they find in Gennany and Japan, where capital is traditionally raised from private sources, 
that earnings are not superior to cash flows for equity valuation with no significant differences. 
61 Note that if retained earnings are invested in zero NPV projects, the present value of their 
incremental future outcome will be equal to the retained amount at the time of retaining. 
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manipulations. These manipulations come in the form of timing differences, 
and are therefore mitigated at market aggregate level. 
(e) Although accounting measures of performance at a company level have many 
drawbacks for valuation because of timing differences, earnings are still based 
on sound, logical and consistent basis of accounting. That is accrual basis or 
matching principle. US Financial Accounting Standards Board (F ASB) 
believes that earnings which are based on accrual basis of accounting provide 
superior value-relevant information for assessing future cash flows and value 
estimates than reported historical cash flows. 62 
It is not meant by using earnings that they form the best valuation metric in all 
circumstances. It is merely used because a metric to measure annual performance 
is needed. Accrual basis and matching principle of accounting make earnings 
good candidate for this specific purposejust at market level. 
The derivation below addresses the two fundamental points about the 
economic value of equities as highlighted by Smithers and Wright (2004), that 
equities (a) are financial assets, and (b) represent a title to the ownership of real 
assets. In the following is a brief discussion of the model with the derivation of a 
theoretical earnings-yield model and an empirical model that validates the 
theoretical formulation. The following equation is a standard present value model 
based on earnings. 
Equation 4-1: 
where MVE is market value of equity, EGS is earnings, KE is the cost of equity 
capital, and gi is the growth rate. 
First, there is an essential technical point to clarify. Valuation is an ex ante 
process where value is the present value of future outcomes (cash flows, earnings, 
62 The Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) number 1 (1978) explains that the 
accrual basis underlying earnings aims at recording the fmancial effects of transactions and other 
relevant events and circumstances on an enterprise in the periods in which they occur rather than 
in the periods in which cash is received or paid. 
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etc). However, using analysts' earnings forecasts or estimating future earnings for 
the market is both subjective and unviable. Therefore, the model will extrapolate 
from the market's aggregate prior year's earnings into the following year's 
forecast and so on reducing the subjectivity by relying on a hard fact as follows. 
What also justifies this technical solution, is that for a single company actual 
earnings might differ significantly from forecast ones, but aggregate realized 
earnmgs for a large number of companies is a representative and acceptable 
measure for valuation at market level. Combining all analysts' forecasts for the 
market, if of any good, should be close to the realized aggregate earnings. 
There are two more technical problems that could lead to errors in using the 
model at aggregate level. These are (a) having different number of companies 
from year to year, and (b) companies' capital base could change from year to 
another, so relating one year's market-cap to the next year's earnings would be 
inconsistent. These technical problems were overcome by re-writing the model in 
Equation 4-1, for market level, with the earnings of year t+ 1 growing from those 
of year t = 0 as follows: 
Equation 4-2: 
A reduced form of this model is needed to make it usable. A terminal growth 
figure, i.e., a long run growth rate can combine an explicit short term forecast with 
a judgement about future growth rates, into a single rate. Hence, the alternative 
used for the present analysis, is a single practically comparable perpetual growth 
rate that applies from year one onwards.63 Table 4-1 illustrates how the use of 
perpetual growth can be representative for more detailed explicit growth rates and 
helps to derive a practically single comparable figure. 
63 It is not practically possible to derive and compare implied explicit growth rates for long period. 
Although at a company individual level forecast explicit growth rates could be different from year 
to year, it is fair to assume that earnings groWth at market aggregate level can be expressed in a 
single growth rate. Also, even at a single company level it is not practically possible to 
use/estimate and compare multiple growth rates. Moreover, estimating a perpetual growth rate is a 




Year t= 0 2 3 4 5 Tenninal 
Earnings £m 95 100 115 95 120 115 1,993 
Growth rates Percent 5.0 15.0 -17.0 26.0 4.0 4.0 
Cost of capital Percent 10.00 
Present value of earnings 91 95 71 82 71 1238 
Market value estimate £m 1,648 
Equivalent single implied 
Eerpetual growth rate 3.93 
Table 4-1. Perpetual Growth Substituting Detailed Growth Rates 
The tenninal value is estimated at the end of year 5 assuming 4 percent perpetual growth from year 
6 onwards by using Gordon model. The perpetual growth rate that singles out all detailed growth 
rates can is calculated by inverting the Gordon model (g = KE - EGS/MVEo). This growth rate 
gives, of course, the same market value estimate as derived from explicit growth rates. 
Based on the above discussion, the explicit growth rates gl. g2. etc in Equation 4-2 
are replaced with their representative constant geometric growth rate g: 
MVE _ EGSo(l + g) EGSo(l + g)2 EGSo(l + g)3 
0- (1 +KE) + (l +KE)2 + (l +KE)3 + ... 
MVE = EGSo (1 + g) [1 + ( 1 + g ) + ( 1 + g )2 + ... J 
o (1 + KE) 1 + KE 1 + KE 
The expression in square brackets is a declining infinite geometric progression 
where its sum is given by the expression shown below in square brackets (for KE 
>g): 
MVE = EGSo(l + g)[ 1 1 = EGSo(l + g) 
o (1 + KE) 1- 1 + g KE - g 
I+KE 
in a generalised form: 
Equation 4-3: MVE = EGS/(l+g) 
I KE-g 
In the following section, we validate, empirically and statistically, the 
model presented in Equation 4-3. Earnings yield EY was not used as the 
dependent variable in the regression. Instead, a mathematically equivalent 
transformation of MBE was used because ex post earnings yields at company level 
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are very unstable.64 For this task, the model is re-written using market-to-book 
equity ratio by dividing both sides of Equation 4-3 by book equity BE at time t: 
EGSt (1+ g) 
MVEI BEl . I 65 
---'- = ------:.-- , yte ding: 
BEl KE-g 
Equation 4-4: MBE = ROEt(l+g) 
I KE-g 
It is worth showing how the theoretical earnings yield model is derived from the 
valuation model in Equation 4-3 (EY is earnings yield, RF is the risk-free rate, 
RM is the expected return on the market): 66 
Equation 4-5: 
EGS (1 +g) 
MVE = I re-arrange 
I KE-g' 
MVEI = 1+ g = PE =_1_, of which 
EGSI KE-g EY 
EY= KE-g. 
l+g 
For stock level, Equation 4-5 can be re-written using CAPM cost of equity as in 








64 The issue here is that there are substantial short-term variations in earnings yield, driven by 
short-term earnings fluctuations. The objective is to estimate a long-run valuation model. without 
having to model the dynamics of short-term earnings growth. Therefore, it is better to use market-
to-book which bears a simple clear relationship with earnings yield, and is less affected by short-
term earnings fluctuations. Moreover, earnings yield can be derived from the MBE empirical 
model; see the derivation of Equation 4-19 in Appendix 4.7.1. 
65 Wright (2004) discusses market-to-book as an indicator for market value levels. He refers to 
market-to-book equity MBE as 'equity q' as a variation of Tobin's q. He defines Tobin's q as 
[(Market value of equities + Liabilities)lTotal assets] and equity q as [Market value of equities/Net 
worth], where net worth is defined as [Total 'assets - Liabilities]. However, Wright use assets' 
replacement cost in his calculations as produced by statisticians in the us. 
66 Lansing (2002) used earnings yield (the inverse of price-earnings ratio) in examining stock 
market levels in the US. Wright (2002) referred to earnings yield calculation as earnings divided 
by market value of equities. 
124 
4.3.2 Estimating the Empirical Model 
This subsection now presents an estimated version of the MBE model. To 
implement Equation 4-4, an empirical model is adopted in which market-to-book 
equity MBE (market valuation) is the dependent variable, with return on equity 
ROE (profitability), g (growth), and cost of equity KE (for risk) are the 
explanatory variables. The idea is to establish empirically the statistical relations 
between market valuation, profitability, growth and risk because the earnings 
yield model will be a variation of the valuation model presented in Equation 4-3 
or Equation 4_4.67 
It is worth noting how the theoretical and the empirical model reflect that stock 
prices or stock returns should be detennined by the underlying profitability, 
growth potential and risk factors. Any other factors such as explicit macro-
economic and sector factors are relevant to corporate valuation as far as they 
impact the above three factors. Thus, the explanatory variables on the right hand 
side of a value model should be proxies for all fundamental underlying factors. 
The literature has mainly used market-based explanatory variables in explaining 
stock returns such as price-earnings PIE, dividend yield DY, market-to-book MIB 
and Tobin's Q. These variables are manifestations of value rather than value-
explanatory variables. Therefore, they fall in the same category of stock returns. 
In the context of searching for value-relevant factors these factors are better used 
as the dependent variable on the left hand side of value models leaving the right 
hand side to the underlying corporate factors that eventually capture the impact of 
both unique and systematic factors that affect corporate performance and 
potential. 
Table 4-2 shows the estimation outcome of the regression. 
67 log(MBE) is used as it represents the logarithmic rate of the premium that is to be explained by 
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Table 4-2. Empirical Verification for MBEIEYTheoretical Model 
The dependent variable is the natural log of market-to-book which measures the rate of market 
value premium/discount over book value; C is the constant term; ROE is the return on equity; 
GEGS is growth in earnings measured as 10g(EGS/EGS,_I). KE is the cost of equity capital (risk) 
estimated using CAPM as discussed in detail in the data section in Chapter 3. Total number of 
observations is 7,108 for pooled data for all survivor and new stocks for the period 1989-2002. 
Method of estimation is least squares pooled regression. Robust estimation technique (White 
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance) is used to correct the standard errors 
as the model exhibited heteroskedasticity. Firm with MBE smaller than O.Olor larger than 100 
were excluded as in Pastor and Veronesi (2003). 
Estimating the same equation over different periods, including for single years, 
showed that model is stable over time in its ability to explain value by the selected 
fundamental variables. The statistical significance and signs of the empirical 
model provide comfort to use the theoretical MBE model to derive the earnings 
yield model. It is worth commenting on the sizes of the coefficients. If all 
coefficients have zero value then the estimated premium rate [log(MBE)] will be 
the value of the constant term 45 percent. ROE has a coefficient of 2.61; at an 
average ROE of 9.80 percent its contribution will be 26 percent. The growth 
coefficient is 0.07; at 2 percent growth rate its contribution will be minimal at 
0.14 percent reflecting the weak link between realised growth and market value. 
Cost of equity (risk) has a coefficient of -2.14; at an average of 9 percent its 
contribution will be -19 percent. Clearly with the disturbances, all coefficients are 
within the overall historic average market premium 10g(MBE) (or roughly MBE-l 
of 144 percent) and do not show insensible values and hence we can rely on the 
sensibility of the signs and significance of the established relations between MBE 
and the explanatory variables for our analysis. This statistical confirmation was 
introduced as earnings yield model is derived from the theoretical MBE model 
where an empirical earnings yield model will also be derived from the empirical 
MBE model of Equation 4-8 as shown in Appendix 4.7.1. 
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4.3.3 The Sensitivity of Earnings Yield to Growth and Risk 
It is important to clarify the sensitivity of earnings yield to growth and risk 
before moving, in the next section, to analyse the plausibility of earnings yield 
levels. The earnings yield model indicates that the higher the expected growth the 
lower the earnings yield, and the higher the expected rate of return the higher the 
earnings yield, and vice versa. 
Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 illustrate these relations where changes in EY are 
calculated by taking the first derivative of EY from Equation 4-7 with respect to g 
and RM respectively, and then applying finite changes as follows: 
. h aEY I + RM I' fi' h WIt respect to g: --= 2 ' app ymg mte c anges: 
Equation 4-9: 
ag (l+g) 
MY ~ 1 + RM x t1g 
(1 + g)2 
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Figure 4-4. The Sensitivity of Earnings Yield to the Level of Expected Growth 
EY = (RM - g)/(l+g) and MY ~ -(l+RM)/(l+g)2xl\g controlling for expected return RM at 10 
percent for illustration purposes. 
Other things being equal, the higher the expected growth the lower the earnings 
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Figure 4-5. The Sensitivity of Earnings Yield to the Level of Expected Return 
EY = (RM - g)/(l+g) and MY ~ l/(1+g)xMM controlling for growth rate g at 4 percent for 
illustration purposes. 
Other things being equal, the higher the required rate of return the higher the 
earnings yield. 
Expected return on the market RM and the risk-free rate RF are the same for all 
stocks. Hence, risk (say as measured by beta according to CAPM) and growth 
determine the deviation of a single stock's earnings yield from that of the market. 
Figure 4-6 shows the relation between stock's earnings yield and its beta. The 
higher the risk (beta) the higher the earnings yield. 
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Figure 4-6. The Sensitivity of Stock EY to Risk as Measured by Beta 
EY = [RF+/X..RM - RF) - g]/(1+g) controlling for RM at 10 percent, RF at 7 percent, and gat 4 
percent for illustration purposes only, 
The interpretation of Figure 4-6 in conjunction with Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 
highlights how although hi~er expected growth lead to a lower EY, higher risk 
leads to the opposite. Implication for possible behavioural bias: a combination of 
optimistic growth expectations and underestimated risk? 
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4.4 Examining Earnings Yield Levels 
This section uses earnings yield (the inverse of the price-earnings ratio) to 
examine the stock market aggregate level to identify possible mispricing by (a) 
comparing with the risk-free rate documenting the behaviour of the spread to test 
whether this spread is consistent with fundamental valuation in terms of growth 
expectations and risk perception, (b) comparing with theoretical and empirical 
model values for earnings yield derived from plausible assumptions about growth 
expectations and risk perception, and (c) examining in-sample earnings-yield 
predictions that would detect mispriced levels indicating major corrections under 
plausible assumptions. 
4.4.1 Earnings Yield, Risk-Free Rate, Risk, and Growth 
Growth and risk are important factors to stock valuation. The problem in 
studying them is that they are not directly observed. Therefore, the relation 
between earnings yield and the risk-free rate is utilised to test stock market levels 
to analyse the combined impact of growth expectations and risk perception 
implied in earnings yield levels (as in the empirical research, e.g. Asness (2000) 
and Lansing (2002». Here is the logic behind this analysis. If stocks were risk-
free like the short-term discount government bonds with no growth potential, then 
investors would expect earnings yield to be close to the risk-free rate.68 Taking 
one factor at a time: (a) Stocks are riskier than risk-free assets; hence earnings 
yield would be higher than risk-free rate as market valuation should reflect 
negatively the risk differential into stock prices. (b) Stocks have growth potential 
unlike bonds; therefore, earnings yield would be lower as market valuation should 




KE = RF + Equity Risk Premium (ERP) 
(RF+ERP)-g 
Equation 4-11: EY = ...:...-------'-'~ 
l+g 
68 To overcome the issue of expected inflation implied in the risk-free rate, we used the short-term 
interest rate on the 3-month UK Treasury Bill (government discount bonds) in addition to the 
government bonds' 1 O-year redemption yield. 
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If the expected benefits from future growth outweigh risk differential between 
stocks and risk-free assets then earnings yield should be lower than the risk-free 
rate and vice versa. Table 4-3 and Figure 4-7 below show how earnings yield was 
always, apart from 1998, below the risk-free rate, which highlights market 
perception that growth potential benefits outweigh risk differential. An important 
reading of Table 4-3 and Figure 4-7 below is the semi-stable spread between 
earning yield and the risk-free rate (circa 2 percent on average). The big question 
to ask is: Are these implied growth and risk levels consistent with fundamental 
valuation, in particular that growth potential outweighs risk exposure? 
To try to answer this question, the balance of this section explores plausible 
(rationalised) scenarios for earnings yield and earnings yield predictions for stock 
market levels. We then test the hypothesis from a different angle via directly 
examining corporate profitability patterns, growth expectations, and return 
expectations. 
Year Earnings 10-Year 3-Month Obs 
Yield Risk-Free Risk-Free 
Percent Rate Rate 
1989 7.72 10.26 14.50 451 
1990 9.38 10.95 13.41 488 
1991 8.38 9.73 10.13 501 
1992 6.44 8.26 6.53 507 
1993 3.91 6.10 5.00 524 
1994 5.08 8.71 6.19 551 
1995 5.77 7.42 6.22 590 
1996 5.52 7.51 6.16 657 
1997 5.27 6.29 7.34 753 
1998 4.64 4.36 5.94 825 
1999 3.42 5.48 5.63 872 
2000 3.10 4.88 5.88 933 
2001 2.23 5.05 3.86 1088 
2002 0.27 4.37 3.88 1151 
Weighted average 4.05 
SimEle averase 5.08 7.10 7.19 
Table 4-3. Earnings Yield versus Risk-Free Rate 
Earnings yield is calculated as the sum of earnings for all companies every year divided by the 
corresponding sum of market value of equities. The risk-free rate uses, (a) the redemption yield on 
the 10-year government bond benchmark, (b) the interest rate on the UK discount 3-month 
Treasury Bill. The choice of the lO-year bond was discussed under the Data Section 3.2 in Chapter 
3. The use of the 3-month rate was introduced to overcome the impact of expected inflation in 
longer term bonds distorting the comparison as discussed at the outset of this section. Obs is the 
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Figure 4-7. Earnings Yield versus Risk-Free Rate 
---Earnings Yield 
-. - - - 10-Year Risk-Free Rate 
---------- 3-MJnth Risk-Free Rate 
---------.. , 
". ............. . ~' ... :::...... ...... 
This graph plots the figures calculated in Table 4-3. Earnings yield is calculated as the sum of 
earnings for all companies every year divided by the corresponding sum of market value of 
equities. The risk-free rate uses, (a) the redemption yield on the to-year government bond 
benchmark, (b) the interest rate on the UK discount 3-month Treasury Bill. 
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4.4.2 Plausible Scenarios for Earnings Yield 
This exercise aims at examining stock market valuation at aggregate level 
for the whole period 1989-2002 using earnings yield to form an idea on whether 
the market is fairly priced on average over time. This test uses the theoretical 
model introduced earlier and compares with the empirical model. The theoretical 
model EY = (RM - g)/(l +g) is from Equation 4-5 and the empirical EY model 
comes from Equation 4-8 where EY = ROEIMBE = ROE/exp[log(MBE)], with 
log(MBE) provided by the empirical model of Equation 4-8 estimated in Table 
4-2: 10g(MBE) = 0.45 + 2.61xROE + 0.07xGEGS - 2. 14xKE. Table 4-4 presents 
plausible scenarios for EY derived from both models followed by interpretation. 
Assessment Scenarios (ex post) 2 3 4 
Percent 
Required total return on the market RM 14.92(1) 10.18(2) 8.21(3) 9.25(3) 
Expected growth 5.89(4) 5.89(4) 4.00(S) 5.00(S) 
EY (theoretical model) 8.53 4.05 4.05 4.05 
EY (empirical model) 6.63 5.99 5.75 5.88 
Realised EY (pooled weighted average) 4.05 4.05 4.05 4.05 
Percentage difference: 
Theoretical EY versus Realised EY 111 N/A N/A N/A 
Empirical EY versus Realised EY 64 48 42 45 
Implied RM in EY of 4.05 percent using the 
emEirical model at the given 8. scenarios -8.12(6) -8.19(6) -8.16(6) 
Table 4-4. Plausible Scenarios for Earnings Yield 1989-2002 
(1) Average unbiased required return over the period. Expected return on the market is calculated 
every year using total returns (capital appreciation and dividends) on the FTSE All Share 
Index on the following basis: real TRS, 10-year rolling average, add expected inflation, and 
finally adjusted downwards by 1.5 percent for survivorship bias. See Section 4.5.3.1 later. 
(2) Implied in 4.05 percent EY level at 5.89 percent growth rate using the theoretical model. 
(3) Implied in 4.05 percent EY level at 4 (then 5) percent growth rate using the theoretical model. 
(4) Compound average growth of the UK nominal GDP for the period. 
(5) Widely used and generally accepted growth assumptions in the literature and by practitioners. 
(6) These illogical negative implied values for the cost of capital could indicate: (a) that the 
disturbances (in part) is affecting the implied value, (b) partly the disturbances to a degree that 
makes these readings positive and partly underestimated risk. 
ROE figure used for all scenarios is calculated by dividing pooled earnings by pooled book 
equities for the common sample over 1989-2002 resulting in a realised pooled weighted average 
ROE of 9.80 percent, i.e. assuming profitability is mean-reverting consistent with the existing 
empirical literature [e.g., Beaver (1970), Lookabill (1976), Freeman, Ohlson, and Penman (1982), 
Penman (1991), and Fama and French (2000)]. Earnings yields are estimated using the theoretical 
and empirical models. Theoretical EY = (RM-g)/(l+g), Empirical EY = ROElexp[log(MBE)]. 
Realised EY is calculated by dividing pooled earnings by pooled market-caps for common sample 
over 1989-2002. The percentage difference is calculated as [(Model EY - Realised EY)lRealised 
Ey]' All variables and their calculations are discussed further after the results interpretation below. 
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Below are the different readings from the scenarios in Table 4-4 linking 
their interpretations to the hypotheses presented in Section 4.1 : 
1. Scenario 1 suggests that realised earnings yield is understated under both 
models and hence implies overvalued levels of stock prices on overage. If 
growth is reduced below 5.89 percent, the indication of overvaluation will be 
more apparent under the theoretical model, and given a median realised 
growth of 1.30 percent. Although this cannot be conclusive evidence, it 
provides an indication for the possibility of overvaluation. The evidence of 
this scenario is consistent with HI. 
2. Scenarios 2, 3, and 4 under the theoretical model at the set growth and 
discount rate levels, show that earnings yield matches the realised level for the 
period. Growth and cost of capital scenarios are not implausible. Annual 
growth rate of 5.89 percent is the historic compound GDP growth for the 
period. 4 and 5 percent are plausible assumptions too. Average cost of capital 
between 8.21 and 10.18 percent is not implausible given that the average 10-
year risk-free rate for the period is circa 7 percent. In this case, the results 
suggest that the stock market is reaching efficient pricing over the long-term. 
The important implication of this is that severe fluctuations reflect temporary 
periods of mispricing where exuberant high levels are subsequently corrected. 
This evidence is consistent with Hoa but does not say much about Ho. 
3. Scenarios 2, 3 and 4 under the empirical model, show an illogical negative 
implied values for the cost of capital which might be the results of the 
disturbances in part to a degree to make these readings positive but still below 
the risk-free rate (remains implausible) indicating that the balance of the 
explanation of these negative readings implies underestimated risk. This 
evidence is consistent with HI. 
4. All scenarios, under the empirical model, indicate understated realised 
earnings yield level implying overvalued stock price levels. This evidence is 
consistent with HI. 
On balance of the above, the evidence seems consistent with HI. 
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Below is a further discussion for the variables of Table 4-4 and their calculations. 
Earnings Yield EY: 
Realised EY that is compared with model-generated EY is calculated for 
the pooled data over the whole period as a weighted average to be as 




Realised weighted average 1989-2002 EY = ~/;..:..::~=~9-"c...:·:1,---__ 
L LMVEt,j 
/=1989 ;=1 
where n is the number of companies every year for a common sample where both 
earnings and market value of equity data are available, and t is the year. Applying 
Equation 4-12 resulted in 4.05 percent weighted average earnings yield. 
The Expected Return on the Market RM: 
It was estimated as the average of the individual 14 years expected return 
on the market estimated using the procedure described in Table 4-IO(a} Section 
4.5.3.1 where individual years' expected rates of returns are estimated using total 
returns (capital appreciation and dividends) on the FTSE All Share Index using 
real TRS, 10-year rolling average, adding expected inflation, and finally adjusting 
downwards by 1.5 percent for survivorship bias. 
Growthg: 
Median realised earnings growth for the entire period was 1.30 percent. 
Therefore, economic growth would be more representative to use for the 
aggregate expected growth level. The compounded GDP nominal growth rate was 
calculated at 5.89 percent for the period 1989-2002 using Equation 4-13 (a re-
arrangement of the usual discrete compounding formula). 
1 
• 14. [GD~OO2 ]14 Equation 4-13: GD~002 = GD~988(l + gGDP} of whIch gGDP = -1 GD~988 
The simple average GDP growth rate is 5.90 percent. This level of economic 
growth seems reasonable given that part of that is inflation and the remaining part 
is real growth. Compounded annual inflation rate on RPI for the same period is 
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3.63 percent (simple average 3.66 percent) leaving realised average annual real 
GDP growth at 5.89 - 3.63 = 2.26 percent. Using the median realised earnings 
growth 1.30 percent will just enlarge the gap between model and realised earnings 
yields in the same direction.69 It is worth noting that the theoretical model is more 
sensitive to growth rate than the empirical model given that the empirical model is 
based on the relation between value and realised earnings growth which is not 
very strong, acknowledging that realised growth is far below the expected growth 
built into market valuation. Even using growth rate of 4 or 5 percent (the widely 
used assumptions by academics and practitioners) leads to a stronger indication 
for overvaluation. 
Return on Equity ROE: 
Realised ROE is calculated for the pooled data over the whole period as a 




Equation 4-14: Realised weighted average 1989-2002 ROE = '=~:~ ;=~ 
L LBE,.; 
,=1989 ;=1 
where n is the number of companies every year for a common sample where both 
earnings and market value of equity data are available, and t is the year. Applying 
Equation 4-14 resulted in 9.80 percent weighted average return on equity. 
69 Average earnings growth was not used because earnings fluctuations for some companies can 
distort the whole average severely. Examples, one company (OS number 900909) has EPS 1988: 
1.19p, EPS 1989: 923.6p which results in a growth rate of 77,513 percent. Another type of severe 
distortions (OS number'361085) has EPS2001: -0.29p, EPS2002: -8.15p which results is a positive 
growth rate of 271 0 percent. 
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4.4.3 Earnings Yield Predictions 
This exercise aims at testing the predictive power of the earnings yield and 
providing a procedure for predicting stock market levels on FTSE ALL and FTSE 
100 indices providing some evidence about stock market levels form two tested 
periods. Table 4-5 shows that the introduced earnings yield model and prediction 
procedure can be useful when rational plausible assumptions are used. 70 The 
results are followed by a discussion about the plausibility of the key assumptions. 
Percent unless stated othenvise 
Risk-free rate (I) 
Equity risk premium (1) 
Expected return on the market (RF + ERP) 
Expected growth 
Rationalised earnings yield EY = [(RF + ERP) - g]/( 1 +g) 
Book equity BE 2002 for 1151 companies £ billion 
ROE (reverting to weighted average historic mean) (2) 
Normalised earnings NEGS for 2003 (BExROE) £ billion 
Actual market-cap 2002 for 1151 companies £ billion 
Market-cap at EY for 2003 (NEGS/EY) £ billion 
Predicted percentage change in stock prices PC (3) 
FTSEALL 
Realised 2002 index points 
Predicted 2003 [Index 2002(I+PC)] (3) index points 
Realised 2003 index points 
Prediction error (percent) 
FTSE 100 
Realised 2002 index points 
Predicted 2003 [Index 2002( 1 + PC)] (3) index points 
Realised 2003 index points 




















Table 4-5. Procedure for Predicting stock Market Levels Using EY Model 
(1) Damodaran of Stem Business School (January 2004) used 4.25 percent risk-free and 4.82 
percent equity risk premium for the European market that is 9.07 percent market discount rate. 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edul-adamodar. Pastor and Stambaugh (2001) estimated the equity 
premium for US stocks since 1834 to have fluctuated between 4 and 6 percent. 
(2) Consistent with the existing empirical literature [e.g., Beaver (1970), Lookabill (1976), 
Freeman, Ohlson, and Penman (1982), Penman (1991), and Fama and French (2000)]. 
(3) The reason for using book equity and market-cap of the sample is the unavailability of good 
quality data for UK indices on book equity and earnings per index. This was confirmed with 
FTSE International Limited. 
70 However, small changes (say by ±t percent) in the assumptions or applying to different years 
other than extreme points (peak and bottom of the market) would change the prediction 
significantly. As prediction is not the subject of this study, this is left to develop in future research. 
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The cost of capital was used at a 4 percent risk premium over the risk-free rate. 
Using an unbiased expectation as introduced later in Section 4.5.3.1 would lead to 
a major deviation because an unbiased return expectation would be the cost of 
capital only in a strong-form efficient market. 
Nominal growth rate of 4 percent is both plausible and widely acceptable 
assumption in investment and economic sense. Using a 5 percent rate will predict 
the right price direction but at a price higher rate. 
Overall weighted average ROE for 2002 was extremely low 0.47 percent due to 
the continuing negative impact of the business cycle on one hand and the impact 
of massive asset write offs charged against earnings.71 Therefore, consistent with 
the literature, it was assumed that the historic mean would be at least achievable 
in the future (mean-reversion). On one hand, 9.80 percent historic weighted 
average ROE seems low being affected by the very low performance of 2001 and 
2002, the average excluding both years is 12.74 percent and excluding only 2002 
is 11.37 percent. On the other hand, it is highly likely that higher ROE level 
associated with higher ROE volatility would increase both profitability and the 
cost of capital to account for the increased risk of the increased profitability. 
Could this model predict the severe fall in stock prices after the 1999 
peak? Table 4-6 shows that the model at the plausible inputs was able to predict 
the severe price fall of 2000-2002 to a good extent. Note that same equity risk 
premium and growth rate were used in Table 4-5, while the risk-free rate and the 
return on equity were updated by those of year 1999 to match current market 
parameters on such variables. 
71 This refers to billions of write offs of assets (such as natural reserves or licences) charged to 
P&L. See for example: Br, BT, Vodafone, Shell Transport & Trading, BHP Billiton, Cable & 
Wireless in 2002. 
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Percent unless stated otherwise 
Risk-free rate 
Equity risk premium 
Expected return on the market (RF + ERP) 
Expected growth 
Rationalised earnings yield EY = [(RF+ERP) - g]/(l+g) 
Book equity BE 1999 for 872 companies 
ROE as realised in 1999 
Earnings NEGS for 1999 
Actual market-cap 1999 for 872 companies 





Predicted percentage correction for 1999 stock price level PC 
FTSE ALL 
Realised 1999 
Corrected 1999 [Index 1999( 1 + PC)] 
Realised 2002 (end offall) 
Prediction error (percent) (I) 
FTSE 100 
Realised 1999 
Corrected 1999 [Index 1999(I+PC)] 
Realised 2002 (end offall) 
Prediction error (percent) (I) 


























(1) Error difference could be due to assumption error and/or market overreaction. If 13 percent 
ROE was used instead of the realised one the error will be significantly lower (-1.13 and 1.57 
percent respectively). Nevertheless, realised ROE was used to avoid subjective inputs. 
If equity risk premium was increased by 1 percent (to 5 percent) accounting for 
the interaction of ROE level and its volatility with the cost of capital discussed 
above the predicted price fall would have been 45.19 percent which would reduce 
prediction errors significantly. 
Predicting the price fall from 1999 level to 2002 level (Table 4-6) and the 
recovery from 2002 level to 2003 level (Table 4-5) under plausible assumption 
can be construed as evidence consistent with Hoa. 
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4.5 Testing the Fundamental Valuation Hypotheses 
As earnings yield testing evidence points towards overvaluation, this 
section, in testing the research hypotheses, investigates whether the fluctuations or 
levels of individual valuation fundamentals, i.e. profitability, growth expectations, 
and investor attitudes towards risks, can explain the observed levels in stock 
prices. 
4.5.1 Can Changes in Profitability Explain Stock Price 
Fluctuations? 
Before going onto examining growth expectations and return expectations, 
we first examine the relation between stock price levels and corporate 
profitability, to establish whether there were significant changes in its pattern over 
the period under study that could explain the fluctuations in stock price levels in 
full or part. See Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 in Section 4.1 for stock price 
fluctuations. 
Figure 4-8 below shows that corporate profitability, measured by return on equity 
ROE, has not improved in any form that would explain the soaring stock prices up 
to 1999. Save for the exceptional decline 2000-2002, profitability almost has a 
constant level. The period 1989-1999 seems to be representative for a full ROE 
cycle producing a historic weighted average at 12.74 percent while the weighted 
average over 1989-2002 is 9.80 percent affected by the severe decline over 2000-
2002. The very low profitability figure in 2002 is due to the continued negative 
impact of the business cycle in that year where corporate earnings were very poor 
on one hand and the impact of the massive asset write offs charged against 
earnings by companies on the other hand. This refers to billions of write offs of 
assets (such as natural reserves and licences) charged against earnings. Examples 
of some companies that made major write offs in 2002: BP, BT, Vodafone, Shell 
Transport & Trading, BHP Billiton, Cable & Wireless. 
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Figure 4-8. Corporate Profitability, ROE 
ROE is calculated at aggregate level every year as the sum of earnings for all companies divided 
by the corresponding sum of book equities. The dashed lines represent historic weighted average 
return on equity for the whole period 1989-2002 at 9.80 percent and 1989-1999 at 12.74 percent 
respectively calculated as the sum of earnings for all companies all years divided by the 
corresponding sum of book equities. The very low ROE in 2002 is due to poor corporate earnings 
(continued bad business cycle phase) and the massive asset write off's charged against earnings that 
year (e.g. BP, BT, Vodafone, Shell Transport & Trading, BHP Billiton, Cable & Wireless). 
What is the relation between stock prices and corporate profitability? Part of 
earnings is distributed to shareholders and the other part is retained. The retained 
part contributes to organic growth and is reflected in stock price capital 
appreciation. ROE is calculated using those earnings. Hence, it represents 
corporate performance with respect to both elements (dividend and capital 
growth). Therefore, for a consistent comparison between corporate performance 
and stock market levels, weighted average ROE is compared with FTSE ALL 
Share Total Return Index that reflects capital appreciation and dividends. What 
can this comparison depicted in Figure 4-9 tell us? First, what is the sensitivity of 
stock market level to changes in profitability? Using a simple single variable 
regression of Total Return to Shareholders TRS on ROE using 14 annual data 
points (time-series analysis) gives some idea as shown in Equation 4-15. 
Equation 4-15: TRS = Po + PI ROE + & 
Table 4-7 presents the results of this estimation. For ROE at time t and lagged by 
one year, at 5 percent level: the constant term was insignificant while the slope 
was positive and significant. Clearly, the positive direct relation represented by 
the value and significance of the slope indicates that stock prices are sensitive to 
current and recent profitability levels. This is confirmed cross-sectionally with the 
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significant positive relation between market value indicator 10g(MBE) and 
profitability (presented in Table 4-2 Section 4.3.2). The slope and the whole 
regression were insignificant when ROE was lagged by two years.72 
Description Symbol ROE at time I ROE at time 1-1 ROE at time 1-2 
Dependent variable TRS at time I 
Constant C 
(p-value) 
Return on equity ROE 






















This simple regression is meant to only give a rough quantified description for the sensitivity of 
stock prices to profitability. TRS is total percentage returns to shareholders (dividends and capital 
growth) calculated on FTSE All. ROE is the weighted average ROE on equity calculated across the 
sample every year. 
Back to visually examine the relation between stock market levels and corporate 
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Figure 4-9. Stock Market Levels versus Corporate Profitability 
ROE is calculated at aggregate level as the sum of earnings for all companies every year divided 
by the corresponding sum of book equities. FTSE All Share Total Return Index represents capital 
appreciation with dividends income. 
1989-1993: From 1989 to 1991 profitability was almost flat, then declined to 
1993 while FTSE All was rising on the overall over the period 1989-
72 Data issue could be a possible explanation as not all companies have their year-ends aligned to 
the end of December beBides that FTSE All includes financial stocks. 
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1993. There was a lagged response for the declined profitability 1991-
1993 where stock prices FTSE All responded negatively only by 1994. 
1994-1999: Profitability was recovering between 1994 and 1997 while FTSE All 
was rising. Profitability was almost flat with slight decline after that 
until 1999 while the stock market kept rising. The market only 
responded to the sign from flat then slight profitability decline after 
1999 when the market has peaked. 
2000-2002: Severe decline in profitability and severe decline in stock prices. 
As if the market was hopping that the declined profitability is temporary until it is 
evident over at least 2 years before it responds. 
Back to the original question, did corporate profitability pattern change in any 
way that can explain in full or part the severe changes in stock market levels? 
Despite the clear sensitivity of stock prices to profitability levels, the increase in 
profitability after 1993 to 1997 (which was then almost flat to 1999) was not an 
improvement in profitability; it was rather a recovery to post 1992 level. So, this 
does not explain why stock prices should soar as they did up to 1999. Did this 
ROE recovery mislead investors as a profitability improvement, which did not last 
anyway? Perhaps yes! It is worth noting that we have compared like with like, 
total profitability with total return index. But, investors do not pay only for one or 
two-year profitability; they should be investing in the longer-term sustainable 
profitability! Apparently, psychological behavioural factors are at work magnified 
by speculative activities. This is confirmed by the demonstrated sensitivity of 
stock prices to profitability. See the Literature Review in Chapter 2 on 
behavioural explanations in support of this inference. 
To sum up, stock prices are sensitive to profitability; profitability pattern 
did not improve in a way that can justify the soaring stock price levels that were 
followed by correcting price falls (the latest 1999-2002 is so dramatic). Hence, 
this evidence is leading to reject Ho only as far as the profitability factor is 
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concerned, but the explanation could be in other factors. Nevertheless, this 
evidence does not per se imply rejecting HOa or otherwise. 
Caveat on Inflation: 
Did inflation have a significant impact on ROE pattern? Here is a brief 
discussion: ROE is calculated as earnings divided by book equity. Earnings are 
almost in current prices for the year except for annual depreciation of fixed assets 
in historic prices and the impact of price inflation throughout the year. Book 
equity = Fixed assets + (Current assets - Current liabilities) - Long-term 
liabilities. Current assets and total liabilities consist of monetary items and other 
items that are being replaced regularly; therefore they are almost in current year 
prices. The part that is subject to inflation is fixed assets. Properties are being re-
valued regularly by companies. The problem remains with plant and equipment 
till fully depreciated and/or replaced. It does not seem that inflation would have 
been a significant factor in impacting ROE pattern. 73 
We tum in the next section to growth expectations. Would the market 
growth expectations be the main culprit? 
73 It is worth noting that standard theoretical valuation models are models of prospective values or 
ratios. But estimated models are based on current, not prospective, figures. For example, inflation 
can affect the relationship between current year earnings and next year earnings. so altering the 
observed relationship between ROE and MBE. 
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4.5.2 Expected Growth; The Main Culprit? 
The objective of this section is to estimate and study, at aggregate market 
level, the expected growth implied in market valuation as a proxy for investor 
growth expectations and to compare against economic growth and realised 
earnings growth to evaluate the plausibility of market expectations. Our principal 
difficulty here is that, unlike the case of profitability (ROE) examined in the 
previous subsection, long-term expected growth is not directly observed. There 
will always be some implied long-term expected growth of earnings that is 
consistent with observed market valuations. The question we examine, in order to 
test our null hypotheses, is whether these implied growth expectations are 
reasonable. 
Smith (1924), in his book "Common Stocks as Long Term Investments" 
that was reviewed by John Maynard Keynes in 1925, said: "Why do stocks 
typically outperform bonds? A major reason is that businesses retain earnings, 
with these going on to generate more earnings--and dividends, too." According to 
Buffett (2001) this finding ignited an unprecedented bull market the US, for the 
American public, this new understanding was like the discovery of fire. 
Investors pay a price for expected future growth and accept a lower yield today. If 
growth potential were under-lover-estimated by investors then stocks would be 
under-lover-valued as far as growth is concerned. Equation 4-4 and Equation 4-19 
(repeated below) illustrate the relation between market valuation (measured by 
MBE or EY, etc) and expected growth: 





Market valuation (say measured by MBE as expressed in Equation 4-4) IS 
determined by: 
1. Profitability level (discussed in Section 4.5.1 earlier); 
2. Expected growth (the subject of this section); and 
3. Risk (discussed later in Section 4.5.3). 
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Table 4-8 illustrates this relation through a simple numerical example. 
Common Inputs: 
Equity capital investment in a business 
Earnings 
ROE 




Value or price =EGSr( 1 +g)/(KE - g) 




Value or price =EGSr( 1 +g)/(KE - g) 














Table 4-8. The Impact of Growth on Market Valuation (EY, MBE) - IUustration 
Also, take this analogy: a corporate bond issued at a coupon of current market 
rates and therefore sold at par value. 74 Book equity: £100 (par value), ROE: 7 
percent (£7/100 coupon/par value), MBE: 1.00 (price/par value), EY: 7 percent 
(£71100 coupon/price). If rates do not change EY = ROE. If interest rates fall, 
bond price will rise say to £110: ROE: 7 percent (the same), EY: 6.36 percent 
(£71110), MBE: 1.10 (110/100), and EY = ROEIMBE = 0.07/1.10 = 6.36 percent. 
In this analogy, given that income from bonds is fixed, MBE is only affected by 
changes in redemption yield, the discount rate, reflecting risk due to market rate 
changes and changes in default risk. For stocks, it is more complicated as MBE 
reflects expected future growth in addition to market rates and risk, and also 
income level is not fixed as with bonds. Holding income level and risk the same 
for the time being, stock prices will be higher for higher growth potential and 
hence lower earnings yield. 
Consistent with the literature, e.g., Heaton and Lucas (1999), the structure 
of Gordon Constant Growth model is used. However, it is used at aggregate 
market level and not at firm level. The reduced form below has been inverted to 
estimate the growth rate implied in market valuation: MVE, = EGSI+\ • of which 
KE-g 
74 Even if not at par, consider the price as par and hence current redemption yield as coupon rate. 
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KE EGSt+l Th' ~ l' f h h ~ .. .. g = - . IS lormu atIon 0 growt as lew techmcal Issues to Justify 
MVEt 
or overcome: (a) the use of earnings in this valuation model, (b) how a terminal 
growth figure can reduce detailed future explicit growth rates into a single 
practically comparable and representative rate/5 and (c) the changing number of 
companies and their capital from yea to year which makes relating time t+ 1 
earnings to the valuation at time t inaccurate. These technical issues are discussed, 
justified or overcome in detail in Section 4.3.1. Hence, using Equation 4-4 from 
Section 4.3.1 overcomes the above issues. 
MVE = EGS/(I+g) 
t KE-g' 
MVE/ X KE - EGS/ 
Equation 4-16: g = ---'------'-
MVE/+EGSt 
[Equation 4-4] re-arrange: 
Note that Equation 4-16 can be also written as a function of MBE and ROE, by 
either dividing the numerator and denominator by book equity BE, or by re-
arranging Equation 4-4 leading to implied growth expressed as: 
MBEt x KE - ROEt Equation 4-17: g = ----....::..-...-----.!.. 
MBEt + ROEt 
One of the advantages of the above formulation is that the inputs of earnings EGS 
and market value of equity MVE in Equation 4-16 (or MBE and ROE in Equation 
4-17) are the actual realised values. The only estimate is the cost of capital; the 
required rate of return on the market KE. The market would look at this as a risk 
premium over the risk-free rate. It is difficult to estimate the size of the premium. 
In a liquid efficient market such as the government bond market, the discount rate 
and internal rate of return IRR are almost the same.76 Therefore, we need to 
estimate implied growth under a robust unbiased and plausible estimate for the 
required return on the stock market to hopefully have an unbiased estimate for 
implied growth. Section 4.5.3.1 deals with the cost of capital estimation in detail, 
where the required rate of return on the market is calculated using total returns 
(capital appreciation and dividends) on the FTSE All Share Index on the 
75 Because it is not practically possible to derive and compare implied explicit growth rates say for 
long period. 
76 The redemption yield and fRR are mathematically the same thing. 
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following basis: real TRS, lO-year rolling average, adjusted downwards by 1.5 
percent for survivorship bias, and finally add expected inflation, which in our 
view fonns an unbiased investor expectation for total returns. 
Earnings could be unrepresentative for valuation models when profitability is very 
low or very high. Therefore, implied growth is calculated using nonnalised 
earnings (book equity x period weighted average ROE). Assuming profitability is 
mean-reverting consistent with the existing empirical literature [e.g., Beaver 
(1970), Lookabill (1976), Freeman, Ohlson, and Penman (1982), Penman (1991), 
and Fama and French (2000)]. Table 4-9 and Figure 4-10 present the calculations 
and results, followed by a growth gap presentation in Figure 4-11, and then by the 
conclusion of the analysis in this section. 
Year Required Rate Earnings Market- Annual Implied Impliedg at GDP Realised 
of Return EGS Cap ROE Growth at weighted Growth Earnings 
RM MVE annual ROE average ROE Growth 
Percent £ Billion £ Billion Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent 
1989 16.36 18 234 14.69 8.03 10.67 9.77 17.42 
1990 22.31 21 224 14.49 11.82 15.02 8.39 8.05 
1991 20.56 23 269 14.93 11.24 14.28 5.18 -13.42 
1992 18.34 19 298 11.77 11.18 12.32 4.21 -13.56 
1993 15.94 15 371 8.35 11.58 10.85 5.15 4.84 
1994 14.21 20 400 11.05 8.69 9.29 6.07 10.20 
1995 11.64 24 420 13.09 5.56 7.03 5.56 9.87 
1996 13.44 30 535 13.80 7.50 9.16 6.13 7.79 
1997 11.38 32 602 15.33 5.81 7.75 6.24 8.11 
1998 13.70 35 752 15.30 8.66 10.43 5.98 10.48 
1999 14.38 33 974 14.59 10.60 11.81 5.17 -2.77 
2000 11.92 40 1280 9.38 8.56 8.41 5.24 -0.41 
2001 14.45 24 1060 4.71 11.96 9.39 4.50 -11.55 
2002 10.25 2 864 0.47 9.96 4.44 5.02 -24.70 
....................................................... ,. ............................................ -.......... 
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Avg. 14.92 11.57 9.37 10.06 5.90 0.74 
Period weighted average ROE: 9.80 
Compound average GDP growth: 5.89 
Grand median realised earnings growth: 1.30 
Table 4-9. Implied Growth in Stock Market Valuation 
The expected return is the unbiased estimate discussed in Section 4.5.3.1 and presented in Table 4-10. the 
estimate (a) that used previous year inflation as the expected inflation is presented in this table. However. 
using the market expected inflation implied in the government bond trading (index-linked) estimated by the 
bank of England (b) leads to the same as shown below in Figure 4-10. Implied growth is calculated using 
Equation 4-16: (MVEtxKE - EGSt)/(MVEt + EGSt). As earnings or ROE are not representative for some years 
(e.g. 1993 and 2000-2002). Implied growth at weighted average ROE is calculated either using the same 
fonnula of Equation 4-16 with actual earnings replaced with nonnalised earnings (book equity for the year x 
period weighted average ROE). or by using Equation 4-17: (MBE,xKE - ROE,)/(MBE, + ROE,) applying 
period weighted average ROE. All figures are nominal. Realised earnings growth figures are the historic 
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Figure 4-10. Implied Growth v Economic Growth 
This graph depicts implied growth (calculated at weighted average ROE) versus GOP growth. All data 
obtained from Table 4-9 above. Implied growth was calculated using different inflation expectation estimates. 
one from previous year RPI and the other is the market expected inflation implied in the government bond 
trading (index-linked) estimated by the bank of England. Both lead to the same as shown. Similar pattern is 
observed if implied growth is calculated on actual earnings was plotted instead of using weighted average 
ROE. 
Before stating the conclusion of the above analysis, for a good insight, Figure 
4-11 plots the gap between implied growth and economic growth against stock 
market levels revealing a cyclical behaviour in terms of growth expectations. Up 
to 1991 the gap was widening with rising stock prices. After that, there was a 
correction continued up to 1995 accompanied with a slow down in stock price 
increase. Again the gap was widening with the steep increase in stock prices up to 
1999 where the correction started again with steep fall in stock prices. There seem 
to be two distinct cycles for expected growth, 1989-1995 and 1996-2002. 
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Figure 4-11. Growth Gap against Stock Market Levels 
The solid line is calculated as the growth rate implied in market valuation as calculated in Table 4-9 using 
normalised earnings as explained in the same table minus GOP growth. Same pattern is observed if actual 
earnings are used. 
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One could argue that the reason for the major gap between implied growth and 
current GDP growth in around 1990-1992 was presumably in part because of the 
depth of the early 1990s recession in the UK, which is not reflected in long-term 
expectations of growth. Besides, the first gap peak up to 1991 is affected by the 
high cost of capital; driven by high average realised real total returns over each 
past 10-years and high expected inflation. Hence, the early 1990s might not be 
overvaluation. Of course, the same explanation cannot apply to the gap in the late 
1990s, because this was a boom, not a recession. 
It is also noteworthy that the valuation bias uncovered in Chapter 3, 
between newly issued and mature stocks, correlates over time with the aggregate 
valuation bias in this chapter as demonstrated by the behaviour of the valuation 
gap between new and mature stocks where it widens in bullish markets and 
diminishes in bearish markets as shown in Figure 3-4 and Figure 3-5 of Section 
3.3 in Chapter 3. This seems to support the refutation of the hypothesis that new 
stocks higher valuation is due to learning, why should learning mechanisms be 
any different in late 1990s than in previous periods. 
All the results above show that growth rates implied in market valuation 
(in both calculations) have almost always been higher than actual economic 
growth and realised earnings growth suggesting that investors might have been 
overestimating growth potential and have paid, until recently, too much for future 
growth levels that have never materialised on economic or corporate levels.77 This 
77 Calculating the number of years needed to organically double corporate earnings in size gives 
some indication as what could be realistic growth rates. If earnings to double in size in n years we 
can replace EGSn with (2xEGSo) in the usual discrete compounding formula and take the natural 
logarithm of both sides, then re-arrange to calculate the number of years needed as below: 
Calculation Formula 
ECS" = ECS" (I + g)" 
ECS. =2xECS" 
n = _lo.=..g(:.....2..:-) _ 
log(J + g) 


















People have different views about realistic long-tenn growth, assuming that earnings and hence 
the market will roughly double in size in less than 18 or even 14 years could be seen as unrealistic. 
The 4 percent tenninal growth level was frequently referred to in the literature and by market 
practitioners, see for example Kaplan and Ruback (1995) and Sougiannis and Yaehura (200 I) and 
compare with the implied growth rates for both groups in Table 4-9 since 1997 onwards. 
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evidence supports rejecting Ho and HOa in favour of HI. Although shifting the cost 
of capital downwards from its unbiased estimation would change this conclusion, 
the strong support of the weak realised earnings growth and the weaker case of a 
lower cost of capital compared to an unbiased estimate suggest that the rejection 
of Hoa is reasonable. This evidence on growth is consistent with Bulkley and 
Harris (1997) who, by studying earnings forecasts, find evidence to support their 
hypothesis of the market's failure to form rational expectations. Their evidence 
shows positive correlation between stock prices and earnings forecasts while 
forecasts were overestimates with respect to realised earnings. 
Caveat on Inflation: 
All figures in this section, earnings implied and realised growth and GDP 
growth are in nominal values (real growth + inflation). Inflation affects all 
numbers with the same impact or multiple. Hence, repeating the same analysis 
with real rates does not change the identified patterns or conclusion. 
The next sub-section turns to the risk factor in examining the research 
hypothesis. 
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4.5.3 Can The Explanation Be in Risk Aversion Levels? 
We learn at business schools that the rate of return required by investors is 
the discount rate to convert future outcomes into present value terms. Is it the case 
in the stock market? Again, we face a similar problem as arises with long-term 
expected growth rates, the appropriate discount rate, i.e. the cost of equity KE, is 
not directly observed and so market valuations will always be consistent with 
some discount rate. 
This sub-section has two objectives. The first objective is to establish an unbiased 
estimate for the required rate of return every year based on information available 
to investors at the time avoiding processes or inputs that could be biased or 
subjective to evaluate investor return expectations in isolation of fundamentals. 
Second, controlling for growth rate, we examine whether the discount rates 
implied in market valuation are plausible against the unbiased estimate and the 
risk-free rate, should they be relatively too low, this would imply underestimated 
risk and hence overvaluation and vice versa. 
4.5.3.1 Unbiased Return Expectations 
We first need to develop this measure. For an unbiased estimation, the 
impact of historic inflation should be eliminated and replaced with unbiased 
expected inflation because historic inflation might be irrelevant for future 
economic eras. Therefore, real total returns will be used. Also, returns will be 
adjusted for the impact of survivorship bias embedded in return calculation. 
Below is a procedure we believe would produce a reasonable unbiased estimate. 
Step 1: Nominal Total Returns to Shareholders (TRS) 
Data for FTSE ALL are used. Price index data start 1962. Dividend yield data 
start 1964. Total return index data start 1985. The Total Returns Indices 
(Datastream code: RI) measure the total return on the underlying indices, 
combining both capital performance and dividends income. They are calculated 
using declared dividends. (FTSE International Limited, 2003). Total returns to 
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shareholders (TRS) are calculated as the percentage change in the total return 
index. Where the total return index is not available (before 1985), TRS is 
calculated as percentage price change in the usual capital price index plus 
dividend yield (up to 1985).78 
Step 2: Real TRS 
Real TRS is calculated as nominal TRS minus realised inflation. Historic inflation 
is isolated in this manner to be replaced by expected inflation, as the impact of 
historic inflation will distort return expectation because historic inflation might be 
irrelevant for future economic eras. Therefore, real returns are used and adjusted 
later upwards by expected inflation instead. Inflation rates (identifier: CZBH) are 
calculated as the percentage annual change in the All-Items RPI (identifier: 
CHAW). Data are available since 1949 from the Office for National Statistics. 
Step 3: Expected Real TRS 
Expected real TRS is calculated as the lO-year rolling average real TRS, where 
every year the preceding 10 years are used so the estimation is based on the 
information available to investors at any given year. As dividend yield data start 
only in 1964, the first lO-average can be calculated for 1974 over 1964-1973. The 
10-year basis was selected based on the general recommendation in finance texts 
[see for example Copeland, Koller, and Murrin (2000) and Brealey and Myers 
(2000)], which was used in the literature as well as in practice [see for example 
Kaplan and Ruback (1995)]. 
Step 4: Survivorship Bias 
The figure arrived at by Step 3 is still biased as the data used (on the index) is 
inherently conditioned on survivorship. Therefore, it is adjusted downwards by 
1.5 percent for survivorship bias. Copeland, Koller, and Murrin (2000) estimate 
78 To ensure that percentage price change plus dividend yield is a reasonable calculation, we 
compared TRS calculated in both ways for the period 1986-2003 where the data were available. 
Average TRS as the percentage change in total return index is 12.14 percent and as the percentage 
change in capital price index plus dividend yield is 11.61 percent. The difference is small; and 
therefore using price index. and dividend yield for before 1985 would be acceptable. 
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the downward adjustment by 1.5 to 2 percent based on the tables used by lorion 
and Goetzmann (1999). 
Step 5: Expected Inflation 
Expected inflation every year IS then added to the survivorship bias-adjusted 
expected real TR8. Two estimates were used for expected inflation. The choice 
between the two does not have a major impact on the estimation as shown later. 
However, it served as robustness check for our estimation procedure. These are: 
a) Previous year's inflation figure on RPI (Retail Price Index) is used, as we 
believe is not subjective and therefore is an unbiased expectation for the year 
in question being the most recent evidence and memory investors have (e.g. 
the expected inflation for 1995 is the realised inflation for 1994). 
b) Market expected inflation from the index-linked gilt market (implied in 
government bond trading) estimated by the Bank of England. Inflation rate 
implied in the 10-year maturity is used (inline with the 10-year rolling average 
basis and the 10-year risk-free rate used throughout this thesis). This estimate 
is explained in the footnote. 79 This explanation was taken from Bank of 
England's "Notes on the Bank of England UK Yield Curves". 
Figure 4-14 in Appendix 4.7.2 compares the two inflation measures where the 
average expected inflation set as the realised inflation rate in the previous year on 
RPlover 1985-2003 is 4.35 percent and the average of that estimated by the Bank 
of England as implied in government bond over the same period is 3.94 percent. 
This comparison and Figure 4-12 below show how both estimates track one 
another. Hence, relying on either will not lead to differences in the conclusion. 
79 The Monetary Instruments and Markets Division of the Bank of England estimates yield curves for the United Kingdom 
on a daily basis. One set is based on yields on UK government bonds and on yields in the general collateral repo market. It 
includes nominal and real yield curves and the implied inflation tenn structure for the UK. The methodology used to 
construct the yield curves is described in the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin article by Anderson and Sleath (1999). 
Implied inflation rates: the index-linked gilt market allows obtaining real interest rates and the conventional gilt market 
allows us to obtain nominal interest rates. These nominal rates embody the real interest rate plus a compensation for the 
erosion of the purchasing power of this investment by inflation. The Bank uses this decomposition (commonly known as 
the Fisher relationship) and the real and nominal yield curves to calculate the implied inflation rate factored in to nominal 
interest rates. This is often interpreted as a measure of inflation expectations, although some care is required in doing so 
(illiquidity in the conventional and index-linked gilt markets could distort this measure, and in practice there will be an 
'inflation risk premium' incorporated in the implied inflation rate). As with nominal and real interest rates. 'spot' implied 
inflation rates (subject to the above liquidity caveats) can be seen as the average rate of inflation expected to rule over a 
given period. Similarly forward implied inflation rates can be interpreted as the rate of inflation expected to rule over a 
given period which begins at some future date. These estimates are only available from 1985. This information is available 
on the Bank of England website. 
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To sum up, the ex ante unbiased expected return on the stock market is 
estimated as the survivorship bias-adjusted expected real total returns to 
shareholders adjusted by expected inflation using infonnation available to 
investors at the time of estimation. Table 4-10 and Figure 4-12 present the 
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TRS Inflation 
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10-Y ear Expected Unbiased Expected 
Average Inflation Expected Inflation 
Real TRS Previous Returns Implied in 
Year RPI Gov Bond 
(a) (a) (b) 
5.00 9.20 12.70 
































































































































Annual data for FTSE ALL Share Index are used. Nominal total returns to shareholders (TRS) are 
calculated as the percentage change in total return index from 1986 onwards, and as the percentage 
change in price index plus dividend yield before 1986 (the start of the total return index data). 
Inflation rates are calculated as the percentage annual change in All-Items Retail Price Index RPI. 
Real TRS is calculated as Nominal TRS minus inflation. Expected real return is calculated as the 
IO-year rolling average real TRS. Expected inflation: (a) every year is set to prior year's inflation 
figure calculated on RPI as its unbiased expectation, (b) The expected inflation rate implied in the 
10-year government bonds (index-linked) as discussed above under Step 5, estimated by the Bank 
of England, their series goes back only to 1985. Unbiased Expected Return on The Stock Market is 
then calculated as: Expected Real Return - 1.5 percent Adjustment For Survivorship Bias + 

















--with previous year RA inflation 
....... with inflation il1'1>lied in 10-y Gov Bond 
Figure 4-12. Expected Return on the Stock Market 
The solid line represents the expected returns on the stock market estimated using a lO-year rolling 
average real TRS adjusted downward by 1.5 percent for survivorship bias plus expected inflation 
from previous year RPJ. The line starts from 1976 because the dataset imposed a start by 1974 to 
accord with the rolling lO-year average (from 1964 the of the index total return data) where 1974 
was a hangover from the oil shock and 1975 was a recovery year. The doted line represents the 
same with expected inflation replaced by the market expected inflation implied in the IO-year 
government bond as estimated by the Bank of England, the estimates are only available from 1985. 
This comparison shows that relying on either estimate will not lead to differences in the 
conclusion. 
The correlation between the risk-free rate (redemption yield on the 10-year 
government bond benchmark) and the unbiased estimate for the expected return is 
0.74. This is a robustness test for the above estimation given that the risk-free rate 
was not used in the estimation process while the estimation captures the important 
relation between interest rates and expected returns on stocks. 
6 to 7 percent expected nominal returns on the stock market, as per the 
above estimate, seem a reasonable range for this economic era (2003 onwards) 
based on real return in the region of 4 to 5 percent, which is also affected by the 
level of survivorship bias adjustment. Warren Buffett, the world's most celebrated 
investor - according to Fortune Magazine, (2001) expected in 1999 that the 
American public should expect equity returns over the next decade or two (with 
dividends included and 2 percent inflation assumed) of perhaps 7 percent gross 
and might be 6 percent after frictional costs such as commissions and fees. 
155 
4.5.3.2 Implied Discount Rate 
The objective of this exercise is to estimate the discount rates implied in 
market valuation and compare them with the unbiased return expectations to 
assess whether return expectations were different from discount rates and whether 
implied discount rates are plausible relative to the risk-free rate. 
The same valuation model of Equation 4-4 that was inverted to calculate implied 
growth is used for this exercise. Growth rate was controlled at 4 percent; a 
plausible assumption as (inflation + real growth components), changing this 
assumption to 5, or 6 percent does not change the conclusion. Table 4-11 shows 
the results followed by a robustness check and a discussion. 
MVE = EGS,(1+ g) 
/ KE-g [Equation 4-4], of which: 
Equation 4-18: KE= EGS/(1+g) + MVE g 
/ 
Year Implied Discount Implied KE at Unbiased Risk-Free 
(Percent) RateKE WARDE Expected Return RateRF 
1989 12.03 9.35 16.36 10.26 
1990 13.75 10.59 22.31 10.95 
1991 12.71 9.72 20.56 9.73 
1992 10.70 9.57 18.34 8.26 
1993 8.07 8.78 15.94 6.10 
1994 9.28 8.69 14.21 8.71 
1995 10.00 8.49 11.64 7.42 
1996 9.74 8.07 13.44 7.51 
1997 9.48 7.50 11.38 6.29 
1998 8.82 7.09 13.70 4.36 
1999 7.55 6.38 14.38 5.48 
2000 7.22 7.37 11.92 4.88 
2001 6.32 8.81 14.45 5.05 
2002 4.28 9.79 10.25 4.37 
.~ ... -...... ~ ..... -... "--"" 
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Average 9.28 8.59 14.92 7.10 
Table 4-11. Discount Rate ImpUed in Market Valuation 
Implied discount rate is calculated as KE = EGS,(1+g)IMVE, + g Equation 4-18 with growth 
controlled at 4 percent. Implied discount rate at weighted average (W A) ROE is calculated using 
the same fonnula with actual earnings replaced with normalised earnings (book equity x period 
weighted average ROE) to overcome when earnings are not representative, i.e. assuming 
profitability is mean-reverting inline with the existing empirical literature [e.g., Beaver (1970), 
Lookabill (1976), Freeman, Ohlson, and Penman (1982), Penman (1991), and Fama and French 
(2000)]. Unbiased expected return is calculated as 10-year rolling average real TRS adjusted 
downward by 1.5 percent for survivorship bias plus expected inflation as estimated in Table 4-10. 
Risk-free rate is the redemption yield on the 10-year government bond benchmark. 
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The correlation between the risk-free rate (redemption yield on the 10-year 
government bond) and the implied discount rate is 0.90. This is a robustness test 
for the valuation model used and the estimation of implied growth rate given that 
the risk-free rate was not an input in the estimation process. It seems that the 
estimation strongly captures the important relation between interest rates and 
expected returns on stocks. Also, the correlation between the implied discount rate 
and the unbiased expected return estimation at 0.76 provides another comfort. The 
reason why the correlation is higher for the implied discount rate and the risk-free 
rate could be due to that the implied rate is estimated using one year's market 
value level which reflects interest rate levels of that year with a controlled growth 
rate and a single year's earnings while the unbiased estimation uses lO-year 
rolling average real returns and expected inflation with adjustment for 
survivorship bias which affect this correlation. Table 4-12 shows the correlation 
matrix. 
Implied DR Implied DR Unbiased Risk-Free 
atWAROE EXE. Return Rate 
Implied Discount Rate 1.00 
Implied DR at W A ROE 0.40 1.00 
Unbiased Expected Return 0.76 0.58 1.00 
Risk-Free Rate 0.90 0.62 0.74 1.00 
Table 4-12. Rate of Returns Correlation Matrix 
DR: is Discount Rate for short. WA is short for Weighted Average. 
Figure 4-13 plots a comparison between the implied discount rate, the unbiased 
expected return and risk-free rate followed by analysis of the results. 
It is an interesting and important observation that the pattern of the risk-free rate 
and the implied discount rate are not very different in tenns of the direction. Does 
equity cost of capital always track interest rates? It should! Obviously that reflects 
the correlation between stock prices and interest rates given that the implied 
discount is estimated from stock market levels. 
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Figure 4-13. Discount Rate Implied in Market Valuation - Comparison 
Implied discount rate is calculated as KE = EGStC.l+g)/MVE, + g ( Equation 4-18) in Table 4-11 
with growth controlled at 4 percent. Controlling for growth at 5, or 6 percent or plotting the 
implied discount rate using normalised earnings/weighted average ROE does not change the 
conclusion drawn in this section. Unbiased expected return calculated as lO-year rolling average 
real TRS adjusted downward by 1.5 percent for survivorship bias plus expected inflation as 
estimated in Table 4-10. Risk-free rate is the redemption yield on the lO-year government bond 
benchmark. 
Are the discount rates that justify market value levels, at a plausible 4 
percent expected growth (or even 5 or 6 percent), plausible on average when 
compared to the risk-free rate; implying average equity risk premium for 1989-
2002 of 2.18 percent (1.49 percent using nonnalised earnings)? Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2001) estimate that the equity premium for the US market fluctuates 
between 4 and 6 percent since 1834 with its sharpest drop in the last decade. Fama 
and French (2002) estimate the equity premium for the US market for 1951 to 
2000 at 2.55 and 4.32 percent, where equity premium produced by the average 
stock return was 7.43 percent. 80 On balance of this evidence from the literature 
and the above results, one can argue that equity premium and hence risk might 
have been understated. 
The significant difference between the implied discount rates and the 
unbiased expected rates of return reveals a possible important paradox in investor 
behaviour. High return expectations should mean high discount rates and hence 
lower values. Implied discount rates significantly below the unbiased estimates 
80 See Bansal and Lundblad (2002) for more about risk premium in the global equity markets. 
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for return expectations. Add to that the high likelihood that investors tend also to 
ignore survivorship bias when looking at expected returns, we argue that investor 
high return expectations might have been driving stock prices to meet these 
expectations not in tandem with economic and corporate fundamentals. This is 
also confirmed by testing profitability and growth in Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2. 
Moreover, these high return expectations did not translate into higher discount 
rates. It could be a vicious circle where high required rates of return drive prices 
to high value levels to yield these return expectations where such value levels 
imply lower discount rates and lower values. This seems to continue until the 
economy is gloomy and the gap is too apparent between fundamentals and market 
levels, where then severe corrections are inevitable.81 
In conclusion, based on the above one can think of two possible 
interpretations. The first, if one can accept that implied equity risk premium was 
reasonable compared to both risk-free rate and unbiased expected returns, then 
risk-aversion did not lead to equity mispricing, which is in favour of not rejecting 
Hoa and not enabling us to reject Ho. We do not believe the evidence gathered 
supports this conclusion. The second one, given that risk or equity risk premium is 
underestimated and the paradox between investor return expectations that are 
driving stock prices and the lower discount rates, risk might have been 
underestimated and therefore value overestimated by investors. The latter concurs 
with our personal belief about this matter, this evidence would lead to rejecting Ho 
and Hoa in favour of HI. This analysis suggests that when overvaluation is present, 
it is due either to expected growth or a combination of high expected growth (that 
is inconsistent with economic growth and realised earnings growth) and 
underestimated risk. 
81 This broadly compares with over-extrapolation bias. discussed in Chapter 3. Investors are influenced by 
historic performance. which in tum is affected by survivorship bias and high historic inflation that is highly 
unlikely to be relevant for future economic eras. Quoting Warren Buffett (200 I) again to support the above 
argument: "People are habitually guided by the rear-view mirror and. for the most part, by the vistas 
immediately behind them." Also, John Maynard Keynes in his review in 1925 for Smith's book of 1924 
wrote: "It is dangerous ... to apply to the future inductive arguments based on past experience, unless one can 
distinguish the broad reasons why past experience was what it was." He continues to say "if you cannot do 
that. you may faU into the trap of expecting results in the future that will materialise only if conditions are 
exactly the same as they were in the past." 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Chapter 3 documented differences in valuations between the UK new and 
older stocks where new stocks have relatively higher valuations that decline with 
age. That did not shed any lights on whether older stocks or the stock market 
overall has a tendency to be biased. This chapter attempted at exploring bias at the 
overall stock market level. 
This chapter documents the occurrence of major divergences capital growth 
in stock prices (soaring to high levels) against economic growth and book equity 
(equity invested capital), which are then followed by stock price corrections 
(falls). The severity of the correction seems to depend on the size of the preceding 
divergence. Hence, we examine the hypothesis that stock market levels in the UK 
during the period 1989-2002 can be explained by fundamentals such as reasonable 
expected profitability, expected growth and risk perception (Ho), along with 
another variation of this hypothesis that stock prices, on average, over time, are 
correctly valued against fundamentals, but sometimes there is temporary 
mispricing (Hoa), against the alternative hypothesis that stock market levels in the 
UK were overvalued (biased upwards) on average relative to fundamentals during 
the period 1989-2002 (H\). In testing the hypothesis, we use the data of all UK 
traded non-financial stocks with other market and economic data to analyse 
earnings yield levels, changes in corporate profitability pattern and the sensitivity 
of stock prices to profitability, expected growth and the impact of return 
expectations and risk aversion on stock valuations. 
For this exercise, we develop a theoretical earnings yield model validated and 
supported by an empirical valuation model. The model is used to examine stock 
market levels concentrating on income yield, growth and return expectations 
benchmarking against risk-free assets and economic growth. The one thing we 
endeavoured to maintain in this analysis is simplicity and investment logic. 
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As shown below, on balance, we believe the evidence is tilted towards rejecting 
Ho and rejecting HOa (however, not as strongly as in rejecting Ho) in favour of HI. 
Further discussions detailing this summary conclusion follow this table. 
Hypothesis Testing Ho Ho. 
Changes in profitability Reject Cannot reject or 
Patterns otherwise 
Expected growth Reject Reject 
Risk aversion/Return Reject Reject 
expectations 
Balance of evidence, 
in [avour 0(: Reject Reject 
We document that the spread between earnings yield and the risk-free 
rate is almost stable (EY is below RF by circa 2 percent on average). The big 
question: is this spread reasonable, or in other words, were growth and risk 
rationally priced to produce this negative spread? To answer that, we investigate: 
plausible or rationalised scenarios for earnings yield, earnings yield predictions, 
corporate profitability, growth and return expectations. 
Earnings yield was estimated using the theoretical and empirical models 
under plausible scenarios for profitability, growth and cost of capital. (a) The 
first estimate, produced under period averages of profitability, GOP growth and 
cost of capital, suggests that realised earnings yield is understated under both 
models and hence implies overvalued levels of stock prices on the overall. This 
was derived from a theoretical and an empirical model, which gives some credit 
for this indication. Moreover, if growth is reduced below 5.89 percent, the 
overvaluation will be more apparent, and given a median realised growth of 1.30 
percent, it could be argued that overvaluation is a reasonable candidate 
explanation. (b) The other three scenarios, under the theoretical model, show that 
at the set growth and discount rate levels earnings yield matches the realised level 
for the period. These growth scenarios (5.89, 4, and 5 percent) and cost of capital 
scenarios (10.l8, 8.21 and 9.25 percent) are not implausible relative to economic 
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growth and risk-free rate. These results suggest that the stock market could be 
pricing stocks correctly on average over the long-tenn with an important 
implication, that severe fluctuations reflect temporary periods of mispriced 
levels/market irrationality where unreasonable high levels are corrected by 
subsequent severe price falls. (c) Under the empirical model, all four scenarios 
indicate understated realised earnings yield level implying overvalued stock price 
levels. (d) Under the empirical model, implied cost of capital implies understated 
risk and hence overvalued stock price levels. 
We test the earnings yield model capability in predicting stock market 
levels in-sample to evaluate stock price levels. A test on FTSE ALL and FTSE 
100 indices for 2003 levels is undertaken under a cost of capital of 4 percent risk 
premium over the risk-free rate, a nominal growth rate of 4 percent, and the 
weighted average historic mean ROE of 9.80 percent. The predicted levels 
deviated by just -0.62 and 1.96 percent respectively from end of 2003 realised 
level. The second prediction test was to examine whether the model could have 
predicted the severe fall in stock prices after 1999 peak. The model at the 
plausible inputs was able to predict the severe price fall of 2000-2002 to a good 
extent where it predicted 35.19 percent price fall against realised fall of 46.15 and 
49.18 respectively. These results can be construed as evidence consistent with Hoa. 
These tests suggest that the introduced earnings yield model and prediction 
procedure can be useful when rational assumptions are used. 
The evidence shows that corporate profitability has not improved over 
the period 1989-2002. It almost has a constant trend. The period 1989-1999 seems 
to be a representative for a full ROE cycle producing a historic weighted average 
at 12.74 percent while the weighted average over 1989-2002 is 9.80 percent 
affected by the severe decline over 2000-2002. We find that that stock prices are 
sensitive to profitability levels on same year and I-year lagged data. There seems 
to be a delay before the market responds to declined profitability. By comparing 
total profitability with total return index, for consistency, we find the increase in 
profitability after 1993 to 1997 (which was then almost flat to 1999) was not an 
improvement in profitability; it was rather a recovery to post 1992 level. So, 
profitability cannot explain why stock prices should soar as they did up to 1999. 
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Market expected growth rates were estimated by growth rates implied in 
market valuation, which have almost always been higher than economic growth 
and realised earnings growth suggesting that investors might have been 
overestimating growth potential and have paid too much for expected growth. The 
work also establishes and reveals the gap between implied growth and 
economic growth against stock market levels documenting a cyclical behaviour 
in terms of growth expectations. Where the gap size used to increase inline with 
rising stock prices to a certain extent where a major correction occurs over a 
period of time in the form of slowing or falling stock prices closing the gap down. 
The period 1989-2002 seem to have two distinct cycles for the gap; 1989-1995 
and 1996-2002. 
Market return expectations and risk aversion are studied through an 
unbiased estimation for expected returns on the stock market and discount 
rates implied in market valuation. The former is estimated as the expected real 
total returns to shareholders adjusted for survivorship bias and by expected 
inflation. The correlation between the risk-free rate and the unbiased estimate for 
the expected return is 0.74 and between the risk-free rate and the implied discount 
rate is 0.90 percent, which is a robustness test for the estimations. 
Comparing the implied discount rate with the evidence from the literature, 
average equity risk premium would imply underestimated risk. Comparing the 
same with the unbiased expected return estimation, implied discount rates are 
significantly lower indicating a possible paradox in investor behaviour because 
high return expectations should mean high discount rates and hence lower values. 
Hence, we argue that investor high return expectations might have been driving 
stock prices to meet these expectations not in tandem with economic and 
corporate fundamentals and where these high return expectations did not translate 
into higher discount rates. 
With corporate profitability dropped out as a significant part of the 
explanation, the following matrix illustrates the possible valuation outcomes 
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resulting from different behavioural scenarios in pricing risk and expected growth. 
This matrix was introduced as part of method illustration in the Introduction, 
Section 4.1. 
Pricing Risk 
Overestimated Rational Underestimated 
A B C 
'5 
:it 
Underestimated 1 Undervalued Undervalued Offsetting 
~ \.:) Rational 2 Undervalued Rational Overvalued 
~ 
·5 
.1: ( Overestimated 3 Offsetting Overvalued Overvalued 
The Matrix of Growth and Risk Pricing Impact on Stock Valuation 
Al (top left) and C3 (bottom right) represent the most severe undervaluation and overvaluation 
levels respectively. A3 and CI have an offsetting impact, the underestimation/overestimation 
extent of each variable would result in rational (for the wrong reasons), overvalued, or 
undervalued levels. The relative severity level of B 1 v A2 and C2 v B3 are dependent on the extent 
of one variable under-lover-estimation. 
To sum up the conclusion, on the balance of the evidence there are two 
arguments to stand as suggested candidate explanations for stock market 
aggregate levels. (1) Overvaluation on the overall where stock prices are driven 
by investor exuberant expectations on returns and future growth with possibly 
underestimated risk, where high overvaluation levels are reduced/corrected with 
severe price falls, that would be B3/C2 or even C3 on the matrix. (2) Correct 
pricing, on average over the long run, associated with severe economically 
unjustifiable fluctuations or levels due to periodic exuberant expectations leading 
to overvalued periods corrected when economic gaps are too apparent to expose 
that these expectations are unrealistic. That would be, on the matrix, B2 over the 
long run and B3, C2 or C3 over shorter periods. And while neither of the above 
two results could be conclusive, both indicate the possibility that mispricing, 
namely overvaluation, is present. The levels and periods are highly disputable. We 
believe the first explanation makes a stronger case. The evidence did not support 
any of the undervaluation scenarios AI, B 1, and A2. C 1 was rolled out, as the 
evidence of exaggerating growth potential is fairly strong and also A3 as the 
evidence suggested either proper risk pricing or underestimation. 
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On the balance of evidence obtained through this research, we are at least 
able to join Shiller in his view (2001), on the US stock market, that its ups and 
downs over the last century have made virtually no sense ex post, and the views of 
others such as Cole, Helwege, and Laster (1996), Campbell and Shiller (1998), 
Heaton and Lucas (1999), Kiley (2000), and Smithers and Wright (2004), as these 
US-based views are applicable to the UK stock market at least over the recent 
history 1989-2002 given the high correlation between the two markets. And we 
are, of course, able to join those who worked on the UK stock market such as 
Brooks and Katsaris (2003, 2003b) in their conclusion, using speculative bubble 
theory, that UK stocks were overvalued in the late 1990s as they deviated too far 
from their fundamental values. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the valuation bias uncovered in Chapter 3, 
between newly issued and mature stocks, correlates over time with the aggregate 
valuation bias in this chapter as demonstrated by the behaviour of the valuation 
gap between new and mature stocks where it widens in bullish markets and 
diminishes in bearish markets. This seems to support the refutation of the 
hypothesis that new stocks higher valuation is due to learning. 
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4.7 Appendix 
4.7.1 Deriving Empirical Earnings Yield 
This appendix shows below how to move to the empirical EY using the 
empirical MBE model. 
10g(MBE); = 130 + P1ROE; + f32GEGS; + f3sKE; + &; [Equation 4-8] 
MBE = ROE(l + g) 
KE-g 
1 + g 1 
= RM-g EY 
[Equation 4-4], with 
[from Equation 4-5], gives: 
MBE = ROE from which: 
EY 
Equation 4-19: EY = ROE = ROE where log(MBE) from Equation 4-8 
MBE exp[log(MBE)] 
Or, in a simpler exposition: 
ROE = EGS EY = EGS MBE = MVE of which EY = ROE 
BE ' MVE' BE MBE 
where EY is earnings yield, RF is the risk-free rate, RM is the expected return on 
the market. It is worth noting that earnings yield is inflation-adjusted by 
construction as earnings and market value of equity are subject to the same 
inflation impact. 
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4.7.2 Expected Inflation - Measures' Comparison 
The figure in this appendix compares the two expected inflation measures; 
the expected inflation set as the released inflation rate in the previous year on RPI 














.....• ·10-Year Expected nflation 
--RPllnflation (A'"evious Year) 
.' 
~ 8 8 .~ N N 
Figure 4-14: Expected Inflation Estimation - Comparison 
The solid line represents expected inflation set as the released inflation rate in the previous year on 
RPI (average 1985-2003: 4.35 percent). The doted line represents expected inflation estimated by 
the Bank of England as the market expected inflation implied in the lO-year government bond 
(average 1985-2003: 3.94 percent), the estimates are only available from 1985. This comparison 
shows that relying on either estimate will not lead to differences in the conclusion given their 
tracking pattern. 
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15 Chapter Five: Investment Knowledge and Stock 
Price Rationalisation: Evidence from Property 
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5 Chapter Five: Investment Knowledge and Stock 
Price Rationalisation: Evidence from Property 
Investment Stocks 
Abstract 
In the context of 'valuation bias in the stock market' we seek evidence for the role 
of 'investment knowledge' in 'stock price rationalisation' from property investment 
stocks exploiting the special investment characteristics of their underlying assets and 
operations. We establish the presence of a significant and enduring market discount to the 
underlying value for property investment stocks on ongoing concern even after correcting 
the accounting NAV to liquidation value (called Triple-NAV). We test the hypothesis that 
property investment stocks discount is a reflection of investment knowledge-based 
rationality that limits irrationality or valuation bias for these stocks Ho. The null 
hypothesis is tested by establishing knowledge-based rational explanations for property 
stocks market valuation or discount. The evidence suggests that we cannot reject Ho. 
We find that the percentage return differential between the expected return on 
property stocks and the underlying return on actual capital employed in property 
companies explains market value discount. Market capitalisation of property stocks 
adjusts down from NAV first to account for debt fair value movements and contingent 
capital gains tax liabilities to Triple-NAV and further to produce the required rate of 
return demanded by investors. Consistent with this conclusion, we establish, statistically, 
a strong positive direct relation between the discount and operating expenses. 
The evidence shows that unrealised capital gains are very significant in the 
underlying value. Hence, investor perceptions about the risk of realising these gains could 
be one of the factors behind the discount fearing property prices falling or even crashing. 
This is confirmed in closing the discount gap when liquidation is assumed because of the 
higher level of certainty. Leverage has a negative direct relation with market valuation for 
property stocks contributing to the discount while it has a positive impact on value for the 
non-financial sector. The interpretation for this opposite impact of leverage on property 
stocks is that property has a moderate income yield which makes leverage riskier. 
Consistent with the null hypothesis, (a) our regression analysis supports the 
argument of knowledge-based rationality providing rational explanations for market 
valuation and the discount, and (b) the evidence confirms the stability of property stock 
prices relative to the economy and fundamental value, unlike the overall stock market, to 




The study in Chapter 3 on valuation bias and stock age established the 
presence of valuation bias for new stocks relative to older stocks. The research in 
stock market levels in Chapter 4 suggests that the market has a tendency for 
upward overall bias relative to fundamentals. The motivation for the present 
chapter stems from these results and namely from one of the implications of 
Chapter 3. The implication that investors could overvalue new stocks by 
exaggerating their potential relative to older stocks because the market knows 
relatively less about new stocks. 
To explore the role of investment knowledge in rationalising stock prices, the key 
issue in this chapter is establishing whether the deviation from fundamental value 
(the persistent discount) for property investment stocks can be explained 
rationally because of the greater "investment knowledge". This idea of behaviour 
rationalisation by knowledge will be explored by exploiting the special investment 
characteristics of UK property investment stocks. For this category of stocks, the 
values of the underlying assets are fairly well understood by investors. 
Figure 5-1 illustrates the distinct difference in behaviour of property and 
non-financial stocks. The sample of property investment stocks used for this 
figure and for the empirical research reported in this paper, consists of all publicly 
traded real estate stocks with property investment activities. As shown in this 
figure, the overall non-financial sector of the stock market always traded at a 
premium-to-NAV, with a weighted average premium over the full sample 1990-
2002 of 144.35 percent, i.e. market-to-book of 2.44. Property investment stocks 
traded almost always at a discount-to-NAV, with a weighted average discount 
over 1990-2002 of21.31 percent, i.e. market-to-bookofO.79. 82 
82 Appendix 5.6.1 presents quartile statistics for property stocks discount-to-NA V. 
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Figure 5-1. PremiumlDiscount-to-NA V 
Premium and discount-to-NAV are represented with positive and negative signs respectively_ They 
are calculated as (MVE - NA V)/NA V. where MVE is market value of equity and NAV is net asset 
value of the accounting balance sheet. In the case of property investment stocks, the principal 
assets on the balance sheet that determine net asset value are commercial properties_ These are 
valued, for accounting purposes, using surveyors' valuations of current market value while the 
assets for non-financial stocks assets are valued according to the standard accounting criteria. 
usually historical cost. Property investment stocks sample contained all publicly traded real estate 
stocks with rent to total property revenues in excess of 20 percent (i.e_ those with significant 
property investment activities).83 Note that unrealised capital gains are transferred direct to the 
reserves. The sample starts in 1990 because of the small number of property companies listed 
before that year. Observations for property stocks and non-fmancial stocks ranged between 24 and 
51 per year (average 40) and 488-1151 (average 726) respectively. Weighted average discount for 
property stocks is 21.31 percent and premium for non-fmancial stocks is 144_35 percent calculated 
over 1990-2002 by dividing the aggregate discount (premium) by the aggregate NA V for all 
companies over all years in each sample_ For the most recent history. discount-to-NAV for 
property companies over 2001-2002 for companies with over 70 percent rent to total property 
revenues is higher (34.05 percent). I 
Assuming that surveyors' valuations used to compute net asset value are a reliable 
measure of the realisable value of the underlying property assets given the use of 
comparable market evidence, then the ongoing value of property investment 
stocks is lower than the break up value that would be achieved by dissolving the 
property investment companies and selling all their commercial property holdings. 
This fact, that they trade at a discount to their liquidation values, makes property 
stocks a special case, somehow similar perhaps to investment trusts (closed-end 
83 Barkham and Ward (1999) stated that the majority of property companies listed in the UK are 
property investment companies. Although a few of them have some non-property activities, these 
activities make a very small contribution to the profits of those companies. 
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funds) that also trade at a discount to realisable value and also to real estate 
investment trusts. 
Matysiak and Brown (1997) find that the majority of the UK property 
companies exhibited an enduring risk-adjusted underperformance profile over the 
period 1980-1995. This underperformance was not statistically significant. 
Barkham and Ward (1999) examine two hypotheses to explain the discount of the 
UK property stocks; (a) the discounts are the result of agency costs, contingent 
capital gains tax liability, and a number of other firm specific factors, (b) the 
discounts result from the interaction of noise traders and rational investors. Their 
evidence suggests that both hypotheses have utility in explaining property 
company discounts. On US Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), Gentry, Jones, 
and Mayer (2003) conclude that aggregate price-to-NAV appears to be stationary 
and mean-reverting and that their results although related to similar findings in the 
closed-end fund literature, it is unlikely that REIT premiums and discounts reflect 
the investor sentiment hypothesis of Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991). In this 
study, we investigate whether property investment stocks discount is a reflection 
of the reliable investment knowledge about these stocks leading to limited 
irrationality and limited valuation bias compared to the overall stock market. 
Based on the above introductory discussion, we formulate and investigate the 
following null hypothesis: 
Ho: Property investment stocks discount is a reflection of investment 
knowledge-based rationality that limits irrationality or valuation bias for 
these stocks. 
In other words, valuation bias is less for property investment stocks 
relative to non-financial stocks (as per Chapters 3 and 4) because of the 
greater investment knowledge about the former. 
Against the alternative: 
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HI: The investment knowledge about property investment stocks has no 
distinctive role in rationalising their prices or limiting their valuation 
bias. 
The null hypothesis will be tested by examining rational explanations for property 
stocks discount (or their pricing). Investment-knowledge about property stocks (or 
their investment characteristics) means the specific information about the levels 
and limits of future potential of income, income growth, capital growth, risk, and 
other firm specific factors such contingent capital gains taxes and debt market 
value impact. This knowledge is derived from the knowledge about the underlying 
assets (property investments) and operations. 
We first documented in Figure 5-1 above the phenomena of the persistent 
property stocks discount-to-NAV. This discount appears relatively stable when 
compared with the behaviour of the premium of the non-financial sector. An 
important element of the analysis is to derive as accurate measure as possible for 
the discount. For various reasons the raw accounting NA V, as reported in Figure 
5-1, is not completely accurate. Therefore, NAVis corrected, for robustness 
check, later to liquidation (break up value using the so-called Triple-NAV) to take 
into account the impact of debt market value movements and contingent capital 
gains taxes on properties. 84 
Section 5.2 discusses the investment characteristics of property stocks, 
distinguishing them from the tax-efficient real estate investment trusts (REITs). 
The analyses and tests are carried out using two datasets. One is retrieved from 
Datastream for the period 1990-2002 and the other collected by hand for the 
period 2001-2003. The latter includes property specific information that is not 
available on the usual financial databases like Datastream and is used for a more 
detailed analysis especially to derive a more accurate measure of the discount in 
Section 5.4. The data are discussed in Section 5.3. 
Our procedure is as follows~ Section 5.4 presents the key results of this chapter. It 
tests the hypothesis that property investment stocks discount is the result of 
84 See defmition and calculation of Triple-NAV in Table 5-4 page 189. 
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knowledge-based rationality by examining: (a) return differential between the 
required rate of return on property stocks and that delivered on the actual capital 
employed of the companies holding the underlying properties, also examining the 
impact of operating expenses, (b) other contributing factors to the discount such 
as the risk associated with the unrealised capital gains, and (c) statistical evidence, 
from regression analysis, for rational explanation of the market valuation and the 
discount. We then examine whether, consistent with the null hypothesis, property 
stock price behaviour is relatively more stable compared with fundamental value, 
the economy, and the overall stock market. This is done by examining over time: 
(a) the behaviour of property stocks discount versus the premium of non-financial 
stocks, (b) stock price behaviour relative to the economy and implied growth 
testing, (c) comparative earnings yield behaviour, and (d) the evolution of 
property stock beta. Section 5.5 concludes. 
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5.2 Definition of Property Investment Stocks; Why they are 
Different from REITs 
Real Estate umbrella covers property investment, development, trading, 
agency, consultancy, management, etc. Construction companies come under a 
separate category. This chapter deals only with property investment stocks. UK 
property investment stocks are those of real estate companies that mainly 
specialise in holding properties as their investment or operating assets. In the UK, 
they have a normal corporate structure like most general industries.8s 
Scott (1996) states that property companies have been a part of the real estate 
scene in the UK for more than a hundred years and represent the dominant vehicle 
by which property is securitised in the UK. Currie and Scott (1991) updated by 
Barkham and GeItner (1995) document that the market capitalization of property 
companies in the UK is about 2 percent of the total market-cap and that they hold 
about 12 percent of the real estate in the UK institutional property market. 
Barkham and Ward (1999) note that property companies are subject to no special 
tax treatment and that they have their investment properties re-valued every year. 
The revaluation of properties to open market value is undertaken by specialist 
valuation surveyors based on comparable market evidence according to the Red 
Book of the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS). The revaluation is 
reflected in the balance sheet providing a market value estimate of their total and 
net asset values. 86 
At this early stage, it is worth clarifying the differences and similarities 
with the Real Estate Investment Trusts.87 Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs 
for short, pronounced "Reets"), a form of corporate structure, first created in the 
8S Most UK listed property investment companies hold commercial properties in their portfolios; 
very few of them have some residential property element (e.g. key worker accommodation). Also, 
Barkham and Ward (1999) stated that the majority of property companies listed in the UK are 
property investment companies. Although a few of them have some non-property activities. these 
activities make a very small contribution to the profits of those companies. 
86 Of course, as asset values are updated annually for property investment stocks, that makes them 
more accurate than historic cost valuations used for the assets of most non-financial companies. 
87 Source for information about REITs: Campbell and Sirmans (2002), Gentry, Jones, and Mayer 
(2003), and also the website of the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts. 
175 
US in 1960, with key tax advantages. A REIT is a company that owns, and in 
most cases, operates income producing real estates. Some of them finance real 
estate. They are similar to other companies as they often fund their operations by 
raising capital from external markets. They usually take the form of public 
companies (usually traded on major stock exchanges) where investors can buy 
shares in them to make indirect property investments. They are similar to 
European unit trusts and US mutual funds, but different from European listed 
property companies. 
REITs own and often operate relatively illiquid real estate assets unlike closed-
end funds. The similarity between the two is the ability to gauge the market value 
of the REIT by valuing its underlying assets like for closed-end funds. In Europe 
they have been only authorised in the Netherlands, recently Belgium and very 
recently France. The authorisation of REITs is also being discussed in the UK, 
though the Government did not address them in 2005 budget as was anticipated. 
REITs are classified in the following categories: (1) Equity REITs, own and 
operate income-producing real estate; (2) Mortgage REITs, lend money direct to 
real estate owners and their operators, or indirect through acquisition of loans or 
mortgage-backed securities; and (3) Hybrid REITs, are companies that both own 
properties and make loans to owners and operators. 
To qualify as a REIT in the US, a firm must meet certain asset and income tests to 
prevent them from using their tax-advantage status in other business areas. They 
must earn at least 75 percent of their income from real estate-related investments 
and 95 percent of their income from these sources as well as dividends, interest 
and gains from securities sales. In addition, at least 75 percent of their assets must 
be invested in real estate, mortgages, REIT shares, government securities, or cash. 
They must distribute at least 90 percent (was 95 percent before 2000) of their 
taxable income to shareholders annually in the form of dividends every year. This 
distribution requirement is based on taxable income rather than financial reporting 
income. 
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The benefit of qualifying as a REIT is avoiding the double taxation of equity-
financed investment. Unlike regular companies, they receive an annual tax 
deduction for dividends paid out to shareholders. REITs often distribute all of 
their taxable income to shareholders each year, which eliminates the corporate tax 
completely, where of course it is taxed at the shareholders level. Advocates of 
REITs argue that these vehicles: (a) improve liquidity in local real estate markets; 
(b) reduce cost of capital; and (c) promote more efficient allocation of capital. 
REITs allow individual and institutional investors to make equity investments in 
real estate without incurring the high transaction costs that are related to direct 
property investments while avoiding the burden of double taxation.88 
It is worth noting that price-to-NA V according to Gentry, Jones, and 
Mayer (2003) was close to one on average for US REITs while UK property 
stocks price-to-NA V ratio is significantly and persistently below one even after 
correcting their NA V to liquidation level as shown later. The reason for this 
difference comes mainly from that US REITs are tax-advantaged vehicles where 
they almost pay no corporate tax at all while UK property stocks are taxed on 
operating income and realised capital gains like any other company. At 30 percent 
UK tax rate for property companies, one could justify the difference in price-to-
NAV. 
88 Property transaction costs: Agency commissions, legal fees, due diligence costs, and stamp duty. 
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5.3 Data 
This research uses annual data from the Datastream - Thomson Financial 
database for the years 1990 through 2002. The dataset constitutes of all the UK 
listed Real Estate companies (518 observations). Table 5-1 below presents the 
data items retrieved. The dataset of the UK non-financial stocks used for chapters 
3 and 4 (of which 9440 observations were included here for 1990-2002) is used 
for this chapter too. Data on Investment Property Databank Index (IPD), GDP, 
Interest Rates, different stock indices (capital indices, dividend yield, and total 
return indices), etc were all retrieved from Datastream. Property Sector bids 1999-
2002 data were obtained from a Merrill Lynch report of 2002. Appendix 5.6.1 
shows a list of all publicly traded property companies in the UK. 
Datastream and similar sources do not provide property company specific 
disclosures. Therefore, a more detailed analysis sample 2001-2003 was introduced 
using data collected by hand from the annual reports of property companies to 
refine and test the robustness of the analysis based on the Datastream's 1990-2002 
data. Thus, for example, the discount and return on capital for these companies are 
measured more accurately taking into account tax and debt market value impact 
on NAV and the discount. All the data are used to explain the discount. Most 
annual reports were requested direct from the companies or their agents. Available 
reports for the detailed analysis were 100, distributed into 27 observations in 
2001, 48 observations in 2002, and 25 observations in 2003. Table 5-2 below 
shows the items obtained for this property-specific detailed dataset with their 
calculations where relevant. 
It is worth pointing out that small-size sample has been encountered by previous 
research looking into the UK property stocks. For example, Barkham and Ward 
(1999) conducted their research using three years worth of property stock-specific 
data containing only 87 observations. Even research on US REITs has 
encountered the same, for example Gentry, Kemsley and Mayer (2003) used a 
sample of just 85 REITs with 389 observations for the period 1992-1999. 
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Symbol Description Datastream Code 
NAME Finn name NAME 
YEAR The year which the data belong to (current year) YEAR 
CE Capital employed or Invested capital 322 
DTBS Deferred taxes (balance sheet account) 311 
DTIS Deferred taxes for the year (P&L) 161 
EBITA Earnings before interest, taxes, and amortisation 1502 
EMPCOSTS Employee costs 117 
EXOR Extraordinary items after tax 193 
INVP Investment properties in market value estimate 863 
MVE Market value of equity (market-cap) HMV 
NI Net income, earned for ordinary shareholders 625 
OEQ Ordinary equity capital and reserves 305 
RENT Rent income 106 
REVAL Property revaluation reserve 397 
TPREV Total property revenues 805 
Table 5-1. Datastream Raw Data Items 1990-2002 
Data source: Datastream - Thomson Financial. The codes under symbols are those used in this 
document. Book equity BE and Earnings were adjusted for deferred taxation and extraordinary 
items as in Chapter 3 to obtain NA V and EGS respectively. 
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Description (Symbol) 
Property investment company name 
Administrative expenses (AEX) 
Book value of debt (BVD) 
Book value of minority interests (BVMl) 
Capital Employed or Invested Capital (CE) 
Contingent capital gains taxes (CCG1) 
Debt fair value adjustment (FVAD) 
Discount-to-NA V (DISC) percent 
Discount-to-NA V £ 
Discount-to-Triple NAV (DISC3N) percent 
Discount-to-Triple NA V £ 
Earnings (EGS) 
Earnings yield (EY) 
EBITA 
Fair value of debt (FVD) 
Investment properties (INVP) 
Market-cap or Market value of equity (MVE) 
Net asset value (NA V or BE) 
Property or Portfolio expenses (PEX) 
Property revaluation reserve (REVAL) 
Rent 
Rent yield (Ry) or Property yield 
Return on capital employed (ROCE) 
Share price (P) 
Shares outstanding 
Triple-NAV (orNNNAV) 




Equity capital + debt + minority interests 
Contingent capital gains tax liability on 
properties if they were sold at the 
reported value (as per the independent 
professional valuation at the balance 
sheet date inline with the Red Book of the 
Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors). 
FRS 13: (debt fair or market value 
including the related derivative securities 
- debt book value) x (1 - Tax rate) 
(NA V - MVE)INA V 
NAV-MVE 
(Triple NA V - MVE)/ Triple NA V 
Triple NA V - MVE 
Net income - Extraordinary items + 
Deferred taxes for the year 
EGS/MVE 
Earnings before interest, taxes and 
amortisation 
Debt market value estimate disclosed 
according to FRSI3. This includes the 
MV of debt-related derivative securities. 
Open market value of the investment 
properties at the balance sheet date 
according to the Red Book of the Royal 
Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS). 
Values are provided as an independent 
professional valuation. 
Shares outstanding x Share price at the 
balance sheet date 
Shareholders funds or OEQ + Balance 
sheet deferred taxes DTBS 
£ 
Cumulative unrealised capital gains 
Rent income (from P&L) 
Rent! Investment properties market value 
EBIT AlCapitaI Employed (before-tax) 
As of balance sheet date 
As of balance sheet date 
NA V - (FV AD + CCG1) 
Table 5-2. Property Stocks Detailed Hand-Collected Dataset 1001-1003 
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5.4 Property Investment Stocks Discount: Is it Knowledge-
Based Rationality? 
This section presents the core analysis of this chapter. It aims at providing 
explanation for why property investment stocks trade persistently at a discount to 
net asset value. Having documented the relative stability of property stock prices, 
this investigation is about whether property stock prices are less subject to 
valuation bias than other stocks. Explaining the discount and the behaviour of 
property stocks over time will provide evidence that property investment stocks 
are priced according to knowledge-based rationality, not valuation bias. 
The section is arranged as follows. 
1. Section 5.4.1 examines the difference between the expected return on property 
stocks and the underlying return on actual capital employed in property 
companies (i.e., Does return differential justify the discount?). This reveals 
empirical evidence about the impact of operating expenses, as a major factor, 
on the discount. 
2. Section 5.4.2 deals with other contributing factors to the discount. This 
addresses, briefly, the materialisation risk of the unrealised capital gains, 
mismanagement risk (agency costs), and the financial risk of leverage. 
3. Section 5.4.3 deals with explaining market valuation of property stocks (or 
their discount) rationally in a cross-sectional analysis to support the argument 
of knowledge-based rationality. 
4. Section 5.4.4 examines in more detail the relative stability of property stock 
prices against fundamental value, the economy and the overall stock market. 
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5.4.1 Does Return Differential Justify The Discount? 
In this sub-section, we first establish empirically the level of the required 
total rate of return on property investment stocks with reference to the underlying 
property investment asset class. Then, we compare this total required rate of 
return with the total return on capital employed of the property companies (the 
vehicles holding the underlying investment properties). The percentage difference 
between the two is called "Return DifJerentiar'. 
Total returns are compared between the overall stock market, property stocks, 
direct property investments and government bonds to establish the level of return 
expectations for property stocks investors based on empirical realised levels. 
Figure 5-2 below shows how close is the total return on the direct Property 
Investments and FTSE Real Estate indices. The capital growth on the property 
stocks in the FTSE Real Estate is higher than on properties themselves as in the 
case of property stocks capital gains reflect retained earnings as well as the capital 
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Figure 5-2. Comparative Total Return90 - Average 1986-2002 
FTSE Real Estate Index is only available from 1985, therefore the period used is 1986-2002 to show comparative returns 
for as long period as possible. IPD Index is the Investment Property Databank Index (direct property investment). All 
returns are annual nominal as inflation-adjustment applies equally to all and hence does not afTect the compari on. Total 
return is calculated as the annual percentage change in the total return indices for the first three categories (capital growth + 
dividend or rent yield) apal1 from government bond where the redemption yield on the IO-year government bond 
benchmark is presented. 
89 The accounts of property companies show clearly, up to the end of the sample period, that 
~roperty unrealised capital gains are transferred directly to the re erves. 
o It is worth noting that total returns on the stock market and property stocks are geared return . 
The same is applicable to property investments as they are indirectly geared where held by gear d 
companies or investment vehicles or where directly geared (e.g. direct mortgage). This keep the 
three measures comparable. Also, note that renal income yield on property i close to the yield on 
government bond - slightly below for the balance of risk/growth differences. 
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As a start point to understand return expectations; working backwards: 
How total return on property stocks compares to that of the overall stock market? 
Figure 5-2 above shows that the difference in average total return terms (stock 
price change and dividend income) between FTSE All and Property Stocks over 
1986-2002 is about 1 percent. This is attributable to the difference in stock price 
appreciation (capital gains) as dividend yields are very similar. Over this period 
property stocks have under-performed the overall stock market. Figure 5-3 below 
shows that property stocks have systematically under-performed the overall stock 
market as measured by total returns to shareholders. Annualised volatility 
measured by the standard deviation over the period 1986-2002 for total returns on 
FTSE ALL and FTSE Real Estate is 16.94 and 20.47 percent respectively. The 
monthly mean abnormal return of -0.15 percent has a monthly standard deviation 
of 4.2 percent and a t-statistic of -0.04 indicating that the underperformance of 
real estate stock index, although is in existence, is not statistically significant. 
Replicating the same analysis over the period 1990-2002 leads to the same 
conclusion. This is consistent with the findings of Matysiak and Brown (1997).91 
Hence, total returns, on average, between the overall stock market and property 

















Figure 5-3. Market-Adjusted CAR: FTSE RE v FTSE ALL 1986-2002 
Market-adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) are calculated using monthly total return 
(capital appreciation and dividends) of FTSE Real Estate Index against FTSE ALL Share Index. 
FTSE Real Estate Index is only available from 1985, therefore the period used is 1986-2002 to 
show comparative returns for as long period as possible. 
91 Matysiak and Brown (1997) fmd that although the majority of property companies analysed 
over the period 1980-1995 exhibited an enduring underperformance, this was not found to be 
statistically different from zero. For the few companies delivering a positive abnormal 
performance, it did not prove statistically significant. 
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The second question working backwards: How total return on property 
stocks compare to that of direct property investments? Figure 5-2 above shows 
that over 1986-2002, total returns, on average, are similar for property stocks and 
property direct investments (gross returns). Bearing in mind that capital growth on 
property stocks reflects both retained earnings and property unrealised capital 
gains. In a time-series fashion, Figure 5-4 below shows a comparison between 
total returns on direct property investments and property stocks confirming the 
close link and averages between the two. One argument about the higher volatility 
of property stocks total returns could be the result of speculative activities in 
stocks as they have more liquid market relative to properties and because of 
property significant transaction costs. Given the significant bid/ask spread on 
property stocks, this argument is not strong and might not be valid. A stronger 
more correct explanation is that direct property investment figures are just made 
up! They are artificially smoothed as a result of the surveyor valuation process. 
The measured returns on direct property investment are actually not attainable. 
Also, This volatility could be also affected by the leadllag in reaction and/or over-
lunder-reaction of property stock prices to changes in the underlying property 
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Figure 5-4. Comparative Total Return - Time Series 1986-1001 
Property Stocks: FTSE Real Estate Index is only available from 1985. Therefore, the period used 
is 1986-2002 to show comparative returns for as long period as possible. Property Investment: IPD 
Index is the Investment Property Databank Index (direct Investment in property). All returns are 
annual nominal as inflation-adjustment applies equally to all and hence does not affect the 
comparison. Total return presented is calculated as the annual percentage change in the total return 
indices reflecting capital appreciation and dividend/rent income. 
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The conclusion from the above empirical observations is that the realised 
required total rate of return on property investment stocks matches the total return 
on direct property investments. 
While property stocks and direct property investments have, despite the 
noise, similar average total returns, how could property stocks returns be similar 
to the total returns of the underlying assets while the latter are still subject to 
operating expenses while earnings growth is limited by the rent income levels and 
their growth? 
Total returns on direct property investment are 'gross' before property and 
corporate administrative expenses. Therefore, the fact that total return of property 
stocks is close to that of direct investment would be consistent with the discount 
these stocks trade at. That is because for total return on property stocks to be, on 
average, similar to that on the underlying assets, market-cap has to adjust below 
the NA V. It is important to clarify that the return on real estate stocks is also 
measured gross. The spread, stamp duty and brokers fees could all reduce returns. 
Ifthese stocks are small, the spreads could be very wide (e.g. 10 percent). Valuing 
the underlying property investments according to the Red Book of the Royal 
Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) requires subtracting purchaser's costs 
from gross value (typically 5.75 percent being 4 percent stamp duty, and 1.75 
percent for agent and legal fees) and reporting net values leaving the underlying 
property gross returns (rent and capital growth) subject to operating expenses on 
the corporate level and frictional costs on property stock transactions which is 
consistent with the presence of a discount. The return simulation in Figure 5-5 
below clarifies this further. Refer to Appendix 5.6.3 for the detailed simulation. 
This applies to the ongoing concern status. Soon liquidation is assumed, the 
discount gap would narrow down to reflect the net realisable values as discussed 
later in Section 5.4.2. 
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Figure 5-5. Total Return Simulation for Property Stocks 
This simulation uses a single hypothetical property investment company where the P&L and 
Balance Sheet are projected for 10 years using. for simplicity. constant assumptions about rental 
yield. property capital growth, expenses ratios. etc to track average total stock returns under two 
scenarios of discount to liquidation value; called Triple-NA V (22 and 0 percent). See the defInition 
and calculation of Triple-NAV in Table 5-4 page 189. See Appendix 5.6.3 for the detailed 
simulation. TRS is Total Return to Shareholders on property stocks (price appreciation plus 
dividend yield). 
Figure 5-5 above shows that at zero percent discount to liquidation value property 
stocks will under-perform the gross returns of direct property investments almost 
immediately. While when priced at 22 percent discount, average total stock return 
over 10 years will match that of gross property average total return.92 Note that 
property companies have refurbishment and redevelopment cycles, which besides 
engaging in new investments, will improve the mature performance so it does not 
have a declining trend as Figure 5-5 might suggest based on its simplified 
assumptions. 
We have established, in the above, that the required total rate of return on 
property investment stocks matches the total return on direct property 
investments. The second step is to show empirically, using property specific 
disclosures, whether there is a return differential between the required rate of 
return (as on the underlying property assets) and the vehicles (property investment 
companies) that could justify the discount. Return differential is calculated as: 
92 By looking at Table 5-16 in Appendix 5.6.3 it is clear that dividend yield is the key, where stock 
price appreciation would be the same in percentage terms year-on-year for any same discount level 
while dividend yield with same monetary amounts will increase with the discount and vice versa. 
The numbers appeared in Table 5-16 for the percentage stock price appreciation will not change if 
the discount level was different while maintained the same from year to year. Note that these 
numbers are the same whether discount was at zero or 22 percent. Dividend size (in £ terms) is 
bound by rental income, property and administrative expenses, interest charges. taxation and 
payout ratio, i.e. (Rent - PEX - AEX - INT - TAX) x Payout ratio. 
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Equation 5-1: RD = PTR - TROCE 
TROCE 
where RD is return differential, PTR is property total return (the total return on the 
underlying property investment portfolio made up of rent yield and capital 
growth), TROCE is total return on capital employed in the property company, that 
is ROCE after adding the annual unrealised capital gains on the underlying 
property portfolio. 
Using the 1990-2002 sample, in Table 5-3 compares property pre-tax total returns 
with property corporate vehicles' pre-tax total ROCE (return on capital employed) 
to estimate the discount based on return differential and compare that to market 
value discount. Both pre-tax total ROCE and property pre-tax total return are on a 
firm or enterprise basis for consistency.93 The main result of this analysis is in the 
comparison between return differentials and property stocks discounts. Table 5-3 
shows on a pre-tax basis, in weighted averages, gross total property return over 
2001-2003 of 7.08 percent (total returns on property direct investments including 
capital growth), the accounting-based ROCE is calculated after adding estimated 
unrealised capital gains. That resulted in TROCE of 5.78 percent. The percentage 
return differential between the underlying assets' total return and the vehicles' 
total returns is 22.49 percent compared to the actual discount-to-NAV of 21.31 
percent. 94 Consistent with the null hypothesis, this evidence suggests that, on 
ongoing concern, market value discounts can be justified by return differential as 
the latter predicts the actual discount very closely to produce the rate of return 
demanded by investors. 
93 Although, the discount is expressed on equity basis where leverage is part of the equation with 
interest as tax-deductible generating tax shield, we still relied on finn perspective as it is more 
consistent. Property current returns are moderate and debt servicing could prove difficult with 
small adverse changes in the debt market. Therefore, factoring the extra fmancial risk makes debt 
almost value neutral and renders its use just as a funding facility that might not create much value 
to shareholders. Historically, borrowing helped in making property empires because of the impact 
of high inflation on transferring wealth in real terms from lenders to borrowers. Also, using ROE 
will be problematic as it on after-tax basis and capital gains need to be adjusted for leverage. 
94 Other contributing factors to the discount could affect the accuracy of return differential such as 
the risk of the unrealised capital gains, agency costs, and leverage, besides other minor factors, for 
example, the estimated annual unrealised capital gains added to RaCE, besides being an average 
estimate, was effectively applied to the whole capital employed while in fact it is only applicable 
to the majority of capital employed in the investment properties and not to the elements of working 
capital. Another example, the positive impact of property trading and development profits on 
RaCE for the few companies that have them. 
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Period: 1990-2002 
Underlying Property Investment Returns (pre-tax) 
Rental yield (RY) 
Unrealised capital gains (CG) 
Property total return (PTR = RY+CG) 
Property Investment Companies Return on Capital 
Employed (pre-tax) 
Before unrealised capital gains ROCE 
After unrealised capital gains TROCE = ROCE + CG 
Return Differential: Properties versus Property Stocks 









Actual period weighted average Discount-to-NAV Percent 21.31 
Table 5-3. Property Stocks Discount v Return Differential 1990-2002 
The sample consists of 518 observations as available from Datastream. The sample covers 1990-
2002. All numbers are in pooled weighted averages for the period for all companies. Rental yield 
is calculated by dividing rent income by the value of the property portfolio. Unrealised capital 
gains rate is estimated as the compound annual capital appreciation on IPD for the period as the 
accounts do not show consistently annual capital growth. ROCE is calculated as EBIT AlCapital 
employed. Total ROCE (denoted TROCE) is calculated after adding the unrealised capital gains to 
compare on total return basis. Return differential is calculated as (PTR - TROCE)!fROCE. All are 
before tax for consistency. Actual discount-to-NA V is calculated as (NA V - MVE)INA V. Using 
arithmetic averages instead of weighted averages gives similar results. 
Notwithstanding the above conclusion, there is a problem with the 
measurement of the ROCE and the discount using the usual NA V with other 
capital elements in the calculation. Accounting NA V is not a very accurate 
measure economically for the underlying value of property stocks mainly because 
of tax and debt implications. Therefore, we use the so-called 'Triple-NAV' to 
correct for the impact of property contingent capital gains taxes and debt market 
value adjustments. Triple-NAV is one of the most important indicators used in the 
market for this sector and its analysis is the most widely used for researching 







Assets value (total) 
Less book value of total liabilities and other non-equity capital 
Net asset value, (i.e. shareholders funds) 
Adjusted for marking debt to market value (net oftax9s) 
according to the disclosure required by FRS 13 where debt is 
valued by the present value of future cash flows at market yield 
(Debt FV AD) 96 
Less contingent capital gains tax (CCGT) on properties 
if they were sold at their market value at the balance sheet date; 
disclosed by property companies based on tax-specialist advice 
Also referred to as NNNA V by some analysts 97 
Table 5-4. Triple-NA V Calculation 
Since January 2002, there is another adjustment according to the disclosure required by FRS 19. 
That relates to timing differences on potential tax liabilities. All companies are required to make 
full provision for differences, which are not expected to be permanent, i.e. to treat them as some 
form of deferred taxation. This means that property companies must make provision for tax 
allowances that they have claimed (mainly on capital allowances), as they have to repay the tax if 
they sell the relevant property. This could be the 4th 'N' but we choose to ignore it as many market 
analysts do to ensure consistency in the data, as the information was not available before January 
2002. 
Unfortunately, property specific data are not available to correct the NA V to its 
realisable or liquidation level for the period 1990-2002. Therefore, we rely on a 
dataset we collected by hand, as described in the data section, for the period 2001-
2003 to correct the measurement of net asset value, the discount, and the capital 
employed. Then we can assess the robustness of the conclusion from return 
differential derived from the period 1990-2002. 
Table 5-5 shows a descriptive comparison between the discount-to-NA V and the 
discount corrected to Triple-NA V using the hand-collected data for property 
investment companies from their annual reports as was available over the period 
2001-2003. The discount gap was reduced from 34.64 percent weighted average 
discount-to-NA V to 21.86 discount-to-Triple NA V after NA V was corrected to its 
realisable level. 
95 Net of tax debt market value adjustments because if debt is to be settled at market value then the 
£remium paid (discount received) will be tax deductible (taxable). 
6 Falling interest rates over 1990-2002 resulted in negative impact on NA V for the period. 
97 The proportion of minority interests in property companies is minimal (average over 2001-2003: 
0.85 and 0.46 percent of NA V and capital employed respectively). Therefore, we ignore the 
insignificant impact of minority interests NAV adjustments on common equity Triple-NAV. This 
would insignificantly increase the discount-to-Triple NA V if their related adjustments (debt FV AD 
and CCGT) were excluded from total adjustments. 
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Sample period is 2001-2003 (hand-collected data). Discount-to-NAV is calculated as (MVE -
NAV)/NAV. Triple-NAV == NAV - (Debt fair value adjustment + CCGT). Discount-to-Triple 
NA V is calculated as (MVE - Triple-NA V)lTriple-NA V. The weighted averages are calculated 
using the corresponding sums ofNA V, Triple-NAV and MVE for the aggregate sample. 
Before proceeding to repeat the test using Triple-NAV on the 2001-2003 detailed 
dataset, we study the relationship between Triple-NA V and ordinary NA V to 
examine the stability of this relationship to rely on where Triple-NA V is not 
available. Figure 5-6 shows a strong stable relation between the two measures 
offering some comfort for the use of only NA V for the period 1990-2002 in the 
above analysis. Nevertheless, return differential analysis is repeated below using 
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Figure 5-6: Discount-to-NA V versus Discount-to-Triple NAV 2001-2003 
Discount-to-NA V is calculated as [NAV - MVE]. Discount-to-Triple NAV is calculated as 
[Triple-NAV - MVE]. Triple-NAV is calculated as [NAV - Debt fair value adjustment net of tax 
(marking debt to market value disclosed according to FRS 13) - Contingent capital gain tax 
(disclosed in the annual report)]. Natural logs were used. Correlation is 0.86. 
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We now repeat the return differential analysis using the detailed sample 2001-
2003 to establish the robustness of the conclusion from the 1990-2002 sample 
after correcting the NA V to the Triple-NA V (liquidation value). The results in 
presented in Table 5-6 below confirm that return differential using both NAV and 
Triple-NAV do explain the discount to a good extent. However, when correcting 
to Triple-NAV, return differential is a better estimate for the discount-to-Triple 
NA V than without the correction. Either way, this does not alter the conclusion. 
So the gross total return on property investment that matches, historically, 
the required rate of return on property stocks is subject to operating expenses 
(property and administrative expenses). With other working capital requirements 
and other fixed assets, this leads to a gap between property total return and return 
on capital employed in property companies (the vehicles) where the latter is 
lower. Hence, for property stocks to produce total returns as demanded by 
investors inline with risk-free rate and other asset classes, market capitalisation of 
these stocks adjusts down from NA V first to account for debt fair value 
adjustments and contingent capital gains tax liabilities to Triple-NA V and further 
from that to produce the required rate of return by investors in these stocks. This 
is consistent with one of the two fundamental points about the economic value of 
equities [Smithers and Wright (2004)] that equities are financial assets. Hence, the 
rate of return is the start and end point in this case. 
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Period: 2001-2003 
Net asset value (NAV) 
Market value of eq.'l.!!Y(MY~) . 
Discount-to-NA V 
Debt fair value adjustment 
g()l1tillg~l1~~IiP i!lilgli~.It.~. !Ii~es(c;c;9}1 
Triple-NAV 
Discount-to-Triple-NA V 
Underlying Property Investment Returns (pre-tax) 
Rental yield (R Y) 
Unrealised capital gains (CG) 
Property total return (PTR = RY+CG) 
Property Investment Companies Return on Capital 
Employed (pre-tax) 
Before un realised capital gains 
ROCE (NA V -based CE) 
ROCE (Triple NA V -based CE) 
After property un realised capital gains 
TROCEa (NA V -based CE) 
TROCEb (Triple NA V -based CE) 
Return Differential: Properties versus Property Stocks 
(This is the discount as predicted by return differential) 
Using NAV (comparable to Discount-to-NAV) 






















Table 5-6. Property Stocks Discount and Return Differential, Corrected NAV 2001-2003 
The sample consists of 100 observations as available from property investment companies which 
provided copies of their annual reports. The sample covers 2001-2003, the years contained 27,48 
and 25 companies respectively. The property specific data was extracted by hand. Discount-to-
NAVis calculated as (NAV - MVE)/NAV. Triple-NAVis calculated as [NAV - Debt fair value 
adjustment net of tax (marking debt to market value disclosed according to FRS 13) - Contingent 
capital gain tax (disclosed in the annual report)]. Discount-to-Triple NAV is calculated as (Triple-
NA V - MVE)/Triple-NA V. Rental yield is calculated by dividing rent income by the value of the 
property portfolio. Unrealised capital gains rate was estimated as the compounded annual capital 
appreciation on IPD for the period 2001-2003 as the accounts do not show consistently annual 
capital growth. Pre-tax ROCE is calculated as EBIT NCapital employed defined in two ways in 
the table. Return differential is calculated using NAVas (Property gross total return -
TROCEa)/TROCEa and using Triple-NAVas (Property gross total return - TROCEb)rrROCEb. 
All are before tax for consistency. Using arithmetic averages instead of weighted averages gives 
similar results. 
It appears that because of property investment knowledge about income 
and growth levels investors are limited in their ability to exaggerate say growth 
potential and reflect that in price appreciation to match return expectations like the 
general case of most stocks. Where instead, the opposite happens, where they are 
priced on ongoing concern at a discount to their liquidation value to yield the 
192 
required rate of return guided by investment knowledge. This evidence suggests 
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
As the obvious main reason for return differential is Operating Expenses, 
we show below the relation between the discount and operating expenses using 
scatter plots. We use logs as the discount and the expenses are not in comparable 
levels (the discount is a stock-based measure reflecting the present value of future 
expenses, while expenses are the flow-based annual charge). 
Datastream does not provide data on operating expenses (save for employee costs) 
or on contingent capital gains taxes or debt fair value adjustments for property 
stocks. Therefore, we use the 2001-2003 detailed sample to examine the relation 
between the discount-to-Triple NAV and operating expenses. We then test the 
robustness of that by examining the relation between the discount-to-NA V and 
Employee Costs for 1990-2002 (available from Datastream) given that employee 
costs are the major part of the administrative expenses for a property company. 
Based on 2001-2003 detailed sample, the ratios of staff costs to administrative 
expenses and to total operating expenses are 77 and 39 percent respectively. 
Figure 5-7, Figure 5-8, and Figure 5-9 confinn a clear direct positive relation 
between the discount and operating expenses consistent with the conclusion from 





j: ..~ 2.0 
! 




• . . .. -. .
... ., .. 
.4-•• • .~J. •• ¥: · \ .. 
• 
§ 0.0 ...----.----.---.--+--.----.,.------,,.------,-------.--
is J -2.0 
• 
-4.0 
-3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 
log(Admlnlstratlve Exp.n ••• ) 
Figure 5-7: The Discount-to-Triple NAV and Administrative Expenses 2001-2003 
Discount-to-Triple NAVis calculated as [Triple-NA V - MVE]. Triple-NAV is calculated as 
[NA V - Debt fair value adjustment net of tax (marking debt to market value disclosed according 
to FRS 13) - Contingent capital gain tax (disclosed in the annual report)]. Natural logs of £millions 
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Figure 5-8: The Discount-to-Triple NAV and Property Expenses 2001-2003 
5.0 
Discount-to-Triple NAVis calculated as [Triple-NAV - MVE]. Triple-NAVis calculated as 
[NA V - Debt fair value adjustment net of tax (marking debt to market value disclosed according 
to FRS 13) - Contingent capital gain tax (disclosed in the annual report)]. Natural logs of £millions 
were used for comparability. Correlation is 0.74. 
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Figure 5-9: The Relation between the Discount-to-NA V and Employee Costs 1990-2002 
Discount-to- NAVis calculated as [NAV - MYE]. Natunil logs of £thousands were used for 
comparability. Correlation is 0.62. Based on 2001-2003 detailed sample, the ratios of staff costs to 
administrative expenses and to total operating expenses are 77 and 39 percent respectively 
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5.4.2 Other Contributing Factors to the Discount 
Operating expenses, although a major factor, are not the only one that 
contributes to the discount. Other factors such as mismanagement risk (agency 
costs), leverage, and the materialisation risk of the unrealised capital gains will 
have an impact. 
This study does not test for agency costs due to data availability. Leverage 
has a direct negative relation with value, i.e., positive relation with the discount. 
That is, the higher the leverage the lower the value and the higher the discount. 
This is confirmed by the regression analysis in Section 5.4.3 later. In Chapter 3 
we saw a positive relation between value and leverage inline with standard 
finance theory in terms of taking leverage by companies to the extent tax shield 
benefits overweigh the additional financial risk associated with leverage. The 
interpretation for this opposite impact on property stocks is that property has a 
moderate income yield which makes leverage very risky where small changes in 
interest rates could yield to financial distress coming from short and medium term 
debt servicing obligations. Besides, finance costs are being incurred during the 
time period needed to develop or redevelop without income. 
As for the materialisation risk of property unrealised capital gams, 
property stocks liquidation value grows with the unrealised property capital gains. 
Therefore, investors, on ongoing concern, where companies continue holding the 
properties, might view these unrealised gains as more risky compared to dividends 
(the risk of property crash for example). This means that part of the discount 
could be attributable to this risk perception. To support this argument, Table 5-7 
below shows the significance of the cumulative unrealised capital gains as a 
percentage of the property portfolio value, NAV and Triple-NAV. 
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Percent 1990-2002 2001 2002 2003 
Pooled 
Cumulative revaluation reservelInvestment 30.04 28.02 37.08 37.18 
property value 
Cumulative revaluation reservelNA V 44.55 46.28 57.44 63.32 
(Cumulative revaluation reserve - 40.55 54.47 65.17 
CCGT)/Triple-NAV 
Observations 463 27 48 25 
Table 5-7. The Significance of Property Unrealised Capital Gains 
The ratios are calculated using the aggregate figures for all companies, i.e. a representative 
weighted average. 2001, 2002. and 2003 numbers are based on the detailed dataset. 1990-2002 
numbers are based on Datastream dataset. CCGT is contingent capital gains taxes if properties 
were sold at their valuation at balance sheet date. Triple-NAVis calculated as [NA V - Debt 
market value adjustment - CCGT]. 
This leads to the scenarios where these capital gains are considered realisable 
(M&A and liquidation) at or close to their Triple-NAV in known property market 
conditions over very short horizon (could be just days). Merger & Acquisition 
activities test Triple-NAV in limiting market value movements. In cases ofM&A, 
liquidation value is assumed as investors can either sell the company or break it 
up. From a basic arbitrage argument, if the break up value is greater than the 
value of the sale as a company, investors will choose the former. Therefore, the 
ongoing concern, where equities are valued as financial assets on ongoing concern 
returns, becomes irrelevant and liquidation valuation becomes more relevant to 
reflect the realisable liquidation returns, which is consistent with the second 
fundamental point about the economic value of equities [Smithers and Wright 
(2004)], that equities represent a title to the ownership of the real assets of their 
firms. 
One example of just a bid announcement for illustration, 06 June 2003 Canary 
Wharf Group was trading before lunchtime at 180p for a Triple-NA V of 288p per 
share (37.50 percent discount to Triple-NA V). After lunch it announced that it has 
received a takeover bid. Its share price jumped by 49.44 percent (to 269p) 
narrowing the discount-to-Triple NA V down to 6.60 percent. A report by Merrill 
Lynch (2002), presented in Table 5-8 below, shows how the significant discount 
gap for property stocks does narrow down to a much smaller discount or some 
times to a small premium following M&A completed deals. The report covers 
deals between 1999 and 2002. The same is documented for by Brauer (1984), and 
Brickley and Schallheim (1985) for closed-end fund termination cases. 
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Therefore, Triple-NAV can be viewed as a valuation boundary for property 
stocks, which are economically and commercially ascertainable given the reliable 
information about the break up value of property companies and their ongoing-
concern returns from the good quality information about their underlying assets 
demonstrating again that specific reliable knowledge drives the valuation and 
controls it even in the break up scenarios. This M&A evidence supports the 
knowledge-based rationality hypothesis. 
Target Date Equity Gross NNNAV Bid Discount- Comments 
Value Property Ishare Price to-NNNA V 
im im p p percent 
1999 
Evans May 164 294 123 125 -2 Private by the family 
Greycoat May 282 400 295 260 12 Mercury, auction after Delancey attempted bid 
Chesterfield July 139 382 491 453 8 Quintain after a management break-up attempt 
Hemingway July 119 269 41 40 3 Pricoa backing management 
Milner Oct 169 330 367 350 Delancey (Ritblat link); part paper 
2000 
Allied London Feb 135 280 142 125 12 JER with management 
Scottish Met Apr 153 247 132 117 II Rodamco UK~ Initially hostile. quickly agreed 
MEPC May 1924 3488 569 550 3 Leconport with mgtlHenneslGE 
Eskmuir Jul 144 306 247 230 7 Laing Family 
Raglan Jul 51 85 45 40 12 Management 
Dencora Aug 58 109 318 307 4 Knowle Hill 
Prestbury Liquidation 
Wates Nov 373 600 141 141 0 Pillar/CLOUT 
Frogmore Nov 293 440 627 612 2 ManagementfTrefickiRboS 
Burford Dec 498 950 127 121 5 Mgtllehmans 
2001 
BPT Mar 477 800 312 321 -3 Grainger/Pricoa after board put co in play 
Wamford Mar 190 226 517 495 4 Tender prior to delisting 
Regalian Mar 84 David Goldstone 'independent' 
Delancey Apr 255 400 123 117 5 SorosiRitblat 'committed' shareholders 
Asda Property Jul 228 478 308 300 3 Davidson/British Land 
2002 
Haslemere Mar 987 €1500 72.10 €63.7 11 Brack Capital 
Saville Gordon May 191 552 118 121 -3 Morgan Stanley Real Estate 
Green Property Jun €IOOO €2200 10.50 €9.80 7 MBO 
Grantchester Sep 173 235 250 Hammerson counterbid to MBO 
Table 5-8. Property Sector Bids 1999-2002, Merrill Lynch Report 2001 
Triple-NA V (NNNAV) = [NA V - (Debt fair value adjustment + CCGT)]. Discount-to-Triple 
NA V is calculated as [(MVE - Triple-NA V)ffriple-NA VX 100]. Negative discount means a 
premium. The numbers are rounded to the nearest penny or percentage point. 
The previous analysis shows that property stocks have two different bases 
for valuation: (a) on ongoing concern basis at a discount for the usual day-to-day 
stock trading (consistent with equities as financial assets), and (b) liquidation or 
break up basis at virtually/close to the liquidation realizable value for cases such 
as takeover or liquidation (consistent with equities as title to real assets). 
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5.4.3 Can the Discount Be Explained Rationally in Cross-
Sectional Analysis? 
This section presents a regression model for the market valuation of 
property investment stocks, of course, explaining at the same time the discount. 
The objective is to support the analysis in the previous section by explaining the 
discount rationally because the presence of rational explanations of the discount 
provides the evidence to support the conclusion of not rejecting the null 
hypothesis. 
The data are collected by hand for the years 2001-2003 as described in the data 
section because UK databases do not provide the special details required to carry 
out this detailed analysis for property stocks. We use a model structure similar to 
that used by Gentry, Kemsley and Mayer (2003). Many variants of this model 
were tested before arriving at the reported form, which is first, consistent Gentry, 
Kemsley and Mayer (2003) and second successfully explain the market valuation 
of property investment stocks in a simple linear formulation. Other variants did 
not contradict the reported model. However, the reported model was the most 
successful one. The model of Gentry, Kemsley and Mayer (2003) is similar in 
structure but different in specification due to their different objective (examining 
dividend taxes and share prices, obtaining evidence from REITs). The explanatory 
model is structured, consistent with the null hypothesis, as follows: 
Market Value of Equity = j(Constant, Net asset value, Debt fair value 
adjustment, Contingent capital gains tax liability, 
Capital Growth, Leverage, Property expenses, 
Administrative expenses) 
Equation 5-2: MVE[Company i] = Po + P1NA V; + P2FVADj + P3 CCGT; 
+ P"REVALj + P5BVDj + P~EX; + P7AEX; + ej 
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Note that the Discount-to-Triple NA V = MVE - (NA V + FV AD + CCGT), and 
the above model can be re-arranged as such. All variables are explained below in 
the estimation table. Variables are at their monetary values as in the above article. 
Table 5-9 presents the estimations. 
Dependent Variable 
Market-cap: MVE 
Method: Least Squares Finn Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Variable Code Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Constant C -1.27 0.8717 -2.94 0.7903 
Net asset value NAV 0.68 0.0000 1.97 0.0000 0.71 0.0000 
Debt fair value FVAD -0.96 0.0046 -2.01 0.0028 -1.28 0.0013 
adjustment 
Contingent capital CCGT -0.39 0.0059 -1.97 0.0001 -0.48 0.0032 
gain taxes 
Revaluation reserve REVAL 0.17 0.0002 -0.57 0.0152 0.18 0.0027 
(unrealised capital 
gains) 
Book value of debt BVD -0.18 0.0000 -0.37 0.0005 -0.18 0.0000 
Property expenses PEX 2.17 0.0311 10.84 0.0101 3.30 0.0148 
Admin expenses AEX 6.44 0.0000 4.09 0.3465 5.24 0.0049 
........................... _._ ......... - . ..... ........ _._ ..... _ ........ -.------.-.-...... ---•..... ~ •... __ .. _ ...... __ . __ ._ .. _--_. __ ... __ ... __ ..... _._._._.-- .... _ ....... _ .... __ .. _ .... _ .... ................................ -............ 
R-squared 0.9925 0.9986 0.9949 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9920 0.9965 0.9945 
p-value (F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 
Total observations 100 100 100 
Table 5-9. Explaining Market Valuation and the Discount 
The table reports the results from ordinary least squares, finn specific effects, and random effects 
regressions of the market value of equity on seven explanatory variables. The specifications use 
Pound Sterling values similar to the model of Gentry, Kemsley and Mayer (2003). The data were 
collected by hand for property investment companies over the period 2001-2003, as their annual 
reports were available. Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 100. NAV is net asset value from 
the balance sheet. FV AD is calculated as [(Fair value of debt - Book value of debt) x Tax rate]. 
CCGT is as calculated and disclosed by the companies. REVAL is the property revaluation reserve 
from the balance sheet (for unrealised capital gains, the realized parts are transferred to the P&L 
Reserve). BVD from the balance sheet. Property expenses are those related directly to the property 
portfolio. Coefficients withp-value below 0.01(0.05) are significant at 1(5) percent level. 
The constant in the least squares and the random effects is insignificant with good 
model explanatory power for all estimations. The high R-squared and adjusted R-
squared are similar to Gentry, Kemsley and Mayer (2003). Net asset value is 
positive and significant as expected and as in Gentry, Kemsley and Mayer (2003) 
on US REITs. Debt fair value adjustment (net of tax) resulting from marking debt 
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to market value is as expected negative and significant. The higher the increase in 
debt market value the lower the equity value and the higher the discount. 
Contingent capital gains taxes (CCGT) is, as expected, negative and significant. 
The higher the potential tax liability (if properties were sold at their estimated 
market value at the balance sheet date) the lower the value and the higher the 
discount. 
Revaluation reserve (cumulative unrealised capital gains) is positive and 
significant, except for the fixed effects estimation where it is negative and only 
significant at 5 percent level). Overall, the higher the accumulated capital growth 
the higher the market value and the lower the discount. 
Book value of debt (for leverage) is negative and significant. The higher the 
leverage the lower the market value and the higher the discount. Similar relation is 
established on US REITs by Gentry, Kemsley and Mayer (2003). Barkham and 
Ward (1999) find that leverage is not related to the discount of the UK property 
stocks. Barkham and Ward finding could be due to model misspecification as key 
discount variables were missing from their model (contingent capital gains taxes 
and debt market value adjustments). 
Property and Administrative expenses variables are positive, not as expected, but 
with mixed significance. Barkham and Ward (1999) find that operating expenses 
are not related to the discount of the UK property stocks. Although this appears 
confusing when compared with evidence in Section 5.4.1, the reason for our 
findings and those of Barkham and Ward (1999) could be technical. That is 
because all variables in the estimations are stock-based (market value and balance 
sheet values) expect expenses are the annual flow-based charges. This variable 
inconsistency could be distorting the relation. To verify this, we run the following 
regression using logs to test more comparable levels of the discount and the 
operating expenses. The estimation in Table 5-10 below confirms a direct positive 
relation with the discount (negative with equity value) as with the scatter plots in 
Section 5.4.1. 
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Equation 5-3: 10g(Discount-to-Triple NA V)i = Po + /h 10g(PEX)j+ P210g(AEX)j+ej 
Variable Code Coefficient p-value 
Dependent Variable: log(Discount-to-Triple NA V) 
Constant C 
log(Property expenses) log(PEX) 
















Table 5-10: Discount-to-Triple NAV on Operating Expenses Regression 
Total observations in the sample are 1 00, of which, 11 were excluded because of the use oflogs. 
Coefficients withp-value below 0.01(0.05) are significant at 1(5) percent level. 
In summary, the estimations of the above two models complement each 
other and confirm the finding of the previous sections that the discount has 
rational explanations. In particular, specific knowledge, on key variables such as 
operating expenses, debt market value movements, contingent tax liability, 
cumulative property unrealised capital growth, and leverage does explain the 
discount rationally. This evidence supports not rejecting the knowledge-based 
rationality hypothesis. 
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5.4.4 The Relative Stability of Property Stock Prices against 
Fundamental Value and the Overall Stock Market 
The above analysis suggests that the valuation of property investment 
stocks is rationalised by investment knowledge. If so, and in the light of Chapters 
3 and 4 results, one would expect, relatively, more stable stock price behaviour of 
property stocks compared with fundamental value and the overall stock market. 
Therefore, in this section we investigate whether the behaviour of property 
investment stock prices is relatively more stable or more rationalised to 
complement the conclusion of above analysis. We examine this through the 
following tests over the period 1990-2002: 
1. The behaviour of property stocks discount versus the premium of non-
financial stocks. 
2. Stock price behaviour relative to the economy: The relative behaviour of 
FTSE All Share Index and FTSE Real Estate Index versus the economy 
(GDP) and implied growth testing. 
3. Comparative earnings yield behaviour of property investment stocks and non-
financial stocks. 
4. Beta evolution for property stocks. 
Behaviour of Property Stocks Discount versus Non-Financial Stocks 
Premium 
NA V corrected to Triple-NA V represents very important measure for the 
fundamental value of property investment stocks. We established in Section 5.4.1 
a stable relation between NAV and Triple-NAV and showed that relying on NAY 
alone (because of the unavailability oflong-history data to correct to Triple-NAY) 
does not alter the conclusion fundamentaly. 
Figure 5-1 presented in page 171 of the Introduction, Section 5.1, shows how 
during the period 1990-2002 the overall non-financial sector of the market always 
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traded at a weighted average premium-to-NA V of 144.35 percent while property 
investment stocks traded almost always at a weighted average discount-to-NA V 
of 21.31 percent (Gentry, Jones, and Mayer (2003) conclude also that, as 
aggregate price-to-NAV appears to be stationary and mean-reverting). Barkham 
and Ward (1999), who also defined the discount on property stocks as (NAV -
MC)/NAV where MC is market-cap, report that the average property sector 
discount to NAV over the period 1977-1994 was 22.4 percent. The same (Figure 
5-1) shows a clear relative stability of the persistent property discount compared 
with the very unstable level of the non-financial stocks premium. This relative 
stability of the property stocks discount is consistent with the rational explanation 
for property stocks pricing and discount and with not rejecting the hypothesis of 
knowledge-based rationality. 
Stock Price Behaviour Relative to the Economy 
This section compares the behavioural patterns of the overall stock market 
and property stocks with the economy showing that FTSE Real Estate price index 
is more restrained in its fluctuations relative to the economy when compared to 
the overall stock market. The overall stock market diverges significantly from the 
economy leading to severe corrections to narrow down this divergence gap. 
Figure 5-10 below presents the comparison. Which is again consistent with not 
rejecting the knowledge-based rationality hypothesis. 
To confirm this further, Figure 5-10 is followed by a test for growth expectations 
as implied in market valuation for property stocks and non-financial stocks 
compared with economic growth. Where following the same procedure of 
estimating implied growth in market valuation for non-financial stocks in Chapter 
4 (Section 4.5.2), Figure 5-11 presents a comparison between growth implied in 
property stocks market valuation, growth implied in non-financial stocks market 
valuation and GOP growth. The comparison clearly shows how implied growth 
for property stocks is reasonably inline with economic growth (with similar period 
average) unlike the rest of the stock market (non-financial sectors). Obviously, the 
lower implied expected growth for property stocks relative to non-financial stocks 
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is consistent with why the fonner commonly trade at a discount-to-NA V while the 
latter commonly trade at a premium. So growth expectations for property stocks 
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Figure 5-10. The Stock Market and Property Stocks Levels v The Economy 
The upper chart plots the ratio of FTSE ALL and FTSE Real Estate (in price share index points) 
divided UK nominal GDP then all re-based to the 1990 ratio. If the indices and the economy grew 
at close rates, the relative lines would have been straight around 1.00 on the Y-axis. Nominal or 
inflation-corrected graphs will show the same pattern as the same correction multiple (say based 
on 1990 price level) will be applied to the numerator and the denominator. The lower chart 
presents the same as the upper one using the same data, where all data points are just re-based to 
1990 levels to simplify the comparison between FTSE All and FTSE Real Estate behaviour 
relative to the economy. 
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Figure 5-11. Implied Growth in Market Valuation - Comparison 
Implied growth for property stocks is calculated using the same procedure and formula derived in 
Section 4.5.2 Chapter 4. That formula is presented as Equation 4-16: [(MVE,xKE - EGSt}/(MVEt 
+ EGSt )]. Where MVE is market-cap, KE is the cost of equity. KE is estimated using CAPM: 10-
year yield to maturity on the government bond for the risk-free rate. expected return on the market 
as per the unbiased estimation in Table 4-10 in Section 4.5.3.1, Chapter 4. beta is estimated by 
regressing the monthly stock returns of 60 data points of the FTSE Real Estate Index against those 
of FTSE ALL. KE is also estimated on the FTSE Real Estate index using the same estimation 
procedure for the unbiased expected return referred to above in Chapter 4. Both KE estimations 
yield similar conclusions about implied growth rate. EGS is earnings and calculated as in Data 
Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 as [net income minus extraordinary items + deferred taxation]. All figures 
are nominal. Number of property stocks observations ranged between 38 and 84 (all property 
companies). Average implied growth over 1990-2002 for property stocks and non-financial stocks 
are 5.81 and 10.01 percent respectively compared with 5.60 percent average realised growth on 
GDP. 
Earnings Yield Behaviour of Property Stocks and Non-Financial Stocks 
Comparing property stocks earnings yield with those of the overall stock 
market discussed in Chapter 4 shows some important differences between 
property stocks and the rest of the stock market. Figure 5-12 below shows the 
relative stability of earnings yield levels for property stocks compared to the 
pronounced instability of the earnings yield of rest of the stock market suggesting 
that property stock prices are more stable. The most important reading of this is 
that the stock market perceptions about growth potential and risk of property 
stocks are stable and consistent over time keeping earnings yield stable as 
earnings yield is determined by growth expectations and risk as shown in Chapter 
4. Also, as shown later, beta of property stocks has changed to be very low after 
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the overall stock market soared from 1996 onwards then severely declined after 
1999. Hence, the stability of earnings yield is consistent with the levels of beta in 
different stock market phases. This stability is consistent with the knowledge-
backed rational pricing hypothesis. 
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Figure 5-12. Earnings Yield Comparison 
Earnings yield (EY) is a weighted average calculated as the sum of earnings for all companies 
every year divided by the corresponding sum of market value of equities. Weighted average 
earnings yield t 990-2002 across all companies for property stocks is 4.83 percent and for non-
financial stocks 3.94 percent. Non-financial data is taken from Chapter 4. The severe drop in non-
financial EY in 2002 is due to massive assets write offs against earnings (see Chapter 4 Section 
4.5. t 
Return on equity ROE is significantly lower for property stocks as shown 
in Figure 5-13, which is consistent with their lower valuation and the stability of 
their earnings yield, so, again, investment knowledge is clearly and effectively 
being capitalised for property stocks. The reason for the low property ROE is that 
property investment is, by nature, a relatively moderate-return with relatively 
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Figure 5-13. Return on Equity Comparison 
Return on equity (ROE) is a weighted average calculated as the sum of earnings for all companies 
every year divided by the corresponding sum of book equities. Weighted average ROE 1990-2002 
across all companies for property stock is 3.93 percent for non-financial stocks 9.62 percent. Non-
financial data is taken from Chapter 4. The severe drop in non-fmancial ROE in 2002 is due to 
massive assets write offs against earnings (see Chapter 4 Section 4.5.1 
Beta Evolution for Property Stocks 
The evolution of property stock beta has a story to tell about the 
comparative behaviour of property stocks relative to the overall stock market in 
support of not rejecting the null hypothesis, The analysis of the time-varying beta 
of property stocks against stock market levels shows how the nature of beta 
changed to become more defensive to accord with property investment 
characteristics rather than with the overall stock market fluctuations. Figure 5-14 
shows how beta for property stocks was close to unity (slightly aggressive) up to 
1997. From 1997 where stock market levels soared up to 1999 and then declined 
severely to pre-1996 level, property stock beta moved to the defensive nature and 
gradually became very defensive. This shows that property investment specific 
factors are at work where their impact is translated into property stock prices via 
the reliable investment knowledge about the underlying assets and operations 
creating some kind of valuation boundaries that control or rationalise property 
stock price levels. 
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Figure 5-14. Evolution of Property Stock Beta 
Beta for property stock is estimated using a standard technique of regressing the monthly 
logarithmic stock returns of the FTSE Real Estate Index against those of FTSE All Share Index 
using every year the previous 60 data points (the FSTE Real Estate series starts end of 1985). 
In summary, the above tests in this section confinn the stability of 
property stock prices relative to the economy and the overall stock market, which 
is consistent with not rejecting the null hypothesis of investment knowledge-based 
rationality for property stock pricing. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter, first, establishes the presence of a significant and enduring 
market discount to the underlying value for property investment stocks on 
ongoing concern even after correcting the accounting NAV to liquidation value 
(called Triple-NAV). We test the hypothesis that Property investment stocks 
discount is a reflection of investment knowledge-based rationality that limits 
valuation bias for these stocks Ho, against the alternative that investment 
knowledge about property investment stocks has no distinctive role in 
rationalising their prices or limiting their valuation bias HI. The null hypothesis is 
tested by examining and establishing knowledge-based rational explanations for 
property stocks market valuation and their discount. According to the evidence, 
we cannot reject Ho. Our evidence supports Barkham and Ward (1999) rational 
hypothesis but implicitly not that related to noise traders. The evidence is also 
broadly consistent with Gentry, Jones, and Mayer (2003) that it is unlikely that 
REIT premiums and discounts reflect the investor sentiment hypothesis of Lee, 
Shleifer, and Thaler (1991). However, behavioural factors would appear In 
property stock price volatility. Below is a discussion of the conclusion. 
This investment knowledge is derived from the knowledge about the 
underlying assets and operations (property investments) in terms of property 
investment characteristics such as income levels, income growth, capital growth, 
(including the limits of their potential), risk, and other firm specific factors such 
as contingent capital gain taxes and debt market value impact. The results of this 
study suggest that investment knowledge rationalises market valuations for these 
stocks inline with realisable total returns and investor return expectations. Hence, 
property stock price behaviour is rationalised by this knowledge, whether under 
the ongoing concern or the break up scenarios. Where, unlike the rest of the stocks 
market, property stocks are priced on ongoing concern at a discount to their 
liquidation value to yield the rate of return required by investors. 
We first establish that the total return on the underlying property 
investments matches, empirically, the required rate of return on property stocks. 
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We then examine the difference between the expected return on property 
stocks and the underlying return on actual capital employed in property 
companies. We find that the percentage return differential between the two 
explains market value discount to produce the total returns demanded by investors 
consistent with risk-free rate and other asset classes. Market capitalisation of 
property stocks adjusts down from NAV first to account for debt fair value 
movements and contingent capital gains tax liabilities to Triple-NA V and then 
further to produce the required rate of return by investors on ongoing concern. To 
support this evidence, we establish a significant direct positive relation between 
the discount-to-Triple NA V and operating expenses with a correlation coefficient 
of 0.74 to 0.75. This significant direct relation is also confirmed by regression 
results. 
In addition to operating expenses, the analysis looked at other 
contributing factors to the discount-to-Triple NA V addressing the 
materialisation risk of the unrealised capital gains and the financial risk of 
leverage. We show that unrealised capital gains are very significant in the 
underlying value. Hence, investor perceptions about the risk of realising property 
capital gains, on ongoing concern, could be one of the factors behind the discount 
fearing property price falling and even crashing. This is confirmed in closing the 
discount gap when liquidation is assumed where then there is a higher level of 
certainty about realisable gains. Leverage has a direct positive relation with the 
discount, the higher the leverage the higher the discount (the lower the value). 
This is confirmed by the regression analysis. In Chapter 3 we saw a positive 
relation between value and leverage for the non-financial sector inline with 
standard finance theory. The interpretation for this opposite impact of leverage on 
property stocks is that property has a moderate income yield which makes 
leverage riskier. Small changes in interest rates could yield to financial distress 
coming from debt servicing obligations. 
Consistent with the null hypothesis, our regression analysis supports the 
argument of knowledge-based rationality. We regress market valuation of 
property stocks on several rational explanatory variables including the elements 
that correct NA V to Triple-NAV. The results show high explanatory power and 
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insignificant constant term. They also show that the following variables explain 
market valuation of property stocks. These are net asset value (positive and 
significant), debt fair value adjustment (negative and significant), contingent 
capital gains tax (negative and significant), revaluation reserve (positive and 
significant, except for the fixed effects), and leverage (negative and significant). 
Finally, property and administrative expenses (in a separate regression for 
consistency in model specification) have a negative significant relation with 
market value (positive significant relation with the discount). 
Consistent with the null hypothesis of investment knowledge-based 
rationality for property stock pricing, one would expect, relatively, more stable 
stock price behaviour of property stocks compared with fundamental value, the 
economy, and the overall stock market. So, we test the relative stability of 
property stock prices. We examine: (a) the behaviour of property stocks discount 
versus the premium of non-financial stocks, (b) stock price behaviour relative to 
the economy and implied growth testing, (c) comparative earnings yield 
behaviour, and (d) the evolution for property stock beta. All of which confirm the 
stability of property stock prices relative to the economy, unlike the overall stock 
market, to accord with property-specific factors rather than with the direction of 
the overall stock market. 
Finally, although property stocks discount to liquidation value could 
appear to some as an indicator about market inefficiency. This research provides 
evidence for the contrary! That it is an indicator of market efficiency guided by 
investment knowledge about the underlying assets and operations. Hence, good 
quality investment knowledge could create some kind of economically and 
commercially ascertainable valuation boundaries that limit valuation bias. 
Meanwhile, for many sectors there are not similar boundaries that limit 
exaggerating corporate potential in stock pricing and trading leading to major 
deviations from fundamental value levels. 
One final (side) point, property stocks can be seen as less risky 
investments compared to general stocks given the downside protection of real 
estates with liquidation value exceeds market-cap. The investor is buying a stock 
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at a price below its downside protection. The discount-to-Triple NA V can be 
regarded as a safety net or buffer. Hence, the presence of this systematic discount 
would lead to some extra volatility. Consistent with this explanation, the 
annualised stock return volatility for FTSE All Share Index and FTSE Real Estate 
Index is 15.07 and 18.35 percent respectively over 1990-2002 and 16.94 and 
20.47 percent respectively over 1986-2002. 
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5.6 Appendix 
5.6.1 Quartile Statistics for Property Stocks Discount 
NAV. 























Table 5-11. Property Stocks Discount-to-NA V; Quartile Statistics 
Sample period is 1990-2002. 8 Observations were excluded because of their negative equities. 
Discount-to-NAV is calculated as (MVE - NAV)INAVxlOO using the corresponding aggregate 
sums ofMVE and NA V for each category. Negative discount means a premium. 
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5.6.3 Total Return Simulation for Property Stocks 
The simulation starts with a hypothetical property investment company 
with an investment property portfolio of £1,000 million at the end of year one. 
The P&L and balance sheet are projected under the assumptions shown in Table 
5-13. Table 5-14 and Table 5-15 present the projected P&L and Balance Sheet 
respectively. Table 5-16 shows market values and return information under two 
different discount scenarios. 
Items 
Rental yield 
Property capital growth 
Property total returns 
Percent 
Property expenses/Investment properties 
Admin expenses/Investment properties 
Interest rate 
Debt Investment properties (start/calc) 
Debt fair value adj net of tax/Book debt 
Marginal and capital gain tax rate 
Effective income tax rate 
Dividends payout ratio 
Year I Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year' Year 9 Year 10 
7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 
3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
50.0 47.1 44.3 41.6 38.9 36.2 33.6 31.0 28.5 26.0 
5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 
30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 
25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 






Current assets/Investment properties 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Current liabilities/Investment properties 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Table 5-13. Property Stock Return Simulation - Projection Assumptions 

















Contingent capital gain tax (CCGT) 
Debt fair value adjustment (net of tax) 
Year I Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year' Year 9 Year 10 
75.0 77.6 80.3 83.2 86.1 
-8.0 -8.3 -8.6 -8.9 -9.2 
-8.0 -8.3 -8.6 -8.9 -9.2 
59.0 61.1 63.2 65.4 67.7 
-25.0 -24.4 -23.8 -23.1 -22.3 
34.0 36.7 39.5 42.4 45.4 
-8.5 -9.2 -9.9 -10.6 -11.3 
25.5 27.5 29.6 31.8 34.0 
89.1 92.2 95.4 98.8 
-9.5 -9.8 -10.2 -10.5 
-9.5 -9.8 -10.2 -10.5 
70.1 72.5 75.1 77.7 
-21.5 -20.7 -19.7 -18.8 
48.6 51.9 55.3 58.9 
-12.1 -13.0 -13.8 -14.7 









463.5 5\0.0 557.4 606.9 658.7 712.8 769.4 828.5 890.2 954.6 
25.5 27.5 29.6 31.8 34.0 36.4 38.9 4 t.S 44.2 47.0 
-14.0 -15.1 -16.3 -17.5 -18.7 -20.0 -21.4 -22.8 -24.3 -25.9 
35.0 35.0 3b.2 37.5 38.8 40.2 41.6 43.0 44.5 46.1 




70.0 106.2 143.7 
21.0 31.9 43.1 
26.8 26.1 25.4 
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182.5 222.7 264.3 307.3 351.8 397.9 
54.8 66.8 79.3 92.2 105.5 119.4 
24.5 23.7 22.7 21.7 20.6 19.5 




Total fixed assets 
Current assets 
Less: Current Liabilities 
£ Million 
Total assets less current liabilities 
Debt 
Equity (NA V) 
Total debt and equity 
Check: (D + E) - A 
Year I Year 2 Yeu 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year II Year 9 Year 10 
1.000.0 1.035.0 1.071.2 1.108.7 1.147.5 1.187.7 1.229.3 1.272.3 1.316.8 1.362.9 
10.0 10.4 10.7 1\.1 11.5 11.9 12.3 12.7 13.2 13.6 





















1.010.0 1.045.4 1.081.9 1.119.8 1.159.0 1.199.6 1.241.5 1.285.0 1.330.0 1.376.5 
500.0 488.0 475.0 461.1 446.2 430.2 413.1 394.8 375.4 354.7 
510.0 557.4 606.9 658.7 712.8 769.4 828.5 890.2 954.6 1.021.8 
1.010.0 1.045.4 1.081.9 1.119.8 1.159.0 1.199.6 1.241.5 \.285.0 1.330.0 1.376.5 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Table 5-15. Property Stock Return Simulation - Projected Balance Sheet 
The debt was the item used to balance the balance sheet as equity replaced debt over time. 
Optimisation procedure was used to solve for the circular reference between the P&L and Balance 
Sheet (interest expense-retained earnings-equity and debt). 
OUTCOME RATIOS 
Percent 
Property average total returns 
At 22 percent dlscount-to-trlple NAV: 
Market-cap (£m) 
Stock price appreciation 
Dividend yield 
Total stock returns 
Average total stock return 0 - t 
Discount-to-NAV 
At 0 percent dlscount-to-trlple NAV: 
Market-cap (£m) 
Stock price appreciation 
Dividend yield 
Total stock returns 
Average total stock return 0 - t 
Year I Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year II Year 9 Year 10 
11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 




7.73 7.53 7.34 7.16 7.00 6.85 6.72 
3.80 3.80 3.79 3.78 3.78 3.77 3.76 
6.59 
3.75 
11.76 11.53 11.32 1\.13 10.95 10.78 10.62 10.48 10,34 
11.7611.64 11.54 11.43 11,3411.2411.1511.0710.99 
27.81 28.69 29.45 30.11 30.68 31.17 31.60 31.98 32.31 32.60 
472.0 509.5 548.9 590.2 633.5 678.9 726.5 776.3 828.4 882.9 
7.95 7.73 7.53 7.34 7.16 7.00 6.85 6.72 6.59 
2.97 2.97 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.95 2.95 2.94 2.93 2.93 
10.92 10.69 10.49 10.29 10.11 9.95 9.79 9.65 9.51 
10.92 10.81 10.70 10.60 10.50 10.41 10.32 10.24 10.16 
---Property average total retums 
- - - Average TRS over year 0 to t (at 22% discount) 










. . . 
---
.. .. .. .. 
.. .. -. 





.. .. .. 
.... -... 
.. .. .. -. 
.. .. .. .. - .. 
.. .. .. .. 
10.0+---~----~----~--~----~----~--~----~--~ 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Year 
Table 5-16. Property Stock Return Simulation - Valuation & Return Outcome 
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6 Chapter Six: Conclusion 
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6 Chapter Six: Conclusion 
Given that stock valuation and pricing deal with expected future outcomes, 
research in this area proves difficult to reach clearly conclusive results in the 
absence of any known fair value levels to benchmark against, leave alone model 
limitations. Therefore, in this research we try to understand, to gather evidence, 
and to make reasonable conclusions to contribute to the debate. 
In this work we tackle valuation bias in the stock market. We first looked 
for forms of bias by dividing stocks population into survivors and new stocks and 
examine market behaviour in treating both groups (relative valuation bias). Which 
then led us to move from examining relative bias (new versus survivors) into 
exploring overall valuation bias tendency at stock market aggregate level. The 
research in valuation bias both relative and overall opened another research lead 
taking the work into another dimension. This being whether the availability of 
reliable investment knowledge about some stocks and their underlying operations 
in terms of income, growth potential, and risk could control valuation bias. We 
select property investment stocks, exploiting their investment characteristics, to 
examine the role of the good quality investment knowledge in rationalising their 
stock prices and even leading them to trade them persistently at a discount to 
liquidation value unlike the rest of the stock market (not to include closed-end 
funds). Below is a summary conclusion of the above-mentioned three studies in 
tum. More detailed conclusions are presented in each individual chapter. 
The first study (Chapter 3) documents persistent differences in valuations 
between UK new and older stocks where new stocks have relatively higher 
valuations that decline with age confirming for UK stocks the same pattern of 
declining market-to-book with age documented by Pastor and Veronesi (2003) in 
the US. We examine the hypothesis that these differences are explained by 
differences in fundamentals (Ho) against an alternative valuation bias hypothesis 
that the stock market is biased in valuing new stocks relative to survivor stocks 
(HI)' Another competing hypothesis of rational behaviour based on pricing the 
long-term potential and status for new stocks is tested too. In the course of this 
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research, explanations are sought in the fundamental value detenninants over the 
period 1989-2002 using the data of all UK traded non-financial stocks. The 
fundamentals examined in the course of testing the hypotheses are profitability 
and growth, that detennine cash flows, and risk levels to value these expected 
cash flows besides age and size. The research evidence leads to rejecting Ho in 
favour of HI that the stock market is biased in valuing new stocks relative to 
mature stocks. Such bias manifested as valuation differences, believed to be 
driven by investor expectations that are inconsistent with the differences in the 
underlying fundamental corporate and economic characteristics. We also reject 
the competing hypothesis after examining growth in market value of equity versus 
growth in equity book value, retained earnings and growth and simulating market 
and fundamental valuations. We believe that this competing hypothesis cannot be 
rejected only if risk is correctly priced where the analysis suggests that it is not the 
case as the long-term future potential is priced at future risk levels when the firm 
is more stable and has survived the test of time. 
In testing the hypotheses, we built a value explanatory model with the main 
fundamental value drivers (with and without the age factor) for variable joint 
testing to explain and predict valuation differences. The results suggest that the 
model is reasonably successful in predicting valuation differences between new 
and survivor stocks and explaining the phenomena by age factor (age 
discrimination) and perhaps risk underestimation for new stocks. The pattern of 
historic MBE declining with age is matched closely by the model-generated 
values. Failing to find a known economic explanation for the role of age, we argue 
that our results suggest that the presence of such valuation discrepancies between 
stocks of different age groups result from valuation bias. 
The evidence from testing the differences in individual fundamentals shows that: 
a) profitability is statistically lower for new stocks than for older stocks providing 
contrary evidence in explaining valuation differences, b) insufficient and 
inconsistent evidence that new stocks have statistically significant higher realised 
earnings growth, however, we cannot ignore that growth expectations are most 
likely to be part of the explanation, but unlikely to reasonably account for the 
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majority of the gap, c) comparative analysis of systematic risk, stock returns 
volatility, and age and the death of public limited companies provide no evidence 
that is consistent with higher valuation; that new stocks could be less risky than 
survivors while the contrary is a more valid argument. To sum up, lower 
profitability levels are inconsistent with the higher market valuation levels for 
new stocks relative to survivor stocks, with no consistent or concrete evidence of 
higher earnings growth, and no evidence oflower risk. 
But, new stocks become survivor stocks; this could be the reason! Hence, comes 
the explanation in the competing rational valuation hypothesis, referred to earlier, 
and in the unstable behaviour of the valuation gap. A significant finding with 
respect to the pattern of the valuation gap itself between new and survivor stocks, 
where the gap size overall increases in bullish market and decreases in bearish 
market. This instability of the valuation gap is consistent with the valuation bias 
inference, as with an economically justified valuation differences one would 
expect some kind of stability in the behaviour of the valuation gap. This could be 
driven by investor overoptimism about corporate profitability and growth 
potential for new stocks relative to survivor stocks in bullish markets where 
investor overoptimism drives prices too high. We also find that our evidence is 
consistent with the evidence from IPOs long-tern underperformance in the 
literature. 
The above conclusion does not imply at all that survivor stocks are fairly valued 
as it is a relative comparison where investors expectations appear to be exuberant 
for new stocks relative to older stocks which also implies that could be because 
the market knows more about survivor stocks investors irrationality is limited to 
some extent by this knowledge. From which, we follow two research leads; the 
overall stock market levels in the UK and the role of investment knowledge in 
stock price rationalisation. 
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The second study (Chapter 4) starts where the first one finished off as that 
did not shed any light on whether older stocks or the stock market overall has a 
tendency to be biased. We first document the occurrence of major divergences 
between soaring stock prices and economic growth and book equity followed by 
corrections in the form of stock price falls where the severity of the correction 
appears to depend on the size of the divergence. Hence, we examine the 
hypothesis that stock market levels in the UK during the period 1989-2002 can be 
explained by fundamentals such as reasonable expected profitability, expected 
growth and risk levels (Ho), along with another variation of this hypothesis that 
stock prices on average over time are correctly valued against fundamentals with 
temporary mispricing periods (Hoa), against the alternative hypothesis that stock 
market levels in the UK were overvalued (biased upwards) on average relative to 
fundamentals during the period 1989-2002 (HI)' In testing the hypothesis, we use 
the data of all UK traded non-financial stocks with other market and economic 
data to analyse earnings yield levels, changes in corporate profitability pattern and 
the sensitivity of stock prices to profitability, expected growth, and the impact of 
risk aversion on stock valuations. On the balance, we believe the evidence is 
weighted towards rejecting Ho and Hoa in favour of HI. 
For hypothesis testing, we develop a theoretical earnings yield model validated 
and supported by an empirical valuation model. The model is used to examine 
stock market levels concentrating on income yield, growth and return expectation 
benchmarking against risk-free assets and economic growth. We document that 
the spread between earning yield and the risk-free rate is almost stable (EY is 
below RF by circa 2 percent on average). To explain this negative spread, we 
explore plausible scenarios for earnings yield; earnings yield predictions, 
corporate profitability, growth expectations, return expectations and risk aversion. 
The earnings yield model was successful in predicting, in-sample, the severe fall 
in stock prices after the 1999 peak during 2000-2002 to a very good extent and the 
part recovery to end of 2003 level. Earnings yield using the theoretical and 
empirical models under rationalised plausible scenarios for profitability, growth 
and cost of capital, on balance, indicate that the level of earnings yield is low 
implying overpricing. No changes in corporate profitability patterns over the 
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whole period would justify the major changes in stock price levels. We establish 
the gap between implied growth and economic growth against stock market levels 
documenting a cyclical behaviour in terms of growth expectations, where the gap 
size increases with rising stock prices then closes down with major corrections of 
subsequent falling stock prices. Market expected growth rates were estimated by 
growth rates implied in market valuation, which have almost always been higher 
than both economic growth and realised earnings growth suggesting that investors 
might have been overestimating growth potential and have paid too much for 
stocks. Market return expectations were studied through developing an unbiased 
estimation for expected returns on the stock market, where its correlation with the 
risk-free rate confirms its robustness. We estimate the implied discount rate in 
market valuation where we find that the average equity risk premium 
underestimates risk when compared with the evidence from the literature and 
market expected return. The significant difference between the implied discount 
rates and the unbiased expected returns indicates an important paradox in investor 
behaviour, where stock prices might have been driven by investor high return 
expectations and not by economic and corporate fundamentals where these high 
return expectations did not translate into higher discount rates. It could be a 
vicious circle where high required rates of return drive stock prices up where such 
value levels imply lower discount rates until the economy is gloomy the gap is too 
apparent between fundamentals and market levels, then severe corrections are 
inevitable. 
On the balance of the evidence, we are at least able to join Shiller in his view 
(2001), on the US stock market, that its ups and downs over the last century have 
made virtually no sense ex post, and the views of others such as Cole, Helwege, 
and Laster (1996), Campbell and Shiller (1998), Heaton and Lucas (1999), Kiley 
(2000), and Smithers and Wright (2004), as we believe that these US-based views 
are applicable to the UK at least over the recent history 1989-2002. And we are, 
of course, able to join those who worked on the UK stock market such as Brooks 
and Katsaris (2003, 2003b) in their conclusion, who used speculative bubble 
theory, and concluded that UK stocks were overvalued in the late 1990s as they 
deviated too far from their fundamental values. 
222 
The third and final study in this thesis (Chapter 5) starts from one of the 
implications of the first study, namely that investors might have been more able to 
exaggerate the potential of new stocks relative to survivor stocks as the market 
knows more about older stocks. Hence, in the context of 'valuation bias in the 
stock market' we seek evidence for the role of 'investment knowledge' in 'stock 
price rationalisation' from property investment stocks exploiting their special 
investment characteristic where such knowledge is available and reliable. This 
study, first, establishes the presence of a significant and enduring market discount 
to the underlying value for property investment stocks on ongoing concern even 
after correcting the accounting NAV to liquidation value (called Triple-NAV). We 
test the hypothesis that Property investment stocks discount is a reflection of 
investment knowledge-based rationality that limits valuation bias for these stocks 
Ho. The null hypothesis is tested by examining and establishing knowledge-based 
rational explanations for property stocks market valuation and discount. 
According to the evidence, we cannot reject Ho and below is a discussion of this 
conclusion. 
We first establish that the total return on the underlying property investments 
matches, empirically, the required rate of return on property stocks. We then 
examine the difference between the expected return on property stocks and the 
underlying return on actual capital employed in property companies. We find that 
the percentage return differential between the two explains market value discount. 
Market capitalisation of property stocks adjusts down from NA V first to account 
for debt fair value movements and contingent capital gains tax liabilities to Triple-
NAV and then further to produce the required rate of return by investors on 
ongoing concern. To support this evidence, we establish a strong direct relation 
between the discount-to-Triple NA V and operating expenses. 
In addition to operating expenses, the analysis shows that unrealised capital gains 
are very significant in the underlying value. Hence, investor perception about the 
risk of realising property capital gains, on ongoing concern, could be one of the 
factors behind the discount fearing property price falling and even crashing. This 
is confirmed in closing the discount gap when liquidation is assumed where then 
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there is a higher level of certainty about realisable gains. Leverage has a direct 
positive relation with the discount, the higher the leverage the higher the discount 
(the lower the value). In Chapter 3 we saw a positive relation between value and 
leverage for the non-financial sector inline with standard finance theory. The 
interpretation for this opposite impact of leverage on property stocks is that 
property has a moderate income yield which makes leverage very risky. Small 
changes in interest rates could yield to financial distress coming from debt 
servicing obligations. 
Consistent with the null hypothesis, our regression analysis supports the argument 
of knowledge-based rationality. We regress market valuation of property stocks 
on several rational explanatory variables including the elements that correct NA V 
to Triple-NA V. The results show high explanatory power and insignificant 
constant term. They also show that following variables explain market valuation 
of property stocks. These are net asset value (positive and significant), debt fair 
value adjustment (negative and significant), contingent capital gains taxes 
(negative and significant), revaluation reserve (positive and significant, except for 
the fixed effects), and leverage (negative and significant). Finally, property and 
administrative expenses (in a separate regression for consistency in model 
specification) have a negative significant relation with market value (positive 
significant relation with the discount). 
Consistent with the null hypothesis of investment knowledge-based rationality for 
property stock pricing, one would expect, relatively, more stable stock price 
behaviour of property stocks compared with fundamental value and the overall 
stock market. So, we test the relative stability of property stock prices against 
fundamental value and the overall stock market. We examine: (a) the behaviour of 
property stocks discount versus the premium of non-financial stocks, (b) stock 
price behaviour relative to the economy and implied growth testing, (c) 
comparative earnings yield behaviour, and (d) the evolution for property stock 
beta. All of which confirm the stability of property stock prices relative to the 
economy, unlike the overall stock market, to accord with property-specific factors 
rather than with the direction of the overall stock market. 
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We finally conclude by drawing attention to some prospects for further 
research following on from this work: 
(a) While our work suggests the presence of behavioural bias in stock market 
valuations rejecting fundamental explanations; it does not suggest any 
particular behavioural reasons for this bias. Hence, further research is needed 
to see what type of behavioural explanations best fit with these empirical 
findings linking the work to the existing literature on psychological and 
behavioural theories and explanations. 
(b) The research on valuation bias and age showed that profitability, efficiency, 
growth, and risk differences indicate that mature stocks should be valued 
relatively higher than younger stocks. An expansion for this research would be 
to attempt to quantify the impact of each individual fundamental variable on 
valuation differences. For example, examining the difference in profitability 
between the two stock groups and quantifying the respective impact on 
valuation difference that fundamental profitability difference should translate 
into. 
( c) A side expansion of the first study was the brief introduction and testing of a 
competing hypothesis (the market is rational in valUing new stocks higher 
than survivor stocks because of pricing the foture long-term potential and 
status of new stocks). According to which, in the early period of the stock 
trading a new stock is priced according to its future stable status, and up to 
that time the stock price appreciates at a lower rate relative to book equity 
growth or does not appreciate at all on average across all young stocks leading 
the growth in book equity to match, in say 10 to 14 years, the early market-
assigned price level. The stage, after which, stock returns are positive 
matching or exceeding book equity growth as future growth opportunities are 
to be capitalised too. This competing hypothesis can be developed to a stand-
alone paper by improving the existing tests and developing other tests and 
concentrating on how risk is being priced. 
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(d) The research in the first study concentrated on all sectors combined. An 
expansion of this work would be to address the impact of sector biases, as they 
could be important because the typical survivorship rates will vary a lot 
between sectors. Some sectors could be of a particular interest such as the 
high-tech sector from mid to late 1990s. Also, one can look at using a rolling 
window in defining survival to examine the impact of that on the results. 
(e) Searching for other forms of valuation bias between different stock categories 
(other than between age groups). For example, examining the market 
comparative behaviour in valuing different sectors studying market value 
indicators and fundamentals to gain insight into the cause of any differences 
and similarities in market behaviour and the relation with sector and 
fundamental differences. This could help to understand and adjust for sector 
specific factors and understand the rationality or irrationality of some 
valuation differences. 
(f) The theoretical earnings yield model derived in the second study was 
validated by an empirical regression where the signs and significance of all its 
variables were confirmed inline with its formulation. The model was also 
successful predicting the fall after the 1999 peak and the recovery after the 
2002 bottom. An expansion of this work will be developing this earnings yield 
model for out-of-sample prediction purposes at market level applying to all 
years and developing the determination process for its plausible inputs to 
reduce subjectivity. Most importantly, the prediction should be based on the 
underlying corporate and economic fundamentals. 
(g) The evidence in the literature confirms that corporate profitability is mean 
reverting. Thus, it is worth exploring the use of normalised earnings yield at 
company level to detect mispricing to use in forming long portfolios (of 
undervalued stocks) and short portfolios (of overvalued stocks) studying the 
performance over different holding horizons. Perhaps, the process of 
normalising earnings yield would require thorough investigation rather than 
just simple mean-reversion basis, as at corporate level earnings volatility is 
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significant. In this context, the investment holding horizon would be important 
for the profitability of the strategy. 
(h) The concept of unbiased market return expectation was introduced in the 
second study. It was called 'unbiased' because it is (1) unconditioned on 
historic inflation, (2) unconditioned on survivorship, (3) based on information 
available to investors at the point of estimation, (4) not based on a disputed 
model or theory. The estimation showed robustness in terms of its relation 
with interest rates and implied discount rates and produced return expectations 
for the current market era consistent with what is expected in today's markets 
and going forward. This notion of unbiased return expectation is worth 
developing with its estimation procedure and testing further in the light of the 
evidence on equity premium puzzle with the objective of developing a robust 
procedure of estimating expected returns on the market given the importance 
of this estimation (e.g. for pension plans). For example, the correction for 
survivorship bias and expected inflation can be addressed in more depth. 
(i) Property investment stocks discount was explained by knowledge-based 
rationality where this knowledge, for example about ongoing concern returns 
and break-up values, limits investor irrationality from exaggerating the 
potential of these stocks. It is worth investigating whether some valuation 
boundaries do exist, could exist, or should exist for different sectors. The 
regulated utilities sector would be a good start given the reasonable 
knowledge about consumer demand and it growth, and the constraints of the 
regulations while addressing the variable elements on their inputs (e.g., energy 
prices). 
(j) Studying the possibility of formulating profitable trading and investment 
strategies from identifying valuation biases whether relative or overall relying 
on fundamental characteristics to formulate fundamental strategies or 
fundamental portfolios where the concentration is on the long-term underlying 
corporate fundamentals rather than just on inferring market expectations 
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